Understanding the Routes In and Out of Political Violence: An Assessment of the Linkages Between Identity Politics, Exclusion, Inequality and Political Violence in EMAD Countries

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study is concerned with analysing the routes in and out of political violence in selected countries – Bolivia and Peru, Tajikistan and Yemen - within Latin America, the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EMAD) regions. The study explores the following key issues:

- the importance of multiple and hybrid identities as the basis of claims, forms of empowerment and supporting citizenship;
- the extent to which tendencies to violence around these claims are rooted in processes of exclusion and identity with deepening economic, social and political inequalities;
- pathways to dialogue and the political space within which both political violence and ways forward emerge; and
- the links between social cohesion, identity politics and pathways out of political violence.

The study cautions against the tendency to identify particular identity groups with extremist or terrorist violence.

The findings of the study are:

1. All individuals bear multiple and shifting identities through which they give meaning to their own lives and differentiate themselves from others.
2. Identity politics can be a discourse of power used by dominant groups, as well as by marginalised groups challenging their exclusion.
3. Identity politics are not necessarily violent, and can also provide pathways to dialogue and peaceful solutions.
4. Identity politics can be used to articulate other forms of exclusion and discontent, including both vertical and horizontal inequalities.
5. Charismatic leaders often play a crucial role in manipulating identities and inciting violence.
6. Masculine identities are often framed in terms that facilitate male use of violence global arenas and spaces of power.
7. In general, violence is more likely to occur (a) when its benefits rise, relative to other forms of collective action and (b) when the costs of violence are reduced. In reality, however, the balance of costs and benefits shifts over time and from one national context to another.
8. Though the case studies discuss links between identity politics, exclusion, inequality, and political violence, including how some of the more politicised/visible of these have arisen and are sustained, they also reinforce the key themes outlined in the framework: identity politics can have varying outcomes; the politics of inclusion and exclusion plays out in different ways in different contexts; identity politics can be exercised in ways that provide pathways to dialogue and peaceful solutions and that also culminate in violence. Therefore, assumptions of linear patterns of relationships may be misguided and there are no simple formulae that can be applied across the board. Each case has to be analysed and dealt with on its own merits.
Operational implications:

Three sets of operational implications emerge - those that indicate the importance of better contextual understanding of the sources, dynamics and developmental implications of identity-based violence, those that add further support for policies and programmes, which should be undertaken on their own merits to increase the wellbeing of the most disadvantaged, and policies and programmes needed to directly address the factors sustaining identity-based violence in each specific context. Policy approaches which may be used to discourage identity-based violence include:

1. Improved public security, policing and justice systems, fully accessible to excluded groups.
2. Working with media and advocacy groups to combat prejudice and create public support for non-violent ways of resolving inter-group conflicts.
3. Anti-corruption measures, to prevent the spread of crime and weaken the incentive systems, which encourage violence.
4. Support for inclusive human rights programmes targeting all social groups, whilst remaining sensitive to national and local cultural differences.
5. Measures specifically addressing gender-related violence.
6. Inclusive recruitment of security, police and justice institutions, so that they are not seen as the privileged domain of particular identity groups.
7. Active discouragement of the tendency to manipulate identities to establish political control or demonise ‘disloyal’ and marginalised groups.

However, none of these approaches are sufficient by themselves, and will work best if supported by wider measures to reduce poverty, inequality and the varied forms of exclusions in each particular regional and national context.
INTRODUCTION

This DFID commissioned study adds to a growing body of work on the links between identity politics, exclusion, inequality, and political violence. It builds on a series of studies on fragile states, security and development and on Ladbury’s 2005 report: ‘A framework for understanding global identity and drivers of insecurity: responding to extremism and radicalisation in poor countries’.

This study is concerned with analysing the routes in and out of political violence in selected countries within Latin America, the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EMAD) regions. These regions are noted for their deep and, in many cases, increasing inequalities, which are related to and compounded by various forms of exclusion - political, economic, geographic and social. The study uses case studies to explore the following key issues:

- the importance of multiple and hybrid identities as the basis of claims, forms of empowerment and supporting citizenship;
- the extent to which tendencies to violence around these claims are rooted in processes of exclusion and identity with deepening economic, social and political inequalities;
- pathways to dialogue and the political space within which both political violence and ways forward emerge; and
- the links between social cohesion, identity politics and pathways out of political violence.

Section 1 of the paper outlines the analytical framework; Section 2 synthesises the findings from the case studies, incorporating feedback from the policy seminar, which was convened at DFID on August 30, 2006. Section 3 highlights general policy implications and suggests some key operational questions for each country context. The case studies are presented in Annexes 1-3.

The Terms of Reference for this study (see Annex 4) asked for a broad analysis that would ‘feed into the DFID discussions around White Paper III; strengthen EMAD operational work around social exclusion, political violence and the challenges of creating effective states and contribute to EMAD’s Communication Strategy. The report should also add to Whitehall contributions to the security and social cohesion agendas; add evidence to design and support the development of good practice; provide a better understanding of the drivers towards and away from violence and of what enables and facilitates dialogue across competing claims. Further, the report should ‘aim to examine notions of social cohesion in the context of diversity and identity politics and to support the development of policy approaches that can address the causes and drivers of political violence’.

Consistent with the TOR, the case studies are desk reports written by experts on the history and politics of the regions: Sarah Phillips on Yemen, Colette Harris on Tajikistan and John Crabtree on Bolivia and Peru. One major limitation of this approach is that while the report points to pertinent operational questions; it does not and cannot suggest how DFID country offices might go about tackling the issues. Context-specific policy recommendations require a different methodology, including country visits, wide-ranging interviews with relevant parties and dialogue with officers on the ground. Recent discussions indicate that country officers desire specific operational proposals. To provide these would need a further study.
SECTION 1 - THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This section of the report outlines a framework for analysing the links between identity politics, exclusion, inequality, and political violence. It addresses the following themes:

1. The importance of multiple and hybrid identities as the basis of claims, forms of empowerment and supporting citizenship;
2. The extent to which tendencies to violence around these claims are rooted in processes of exclusion and identity with deepening economic, social and political inequalities;
3. Conditions fostering political violence; and the
4. Links between political violence and extremism, including terrorism.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF MULTIPLE AND HYBRID IDENTITIES AS THE BASIS OF CLAIMS, FORMS OF EMPOWERMENT AND SUPPORTING CITIZENSHIP

All individuals bear multiple and shifting identities through which they give meaning to their own lives and differentiate themselves from others. Such differentiations become politically significant to the extent that they:

- define ‘imagined communities’, (Anderson 1993) linking individuals and groups at levels wider than face-to-face interaction in local communities;
- are woven into symbols, narratives or ideologies, which construct shared histories, moral understandings and goals; and
- form a basis for collective action in pursuit of political goals.

Ethnic, religious and other identities do not necessarily result in social exclusion or generate political violence; nor are there set patterns that determine which are the most salient layers of identity (nationality, religion, sect, ethnicity or clan etc) for conflict-formation in any particular political arena or historical context. Indeed, political mobilisation of identities may contribute to democratic politics. Thus, ethnicity, religion, sect, clan, race, class, sub-national region and nationality are among the important markers of identity that people use as their basis for claims to citizenship and empowerment.

II. THE EXTENT TO WHICH TENDENCIES TO VIOLENCE AROUND THESE CLAIMS ARE ROOTED IN PROCESSES OF EXCLUSION AND IDENTITY WITH DEEPENING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INEQUALITIES

Analysis of identity-based violence has tended to presuppose a somewhat linear causal model (Ladbury 2005). To summarise the latter, political violence stems from grievances arising from social exclusion; plus political blockages, preventing their resolution through the political process; plus ideologies or beliefs which then legitimise collective action, including use of violence.

Whilst this is a useful starting point, it does not do justice to the dynamics of identity politics, nor to their complex relationships with political violence. Identity politics can be exercised in ways that do not culminate in violence. Rather, they may provide pathways to dialogue and peaceful solutions. Therefore, rather than adhere to a linear pattern of relationships, analyses of the routes in and out of violence must consider the following elements:

1. Identity politics can be a discourse of power, as well as of exclusion and grievance – a weapon of the powerful as well as of the weak. Elites may construct their own power base
around core loyalist ethnic or other constituencies. They may manipulate identity divisions to mobilise popular support. And they may weave such identities into national security ideologies, institutions and practices (Enloe 1980).

2. It remains true that markers of identity provide a grammar by which to articulate other forms of exclusion and discontent, including both vertical and horizontal inequalities: class and caste antagonisms; racism; the grievances of the poor and under-employed; uneven regional development; the marginalisation of minorities; or the exclusions faced by immigrant groups. Links between the different forms of inequality and exclusion cannot be assumed and require detailed analysis in particular countries and communities. Moreover, different identities and forms of exclusion can conflict with as well as reinforce each other - and dissipate and undermine as well as mobilise collective action.

3. Policies and institutions play a crucial role: on the one hand in reinforcing exclusions, on the other hand in modifying or reducing them. Citizenship laws, language policies, education policies and land legislation, have all been used to reinforce the privileges of particular groups, often the majority, as in the case of Sinhalisation policies in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, human rights laws, affirmative action programmes, decentralisation, and special voting systems, among other tactics are frequently used to offset minority exclusion.

4. Leadership tends to have a critical role, both in politicising/manipulating identities and in encouraging or discouraging violent responses, though with more potential in some contexts than others. Charismatic leaders tend to be especially important where authority is frail or contested, and where institutions are weak. Even from behind the scenes, the powerful can play a pivotal role in creating violent situations, as happened in Tajikistan both in the riots of 1990 and in the civil war of 1992.

5. Relationships between exclusion, identity politics and violence are interactive and may run in both directions. Political violence can and frequently does deepen political divisions between identity groups, as in Bosnia, Georgia or Iraq, and can create new forms of exclusion, which then feed back into further violence. In such contexts, identities become reconstructed around the ‘societies of fear’, which violence creates (Koonings and Kruijt 1999).

6. Ideologies carry varying cultural resonances and differ in their respective capacities to voice and give political form to identity-based discontents. Political Islam, in particular, is a powerful moral as well as political discourse. It can be a vehicle for inclusive as well as exclusionary politics, for non-violent as well as violent collective action. The Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt are just one example of organisations with potential in both directions. Reductive approaches which see this kind of Islam as inherently problematic are to be avoided, as they limit the scope for constructive policy engagement. Likewise, Christianity has had a role in fomenting exclusion and instigating violence, such as in Northern Ireland, as well as in promoting inclusion and peace. Furthermore, sectarian distinctions – between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, Sunnis and Shias in Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq – can be as politically salient and divisive as those between religions.

7. It should not be assumed that all forms of ethnic and religious politics are exclusionary or foster violence. The mobilisation of popular discontents among the indigenous majority in Bolivia was kept within the bounds of legitimate politics and targeted against the political elite and foreign economic interests, rather than against the non-indigenous population. Many of the countries now plagued by identity-based violence have long histories of different communities living together in relative peace before political movements/leaders manipulated these differences to incite conflict.
8. In many contexts, aggression is an important characteristic of masculinity, which may easily play out in violence. One way young men in the process of forming and testing out their masculinity can prove themselves ‘real men’ is by demonstrating their willingness to use violence in defence of their nation, ethnicity, or clan, or indeed of the honour of these groups. This last is particularly important for those large numbers of cultural groups where what has been dubbed the ‘honour-and-shame’ syndrome provides fundamental elements of gender identities. Here, rape as an instrument of war has special salience. Since men are raised to feel certain levels of entitlement, the denial of these may end up producing violence, as is all too common in the regions under discussion. Moreover, gender identities may be deliberately manipulated during moments of conflict in order to encourage young men to take on the role of (violent) protectors of vulnerable (weak) women (and children).

9. The politics of inclusion and exclusion plays out in different ways in different political arenas and spaces of power, which need to be properly understood. High levels of social polarisation and community violence may prevail in ‘parallel’ communities (such as Brazilian favelas), where state authority is largely absent; they can also prevail in otherwise stable countries. In segmented societies like Yemen or Somalia, clan divisions can generate a complex interlocking of conflicts, spanning both local and national arenas. Peaceful development in most areas of a conflict-affected country can coexist with extreme polarisation and violence in other areas, as has been the case in Uganda and Sri Lanka. Conversely, in otherwise highly polarised national societies, like Bosnia, there may be regional or local ‘islands of civility’, where different ethnic and religious communities are still able to co-exist. Moreover, in some countries a generally high level of everyday violence may facilitate a spill-over into violent conflict.

10. In a globalised world, identity politics and the ‘imagined communities’ whose discontents are voiced, increasingly cross national boundaries and play out in global arenas and spaces of power. International communications and media shrink political spaces, change perceptions and foster new fears as well as creating new interconnections. These influences flow in both directions. On the one hand, existing national, religious and ethnic identities and cultures are challenged, brought into sharper relief and reinforced by globalisation. On the other, they are projected across national boundaries into new regional and global spaces. Diaspora communities, for instance, often nurture and fund identity politics, both in their host countries and their countries of origin. The politicisation of the major world religions, including Islam, potentially addresses the entire community of believers (umma) – as well as triggering narrower sectarian divisions that also resonate across national boundaries.

III. CONDITIONS FOSTERING POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The previous section underscored the fact that identity politics can have varying outcomes. Below, we outline some of the conditions fostering political violence, specifically. Individually, these conditions are not by themselves sufficient or even necessary conditions for violence. What is central is how they combine to generate violence in specific historical conjunctures. Even then, violence does not necessarily follow. There have been many situations in which all the conditions for identity-based violence existed over long periods of time before such violence actually broke out. This is important, since it suggests that there is often scope for timely preventive action. It also suggests the importance of learning to identify potential triggers of violence.

The role of horizontal inequalities, the ways politicised identities arise, the role of ideologies and belief systems, how identities are embedded and how they become globalised have already been discussed.

In general, violence is more likely to occur (a) when its benefits rise relative to other forms of collective action and (b) when the costs of violence are reduced. In reality, however, the
balance between costs and benefits shifts over time and from one national context to another. It is also shaped by the other conditions of violence identified below:

1. Poor conflict-management, including ignored or repressed political demands. If minority groups, in particular, are unable to pursue grievances through political processes, either because the latter are stacked against them, or because their attempts to seek redress are actively repressed, they are more likely to consider violence. Nevertheless, well entrenched authoritarian systems can raise the costs of violence, and maintain order – until fissures open up in the carapace of repressive governance, as in the former Soviet Union.

2. Moments of transition or acute political crisis, especially but not only in formerly authoritarian systems. The literature on democratisation suggests that periods of transition are double-edged, in that they may in some cases open a path to the resolution of underlying conflicts through the political process but in others merely usher in violence. The latter has tended to be especially devastating, where disintegrating authoritarian systems embedded identity politics in their structures of political control, as in former Yugoslavia.

3. Fractured or divided state authority, especially where the state’s own monopoly of violence is challenged, significantly reducing the costs of violence. Many of the most acute identity conflicts occur in situations where state security organisations become divided along ethnic or religious lines, or where violence is privatised, such as in the hands of non-state ethnic and religious militias. At the same time, states and ruling elites themselves may directly promote identity-based violence, for instance by subcontracting their security functions to ethnic or clan militias, as in Sudan.

4. The conditions for collective action by non-state armed groups: how they form, use markers of identity as a basis for collective action, are organised, funded, acquire arms and deploy violence. Studies of groups such as Al Qaeda (Burke 2003) emphasise the fact that radical ideologies per se do not explain why militants become violent. The latter demands a more sophisticated understanding of how militant cells form and turn to violence – and the role of violence itself (including state violence) in shaping the possibilities for militancy. Moreover, not all non-state armed groups are the same. They include ‘terrorists’, paramilitaries, mercenaries, armed wings of ethnic nationalist parties, ethnic or religious militias, guerrillas, warlord followings, semi-criminal gangs, and even freelancing state security bodies. Whether and how they use markers of identity to justify and organise violence is also open to wide variation. A few, like Al Qaeda, operate globally; however, most others limit activities to more localised regional, national or community arenas of power.

5. Incentives for violence and how they motivate conflict entrepreneurs. The rewards of violence may be moral and symbolic (as in certain forms of religious militancy), they may be political (with groups seeking to secede or overturn dominant ethnic elites) or they may be economic. Recent conflict analysis has tended to stress the economic premiums of war and political violence, including the role of conflict resources, drugs, the ‘attack trade’, arms flows, etc. For our purposes, economic incentives are relevant to the extent that (a) conflict entrepreneurs use markers of identity to define enemies and mobilise support and (b) identity-based violent conflicts are reshaped by the war economies which arise from violence – as with the emergence of warlord factions in the SPLA in Southern Sudan, which threatened to compromise its credentials as a broad-based secessionist movement.

6. How identities become ‘securitised’ as well as politicised. The complex interplay between state and non-state insecurity and violence itself reshapes identities, politicises them, and can become a source of violence in its own right. Cynthia Enloe (1980) has shown how states often use markers of identity to recruit members of their security services, manage dissent and define enemies. The widespread practice of ethnic, gender, and religious profiling by security agencies, even in stable democracies, is a case in point. In situations of
insecurity and violent conflict, such markers of identity become even more salient. On the one hand, they tend to feed the paranoia of states and security elites. On the other hand, they reinforce the perceived exclusion of minorities and dissidents, bolstering their tendency to mobilise politically and consider violence.

7. How global and regional networks of identity, power and profit elude state control and feed violence. Most contemporary conflicts are embedded in wider regional insecurities, in which trans-border ethnic and religious affiliations play a major role – as well as being sustained by flows of resources, weapons, arms and combatants etc across national boundaries. National and regional insecurities are linked in turn to global ones, via diasporas, refugee flights, trans-national crime and terrorist networks, etc. Drug trafficking can also play a role in funding and fostering violence, as in the struggles over Afghanistan.

8. Diaspora communities may sometimes nurture and fund identity-based violence, but also mitigate it, both in their countries of origin and in their host countries. Diaspora funding and support, for instance, has played a crucial role in sustaining violent conflicts in the Balkans, Sri Lanka and Somalia. Nevertheless, at times migration can also mitigate violence since it enables people to escape from difficult situations at home and thus lessen the pressure to resort to violence to resolve in-country exclusions (as in Tajikistan or Ecuador).

9. International actors can deliberately instigate violence and provide resources to support it. There were many examples of this on both sides during the cold war period, which sparked off African wars in Angola and Mozambique, amongst others. However, Afghanistan was the most salient case and the one that ever since the 1980s, has had the longest lasting resonance globally when the CIA made it into a training ground for many of those who have subsequently been responsible for major terrorist activities, as well as providing the impetus for Bin Laden’s rise to power and the establishment of Al-Qaeda.

10. International military and humanitarian interventions meant to restore international stability, end violent conflicts and protect civilian populations can all too easily have the opposite effect. There has been much analysis of the destabilising impacts of the ‘war on terror’ and Western interventions, including encouragement of identity based violence in the West, as well as in the Middle East and Central Asia. Even humanitarian assistance can have perverse unintended impacts, reinforcing identity politics and violence.

11. Globalised identities (and, in the current context, political Islam) are often viewed as actual or potential sources of extremism and violence, that are increasingly projected across national boundaries. At the same time, such violence has also prompted problematic global policy responses, like the ‘war on terror’, which polarise further by conflating political religion with religious extremism. The same caveats apply in the international context as in Islamic countries themselves, about the assumed links between political Islam, extremism and violence. Our case studies below suggest the necessity for caution about the assumption that conflicts in the global south, even identity-based conflicts, create pools of disaffected individuals likely to carry violence into the heartlands of the industrial North. The sources of triggers for violence in the latter are often closer to home.
Table – Paths to Identity-based Violence

Horizontal and vertical inequalities

Identity-based ideologies and belief systems

Politically identities

Identities embedded in institutions

Political transition and crisis

Poor conflict management; repressed demands

Incentive systems sustaining violence

Securitised identities

Formation of identity-based violent groups

Non-state political violence

Global networks of identity, power and profit

State-generated insecurity and violence

International military and humanitarian interventions

Bad governance; fractured state authority
IV. LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM

The question of extremism is highly contested political terrain. What is extreme depends to some extent on one’s view-point. Yet, there are two senses in which extremism may nevertheless carry some analytical meaning: on the one hand, in terms of the goals of collective action; and, on the other hand, in terms of the means employed, including terror and violence.

First, groups which mobilise around extreme political goals, attempting to erase other voices and identities, often through the use of terror and violence, can legitimately be characterised as extremist. However, it is not their political radicalism which is crucial, as much as their denial or indeed obliteration of other identities and points of view. By this criterion, neo-Nazis and some of the more exclusivist varieties of political religion are extremist; however, the ANC, PLO and other liberation movements are not.

Second, groups can be categorised according to their use of extreme violence, targeting against civilian populations, designed to instil hate and terror. In a globalised world, ‘terrorists’ and latterly suicide bombers have used the media to construct spectacles of violence, which instil fear and insecurity far exceeding the impacts on the direct victims of the violence itself. But, in addition, groups (and indeed governments) that deploy extreme violence (including sexual violence) against civilians on a more geographically limited scale, such as janjaweed in Sudan, or ethnic nationalists in the Balkans, could also be considered ‘extremist’.

Yet enormous caution is needed concerning assumed links between extremist violence, extreme socio-economic exclusion and radicalised religion. The analysis above suggests that the interconnections are very complex. Moreover, the small terrorist and other groups that play major roles in the theatre of violence are often small minorities within minorities. Micro-analysis of the conditions in which they mobilise to carry out violent acts is needed just as much as macro-analysis of the wider conditions in which such violence resonates with identity politics and becomes globalised.

Terrorism has much in common with extremism and the term should be limited to the systematic practice of violence aimed at instilling fear and hatred among civilians. The spectacle of violence, especially as presented in the media, tends to be as crucial as the violence itself. States as well as non-state violent groups may practice terror against civilians. Whether such state violence amounts to ‘terrorism’ remains open to debate. Terrorism is not new in the twenty-first (or even the twentieth), century and has no intrinsic connection to any one group. There is no reason in particular to apply it to Muslims or even to militant Islamists, more than to other groups who have used similar tactics.

SECTION 2 – SYNTHESIS OF THE CASE STUDIES

The case studies of Tajikistan, Bolivia and Peru, and Yemen explore - though to different degrees - the themes highlighted in the analytical framework. Each case study maps the politically salient identities in each national context, which may include:
• ethnic identities, constructed around markers of language, shared history and social organisation;
• identities based on segmentation within ethnic groups, such as clan membership;
• religious identities, including sectarian differences within the major religions;
• sub-national regional identities;
• national identities, especially where nationalism has symbolic resonance during resistance to external intervention, or is constructed around markers of linguistic, religious, etc. identity;
• gender identities, both in their own right, and in the ways in which they figure in the construction of religious or national identities.

The studies then analyse key questions, such as:

1. How do horizontal and vertical inequalities become translated into discourses of grievance and relative deprivation and with what outcomes?
2. In what ways do ethnic and religious identities become markers for class, regional and other inequalities, and with what consequences?
3. In what ways do vertical class and other inequalities become re-presented in terms of ethnic, religious and other divisions, and with what consequences?
4. In what ways are identities embedded in political, social and legal institutions and with what consequences?
5. How do imagined communities frame themselves in ways that lead to violence (or not) and how can re-imagining communities help with moving out of violence?
6. Who is able to mobilise identities, how, under what conditions and with what outcomes?
7. What methods have been used to prevent violence from erupting? How have state and non-state actors produced political coherence after the end of violence?
8. What strategies have been used to depoliticise identities previously manipulated to provoke conflict?
9. What is the role of migration/the diaspora in defusing/inciting violence?
10. How does the interplay among differing markers of identity - clan and religion; religion and nation; gender, religion and nation, etc. lead to violence or conversely prevent it or help communities move out of it?

Some of these questions have more relevance in certain contexts than others, and the authors of the case studies have weighted them accordingly; therefore, direct comparisons and cross-country lessons are limited. This corroborates the position outlined in the framework: the routes in and out of political violence are not linear or necessarily consistent across contexts; what obtains in one situation need not obtain in another, even where seemingly similar conditions exist. Thus, it is important to analyse each case on its own merit and to resist uniform policy recommendations. Comparative analysis does provide important lessons, however, including the caution
needed in examining assumed links between identity politics, exclusion, inequality, and political violence.

**Synthesis**

Though the case studies discuss links between identity politics, exclusion, inequality, and political violence and show how some of the more politicised/visible of these have arisen and are sustained, they also reinforce the key themes outlined in the framework: identity politics can have varying outcomes; the politics of inclusion and exclusion plays out in different ways in different contexts; identity politics can both contribute to violence and lead to dialogue and peaceful solutions. Therefore, assumptions of linear patterns of relationships are misguided.

(i) The *Yemen* case study emphasises the importance of resisting easy assumptions. It suggests the following, which apply also to the other cases:

1. Identity politics can mask the true nature of grievances or conflict;

2. With effective manipulation, conflict or grievances, especially of a political nature or when primarily rooted in inequitable access to resources, can take on different forms that may degenerate into identity conflicts; however,

3. Identity conflicts can exist for a long time without producing (political) violence.

4. Governance, policies and institutions are important since (a) failures and weaknesses of governance contribute to the spread of violence, and (b) better policies and institutions lay the basis for improved management of conflicts.

Sarah Phillips notes that despite the vast array of sub and transnational identities, there still is loyalty to a perceived ‘Yemeni identity’. Furthermore, the visible sectarian divisions between Upper and Lower Yemen shroud the more significant explanations of the conflict: distribution of the most important natural resources is skewed in favour of the regions outside of the highlands of Upper Yemen. The valuable coastal regions are also located outside this highland area; therefore, this region has always had to rely on the lower areas, including Hadhramaut, for basic survival. People from the lowland areas, particularly many Hadramis, resent the perpetual outflow of resources from their region. Their feelings of exclusion and dispossession increase as perceptions of corruption within the highlands based government proliferate.

Indeed, the government has a significant role in inciting conflicts and laying the foundation for deep divisions and violence. By co-opting sheikhs, purportedly to check potential threats to the administration; manipulating tribal structures and norms, often for patronage or political reasons (such as promoting tribal law over civil law, and revitalising select, largely negative, aspects of tribal practices); and manipulating tribal divisions, including promoting tribal revenge wars, the government has succeeded in provoking substantial and wide-ranging opposition to what some regard as re-tribalisation in its worst form and others, the negation of the more salutary aspects of tribalism. These tactics are particularly pernicious since the tribes possess a disproportionate amount of arms, compared with the state. However, the potential for broad tribal opposition to the government including the use of violence is curtailed because the tribes themselves are highly stratified and the numbers excluded from access to political spoils far exceed the select number of high level sheikhs and constituents that do benefit.
The case study describes strong perceptions of vertical inequalities, deep sentiments of exclusion, dispossession and resentment of growing corruption. It notes that these are key drivers of potential political violence. The study also points to the role of leadership, not only in instigating conflict and sustaining warped and dangerous politics but also as potentially capable of curbing the corruption and addressing inequalities. Correspondingly, it emphasises that donors should pay urgent attention to leadership, to the political and economic reforms necessary for resource re-allocation, and to addressing corruption.

(ii) In Tajikistan, as in Yemen, strong sub-national/local identities exist. While originally the result of isolation in cut-off mountain valleys, during Soviet times inter-local divisions were exacerbated by skewed resource allocation coupled with political manipulation. The disturbances that ended in civil war occurred because of what the framework defines as ‘poor conflict-management, including ignored or repressed political demands’ (specifically, blockages preventing their leaders from moving into positions of political power within the state system), in this case of the Pamiris, Gharmis and urban intellectuals from Dushanbe. While charismatic leaders played a significant role in instigating these disturbances, both in the riots of 1990 and the civil war of 1992, criminal elements were used to trigger the actual violence. It is important to note that what started out as power struggles by elites metamorphosed into fighting among localities. Thus, events in Tajikistan corroborate the argument that conflicts or grievances based on economic or social issues, with effective manipulation can take on different forms and degenerate into identity conflicts.

Resentments among localities continue, as since 1992 Rakhmonov has apportioned most high level positions first to persons from his province of origin, Kulob, and more recently to kith and kin from his native subdivision of Dangara. Harris notes, however, that the Kulob region, on the whole, has not benefited, instead remaining among the poorest parts of Tajikistan, which has reduced the potential for inter-local conflicts, but increased the resentment of many Kulobis who find themselves excluded.

As in Yemen, Harris stresses that there is potential for future violent conflict but that this is more likely to stem from struggles among disenfranchised warlords or between them and the government, battles over resource allocation and lack of employment opportunities, or reactions to perceived government corruption, than over identities per se. Islam is important to personal identity in Tajikistan and it is conceivable that young persons may decide to support radical Islam as they seek a more fair and just society. This situation is also being used by the government to legitimise repression of religiously-based organisations and their followers, justifying this by reference to the ‘war on terror’.

(iii) Crabtree describes the deep vertical inequalities in Peru and Bolivia, which are compounded by longstanding racial and class inequalities and injustices. Peru and Bolivia are classified as among the poorest in the Latin America region and although Peru has a higher GDP, parts of the country record poverty levels as low as those in Bolivia. Poverty levels differ between rural and urban areas and across different sections of each country. Though it is clear that inequalities and poverty contribute to the growing discontent, which can, potentially, be expressed in violent terms, the author underscores the fact that ‘the relationship between poverty, inequality and exclusion on the one hand and political violence on the other is complex and not necessarily a direct one of cause and effect’.

In both Peru and Bolivia, as in many other countries, there is some correspondence between the absence of effective formal channels for pursuing social demand and the use of political violence. Peru’s democratic traditions are fairly weak owing to its
long history of authoritarian rule. In Bolivia, by contrast, traditions of public political participation have been better developed ever since the 1952 revolution, which overturned the oligarchic regime. In Peru, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) movement emerged in the same period in which universal franchise was granted and, propelled by its extremist ideology, sought to destroy the bourgeois state and began by seeking to control the highland areas where state authority was weakest. Meanwhile, the military in Bolivia has interfered with efforts to consolidate and build a more inclusive democracy. More recent attempts to improve the quality of the political systems have been hampered by weak and ineffective political parties in both countries.

Perhaps more than in Tajikistan or Yemen, identity politics, which are primarily focused on indigenous politics, continues to have a very strong influence, particularly in Bolivia. There is close correspondence between identity politics, race, and class issues. Like Tajikistan and Yemen, sub-national divisions are also a significant factor in national politics and Crabtree explains that this has the potential to engender political violence. As in the other case studies, resource allocation is an important variable underpinning these divisions, although the areas demanding greater autonomy, such as Santa Cruz, Tarija and the Bení, also tend to appeal to identity distinctions, such as those of race and class. Again, these struggles over resources confirm that ‘conflict or grievance, such as of a political nature or that primarily rooted in inequitable access to resources can, with effective manipulation, take on different forms and degenerate into identity conflicts’.

However, in Peru, identity politics was also used to contain and limit violence. As Crabtree notes, ‘it is important to remember that SL failed almost completely to penetrate the Aymaran people of Puno, for whom ethnic identity does not mean backing SL’s attempts to cut agricultural supplies to the city or wage war on the modern state. The campaign waged by Felipe Quispe, the self-styled leader (mallku) of the Aymaran people – which involved a sequence of sometimes violent clashes with authority – was designed to open up political spaces in which the rights and interests of Altiplano communities were properly represented’.

Strong Andean traditions of social cohesion and solidarity have persisted to some degree in both countries, though these have been changing with increased urbanisation, with the disruptive impact of the SL in Peru and with hyperinflation and declining living standards, which have strained community survival. For Crabtree, social cohesion and solidarity can assist with mitigating violence (note however, that they can also support violence) but these have had varying impacts in Peru and Bolivia: ‘In Peru, the relationship between the state and society has tended to be one more of domination and diktat than of dialogue; in Bolivia, by contrast, the state has historically been a weaker creature and civil society – or at least the best organised parts of it – stronger and more demanding’. Traditional relations between state and society have influenced conflict resolution. In Peru, there has been little space for civil society involvement in conflict resolution while, in Bolivia the church and NGOs have played a strong and long-standing role.

A policy seminar was convened at DFID on August 30, 2006, during which the conclusions of the report were presented and DFID staff asked to comment on them. There was broad agreement that the case studies raised interesting and important issues; however, there were a few points of disagreement with some of the details. For example, some officers were concerned about the suggested distinctions between identity politics in Bolivia and Peru and indicated that there are a number of areas in Bolivia where identity politics was just as intense as in Peru. Officers from Yemen noted that the divisions between politics in Upper and Lower Yemen are not
as marked as they are presented in the case study. Commentators on the Tajikistan case study highlighted areas where more nuanced explanations were needed, and pointed out that it may be naive to suggest that the violence of the civil war would prevent Tajiks from resorting to violence in the near future. There were also requests for deeper analysis of issues such as the shrinking political space in Tajikistan, the over-centralised nature of the government and the implications of these. In addition, there was consensus that the case studies should do more to provide practical policy recommendations. This critique has been addressed, as far as is feasible within the current project, in the following section.

OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS: WHAT FOLLOWS FOR POLICY AND PROGRAMMING?

Three sets of operational implications emerge from the case studies. We outline these below and include context-specific questions that might inform subsequent analyses.

• The first set of operational implications includes those that indicate the importance of better contextual understanding of the sources, dynamics and developmental implications of identity-based violence. Such understanding is crucial, both in order to increase the effectiveness of policy interventions and to avoid the more obvious mistakes, where policies could stimulate and/or aggravate identity conflicts. (The classic case study of this is Uvin’s case study of the contributions of development assistance to generating the genocidal violence in Rwanda).

• Second, there are those that add further support for policies and programmes that should be undertaken on their own merits anyway. Examples include measures targeted to reduce the underlying exclusions and inequalities sustaining identity-based violence; policies and programmes to improve governance, breaking the links between poor governance, elite manipulation of ethnicity and state and non-state violence; and strategies to ensure that donors’ interventions, including the alliances that are formed through them, do not trigger further conflicts and lead to violence.

• Third are the policies and programmes needed to directly address the factors sustaining identity-based violence in each specific context.

As noted above, this section raises pertinent operational questions but does not address practical approaches for donors to use to tackle reforms; these more applied questions can only be addressed in subsequent policy focused studies.

MEASURES TO PROMOTE BETTER CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING

The case studies strongly reinforce the case for nuanced understanding as outlined in the framework. Important lessons include:

• The need for caution when analysing perceived links between identity politics and violence. As noted above, identity politics can mask the true nature of grievances or conflict. Real or perceived exclusions, as well as inequitable access to resources can take on different forms and may degenerate into identity conflicts. Yet exclusion and ethnic or religious polarisations may exist for a long time without producing political violence. As Crabtree emphasises, the existence of ethnic differentiation or consciousness does not necessarily lead to
‘indigenous’ politics. Further, the relationship between class-based politics, regional politics and identity politics is highly complex. These are intertwined in all three case studies.

- **The role of leadership both in instigating conflict and violence and in offering mechanisms for redress.** Often, too little attention is paid to leadership, as there is an assumption that ‘proper institutions’ are sufficient for restraining leaders or managing conflicts. However, leaders may bear the chief responsibility for fomenting violence, as they did in Tajikistan in the 1990s and may well do again. Conversely there may be a role for creative leadership in responding to pressures for greater inclusiveness, opening spaces for change and exploring non-zero sum ways of handling the conflicting political and economic demands of different identity groups.

- **The importance of deep contextual awareness.** Crabtree notes that the problem of political violence can vary enormously between countries, even those with similar socio-economic or ethnic structures, like Bolivia and Peru. Our case studies also illustrate the importance of sub-national regional differences among areas and groups in which violence takes root, and those in which it doesn't.

- **Deep contextual awareness includes knowledge of history.** Crabtree explains that the conditions that give rise to political violence are often structural and deeply rooted in a country’s past pattern of development, whether political or economic. The past weighs heavily on the present, especially with respect to political culture. ‘Violence usually emerges from deep down in society. In order to anticipate, confront or manage violence, there is no substitute for a proper knowledge of that society and its history. The historical dynamics need to be interpreted and constantly reinterpreted. One country is never the same as another, and regions and localities have their own particular characteristics’.

- **It is important to differentiate between types of violence and violent behaviour.** Some types of violence are considerably more amenable to reconciliation/mediation than others. For example, political violence was more susceptible to negotiation in Bolivia than in Peru. Responses to violence must, therefore, be multifaceted and responsive to particular circumstances. It would be the height of foolishness, for example, to treat protest movements in Bolivia in the same way as Sendero Luminoso in Peru; or to brand regional protests and warlord violence as ‘terrorist’ in Tajikistan.

- **Quick fixes and timelines are unlikely to resolve problems of violence.** Where issues of political culture are involved, change may take a long time and on the basis of basic consensuses that emerge only gradually from local societies. Moreover, violent conflict often leaves behind conditions of systemic violence that may take years to dispel. Addressing apparent ingrained violence requires serious attention to attitudes. For example, where gender identities were polarised and used to legitimise war, these - potentially enduring - dispositions will need to be tackled to bring about real peace. It is important to note that such identities may be invisible at higher levels while playing out in serious violence at domestic and local community levels.

- **Policy interventions need to be properly sequenced in terms of what is feasible in the immediate, medium and long term. However, they should never be viewed as fixed or linear.** Even with careful management, they may not produce the expected or desired outcomes. In the worst cases they may spur
a range of counter-reactions, including violence. The risks of potentially perverse consequences need to be anticipated and factored into policy programming.

POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES TO ADDRESS THE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS OF IDENTITY-BASED VIOLENCE

The case studies highlight a number of specific areas in which development policy and programming could potentially address the underlying sources of identity politics and violence. In general, it is best that such measures be justified and undertaken primarily because they make sense in terms of poverty-reduction and sustainable development. Too much focus on security goals and quick impacts on violence can often be counter-productive – all the more so where development agencies tend to be perceived in terms of their links to counter-terrorist and security agendas, as in much of the Middle East and Central Asia. Four sets of issues emerged in particular:

1. **Addressing regional inequalities and unevenly-spread development.** Horizontal inequalities between sub-national regions emerged as a crucial factor in all the case studies, and are often intertwined with, or express themselves as, identity politics. Unequal resource distribution across regions may be a source of conflict, and can reinforce nationalist sentiments (when the extractor is a foreign company), or more localised struggles for resource control in which ethnic or other salient identities are mobilised. However, policies to redress regional inequalities must be approached with caution, as they can provoke conflicts in their own right. Pertinent operational questions might include:
   a. How can regional inequalities be addressed in the short and long-term? What strategies are immediately feasible? Which are not?
   b. What can be done to ensure that resource rents, such as oil revenues, do not fuel struggles for control?
   c. How can demands for local control of resources and revenues be reconciled with national development priorities, including the needs of poorer, less well endowed regions?
   d. What policy outcomes are reasonable in the long term and what sorts of intermediate interventions are required to achieve them?
   e. What unintended as well as intended consequences (positive and negative) might interventions provoke? How can policy actors plan for and circumvent possible negative outcomes?

2. **Targeting vertical along with horizontal inequalities.** Conventional arguments tend to associate horizontal inequalities with exclusion and political violence. Yet, the case studies show that vertical inequalities based on hierarchies of wealth, power, gender and social class cannot be disregarded. Furthermore, apparent inequalities across identity groups can mask intense vertical divisions within them. Whilst in Tajikistan and Yemen high level positions and benefits were often allocated to members of privileged or ‘loyal’ ethnic groups, clans or religious confessions, this does not mean that the entire group benefited. Indeed, there was often a wide gulf between elite beneficiaries and the less favoured members of the same groups. Perhaps perversely, perceptions of wide vertical inequalities may sometimes help check the potential for group-based conflicts and provide space for timely interventions. Questions relating to development programming include:
   a. How can pro-poor policies be designed to maximise impacts on both vertical and horizontal inequalities at the same time?
b. How can potential alliances between the less privileged members of different identity groups be fostered, and used to generate support for pro-poor policies?

c. What kinds of information and planning are needed to ensure that gender norms do not result in women being disadvantaged through development programming and that young people and children are also taken into account?

3. Better governance and anti-corruption. All the case studies reinforce the wider point that bad governance plays a crucial role, both in generating the grievances and exclusions, which give rise to identity based violence, and in rendering governments unable or unwilling to prevent such violence. Aspects of bad governance which are especially important include the manipulation of identities by competing elites; clientelism along ethnic, clan etc. lines; corruption and government links to organised crime, often reinforced by ethnic and nationalist politics; and the use of ethnic and other links to co-opt and suborn security services and the police. Addressing governance issues is complex, particularly where power is concentrated in non-responsive and unaccountable political leaders, such as the Rakhmonov regime in Tajikistan. Certain practical questions may guide policy actions:

a. How can donors ensure that their funds really reach the targeted populations so as to address the underlying grievances sustaining violence? This is an especially salient issue today, given the aid modalities around budget support for governments. If this is intended to support citizens to hold governments accountable, how is this supposed to happen and how can donors ensure it does?

b. Are there spaces for negotiation with the government? For example, are there government members with whom DFID can form working alliances? Are such alliances feasible and what are the costs and benefits in the short and long term? What are the risks that they may backfire, and how can these risks be minimised?

c. Is negotiation practicable and if so, what methods would be appropriate and optimal? What are the likely outcomes of negotiation in the short and long term?

d. Are there associations/groups external to the government, which share DFID’s policy objectives and can help expose the links between bad governance and violence? Correspondingly, is there a role for the media or sections of it? Is there a role for NGOs/CBOS, etc? What are the likely costs and benefits of working with these associations, both for DFID and for the locals involved?

e. How much legitimacy does DFID have in the country/region? How can it work with other donor partners to influence government? What are the costs and benefits of such joint approaches and how could they be approached and staged?

f. Is it feasible to develop relationships (and find niches for policy interventions) with ethnic and other communities which have/have not benefited from government policies? What forms might such relationships take, and how can the risks that they could stir up identity conflicts be anticipated and averted? How will such alliances affect relationships with the government and what does this mean for the practicability of such strategies?

g. How can EMAD utilise wider regional relationships to address corruption and bad governance in each country context? How much weight is regional influence likely to have? What strategies are required for building regional alliances and what is practicable in the short term? What are the likely spin-off
effects and what proactive tactics are needed to counter/prevent potential negative outcomes?

4. **Empowering and working through civil society as well as the state.** All three case studies suggest that dialogue between the state and actors in civil society is vital in building institutional linkages to overcome exclusion and mediate relationships between different identity groups and the state. How these linkages develop over time can be key to resolving (or at least reducing the threshold of) violence. The contrasting experiences of Bolivia and Peru in developing such linkages are a case in point. International actors can play an important role in helping to develop or to protect such institutions. However, they must also be cautious about efforts to ‘build/empower’ civil society. On the one hand there is the danger of civil groups being perceived as pawns of well-meaning donors, thereby losing their spontaneity and potential effectiveness. On the other hand, not all civil society groups are equally ‘civil’ or non-violent, and some may be players in identity-based conflicts in their own right. Therefore:

a. What is meant by empowering civil society? What relations of power does this entail? What is the optimal strategy for ensuring that civil society groups have the best conditions for developing into dynamic and independent associations?

b. On what basis can donors make informed choices about which civil society partners to work with, and which not? Once again good contextual understanding tends to be critical.

c. Under what conditions can donors work with civil society organisations that are directly or indirectly linked to violence yet at the same time address the concerns of excluded groups or provide valued social services? Can they play a role in encouraging them to explore non-violent alternatives?

d. How can donors engage with civil society groups in situations of acute social tension or conflict without appearing to take sides or undermining the legitimacy of the groups with which they engage?

e. How much do civil society groups in countries with little or no experience of this kind of activism really have a popular basis and how much do they tend to be top-down organisations with a mandate from donors rather than their own societies? Have they been formed with genuine aims to help their own societies or mainly to forward their leaders’ personal aims and agendas? How much can they be independent of their governments and therefore hold them accountable?

5. **Support for decentralisation and devolution.** In general, decentralisation can encourage governments and state bureaucracies to become more responsive to the interests and needs of the excluded. This appears to have been the case in Bolivia as compared with Peru, for instance. In practice, however, decentralisation can cut both ways and entrench locally powerful groups, some of whom may be predatory and practice localised forms of identity politics and exclusion. In Tajikistan, for instance, warlords could usurp the functions, and even at times the institutions, of local government and thus increase their popular support at the cost of the central government. They can also challenge democratic forms of organisation at community level. In such cases support for decentralisation may help foster violence if it provides local leaders with sufficient power to challenge the central government through violent conflict when democratic processes fail. Relevant questions are:
a. How can those encouraging decentralisation take account of the specificities of the context, including the varied ways in which local groups might influence the process?

b. How can governments provide spaces for local organising while avoiding local forms of discrimination and prejudice that could reinforce inequalities of gender, ethnicity, class and race?

c. How can national governments be encouraged to resist actions and inaction where these can undermine the objectives?

6. **Supporting state policies and institutions that seek to tackle exclusion and provide people with the means to defend their rights.** The Peru case study makes the point that support for judicial reforms is important to ensure poor and excluded people have access to judicial remedies. Legal codes need to be equitably framed and enforced, particularly with respect to rights to land and resources. Support can also be given to institutions such as the ombudsman, which, in both Peru and Bolivia, have played a valuable role in providing people with a channel to challenge administrative decisions. There is a tendency to focus solely on 'formal' judicial institutions; however, in countries such as Yemen, tribal law has legitimacy among many people, as well as being used by the government to mete out justice. In Tajikistan and other transitional states, the judiciary also needs technical support to become responsive to the public rather than to the state, as well as financial support to make their practitioners less vulnerable to corruption.

a. What can be achieved by making formal legal and justice institutions more accessible to poor and excluded people, including minorities and women? How can donors best support such reforms, and ensure they do not backfire?

b. Are there lessons countries can learn from one another about institutions (such as the ombudsman) that allow excluded groups to challenge administrative decisions or discriminatory practices?

c. What in each national context is the appropriate balance between support for formal and for informal rights and justice institutions?

d. What opportunities and blockages do tribal, customary and other local institutions present? Are there spaces for engagement with such institutions and with what desired outcomes? What opportunities might be missed by not engaging with traditional justice systems and can support for them lead to influence in other areas? What are the dangers, including the potential for reinforcement of local power structures and of localised ethnic, religious or gender discrimination?

7. **Assistance to initiatives and fora that open political spaces and promote more just and inclusive legal and constitutional relationships.** Processes of political change are complex and seldom take place in ways that can be easily anticipated, still less shaped by donor-promoted political reforms. It is all the more crucial, therefore, to identify and make maximum use of political openings when and where they arise as a result of domestic political pressures for more inclusive institutions and political arrangements. For instance, the current mobilisation of popular support for broad-based reforms in Bolivia appears to open new spaces for political change and, in this context, the current Constituent Assembly could provide a chance to refashion the political system along more inclusive lines. Donors can be most effective when they work with and support domestic reform constituencies, rather than trying to foist their own agendas on unwilling or uncooperative political elites. A case in point might be support for the types of local (mahalla) committees currently being strengthened in the Qurghonteppa region of Tajikistan by NGO Ghamkhori (see Freizer and Abdullaev 2003) in
order to help realise local demands and provide opportunities to challenge centralised government institutions at the local level as well as the power of local warlords.

a. How can donors identify and make best use of open political spaces to carry out reforms, in a manner that is sufficiently timely and responsive to domestic reform constituencies?
b. What fora and initiatives are likely to be most effective and receive broad-based support in each national context?
c. How can support for local institutions open spaces for wider national dialogues concerning inclusion and governance reform?

8. **Policies to improve migrant rights and conditions, and factor in migration and diasporas.** We have seen that diasporas may play roles both in fostering and in mitigating violence. Yet too often, migrants are excluded from consideration by policy-makers both in their originating countries and the receiving ones. The Tajik and the Yemen studies suggest that migration is of vital importance in reducing poverty through remittances and providing economic opportunities lacking at home. At the same time, migrants tend to face maltreatment and harassment by the authorities in host countries like Russia, despite filling important gaps in the labour market. These feed the resentments of migrant communities, making them more likely to be perpetrators as well as victims of violence. Moreover, sudden change in the circumstances of an important receiving country, such as was the case for Yemeni migrants in Kuwait as a result of the Iraq invasion of 1990 and the succeeding Gulf conflagration, may throw the system into disarray and destabilise the originating country’s economy and political system.

a. How can donors ensure their policies and programmes are informed by adequate understanding of patterns of mass migration and their positive and negative impacts on poverty, exclusion and violence in both originating and receiving countries?
b. Should donors engage with diaspora organisations, and if so how and for what purposes?
c. Can remittances be monitored, to prevent them being diverted to fund violence or mafia activities in countries of origin?
d. How, if at all, can donors act across national boundaries to improve the situation of migrants and enable originating countries to voice their concerns about the treatment of migrants in host countries?
e. What can be done to anticipate and mitigate shocks such as those occurring in 1990-91 in Yemen after the return of the migrants from Kuwait?

**POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES SPECIFICALLY TARGETED AT DIMINISHING IDENTITY-RELATED INSECURITIES, AS WELL AS REVERSING INCENTIVE-SYSTEMS SUSTAINING IDENTITY-BASED VIOLENCE INCLUDE:**

1. **Improved law and order, policing and justice systems and better access to them by excluded groups.** The case studies show that when public security institutions are corrupt, inefficient or politically compromised, they easily become part of the problem rather than the solution to identity-based violence. Fundamental reforms to such institutions, building their capacity to tackle criminality and violence, and minimising their biases against excluded groups, can be critical in reducing identity-based violence. As suggested in Point 6 above, informal legal institutions can also provide avenues for addressing criminality and violence. They are particularly likely to be effective, where they are rooted in local communities and enjoy legitimacy.
with disadvantaged segments of the population. Yet there is need for caution here. Informal legal institutions can uphold norms and practices that exacerbate inequalities. (Notably, gender inequalities are pervasive within many tribal/local institutions). Therefore, it can easily happen that donor support/involvement can attend to one set of problems, whilst allowing unintended license for others. Furthermore, their engagement may alienate other important groups - such as many in Yemen who resent the revitalisation of tribalism. The political costs of potential gains or losses of relationships need to be weighed carefully before acting.

a. In what conditions and which ways can donors support the reform of malfunctioning police, public security and justice institutions? How can the attendant risks that their support might merely reinforce existing problems of political bias and corruption be minimised?
b. What are the technical and financial problems of reform, especially where law and order systems are under-funded, dependent on corruption to remunerate personnel, or are embedded in patronage systems?
c. How can the access of excluded groups to the remedies provided by law and order systems be improved, and their fears of discrimination against them and maltreatment by police and justice institutions be alleviated?
d. In what conditions do informal legal institutions provide remedies and conflict-resolution mechanisms not available through formal institutions?
e. How can donors and INGOs best support informal institutions, and at the same time ensure that they do not reinforce local political and gender hierarchies, and exacerbate underlying inequalities and inter-group rivalries?

2. Working with the media and advocacy organisations to overcome prejudice and build public support around non-violent ways of resolving conflicts. Under state control the mass media lack the independence to criticise state violence and human rights abuses. Even when independent, the media sometimes fan prejudice and violence. On the other hand, the media also have a strong potential to discourage state and community violence, through balanced reporting and analysis, by critiquing human rights abuses, and by taking a stand against the escalation of violence.

a. How can donor organisations foster the development of free and independent media, able to criticise abuses of power and violence by governments and their security agencies?
b. How can they support media to develop their capacity to produce independent, critical evaluations of situations?
c. How can donors, governments and independent media work together to promote less inflammatory and more constructive evaluation and reporting of contentious social issues and inter-group conflicts?

3. Support for anti-corruption measures and policies to prevent the spread of organised crime and decouple the incentive systems that encourage violence. The case studies on the whole support the conflict literature in showing that corruption and organised crime within and across national boundaries help sustain multiple forms of violence, including identity-based violence. For instance, they helped create the conditions for violence to spread and undermined the authority of the state in the Andean region, although they are not necessarily the root causes of it, as the case of Sendero Luminoso makes clear. They have also been crucial in Tajikistan, indeed in all of Central Asia and the Russian Federation, for linking mafia activities, ethnic nationalism, and violence against excluded or protesting groups. Corruption within Tajikistan has reduced the numbers of people willing and able to start small and medium businesses and thus, has directly led to decreased employment opportunities. Embezzlement of donor funds has also significantly
reduced the potential of internationally funded development projects to meet their goals. Trafficking in drugs, arms and persons has become acute in many places, again especially in Central Asia and other parts of the former Soviet Union.

a. What can donors do in practical terms to encourage governments to reduce corruption and organised crime, given that political elites may be heavily involved, as in Tajikistan?
b. How can donors support governments and civil society organisations to reduce trafficking of drugs and persons?
c. What forms of international cooperation – for instance between police and intelligence agencies in the Andean region or Central Asia – are needed to deal with trafficking in drugs, arms and persons across national boundaries, and how are they best supported by donors?
d. What are the dangers of over-enthusiastic international support for anti-drugs or anti-crime initiatives, including the risks that they may reflect largely western agendas, be co-opted by local elites or be used to support state violence against marginalised groups? How can donors anticipate and deal with these dangers?

4. Support for inclusive human rights programmes targeting all social groups. Such programmes can be used to foster a sense of common citizenship, as well as to provide excluded groups with effective remedies against maltreatment and exclusion. More specifically, they tend to be crucial in situations where state agencies (including police and public security organisations), themselves practice human rights abuses or engage in violence against excluded groups. The problems of supporting and implementing such programmes can be formidable where they are seen as a challenge to the power of state elites or entrenched majorities. They may also be complicated by the perception that universal human rights standards clash with local values or religious precepts.

a. How can donors work with governments and civil society organisations to put human rights programmes into place, ensure they provide effective remedies and contain mechanisms for ensuring access by all groups?
b. How can human rights standards be negotiated in ways that are sensitive to national, cultural and religious differences, without sacrificing core rights and the ability of marginalised groups to challenge abuses, contest discrimination and obtain remedies?
c. What is the scope for using the forms of Islamic human rights enshrined in the Qur’an and other holy books as a source of Islamic human rights that would have greater legitimacy with Muslim communities than the international laws?
d. How can the police, state security agencies, judicial institutions and informal law and justice institutions be encouraged to internalise human rights standards and be governed by them in dealings with excluded groups?
e. How can public support for human rights standards be fostered, such as by advocacy groups and the media, and how can donors support them in ways that are sufficiently sensitive to national history and context?

5. Measures addressing gender-based violence. Gender-based violence is the most commonly experienced form of everyday violence and thus helps make violence appear more acceptable at community and national levels. Masculine identities are often predicated on the easy display of aggression as well as on a sense of entitlement. Both of these can facilitate violence. Programmes which go beyond the treatment of women as victims, to tackle the issue of gender power relations, could reduce the legitimacy of violence and its acceptability in terms of local notions of honour. Working on masculinities has increasingly entered development practice and needs further elaboration. Men should not simply be
targeted as perpetrators but can be worked with to improve their own situation as victims of narrow versions of masculinity, along with women, and children of both sexes. However, working with the more powerful in gerontocratic societies such as Tajikistan, where parents of both sexes have tremendous power over children and violence against children is a major issue, is also important: youngsters raised in violence are more likely to be willing perpetrators of family, community and political violence as adults.

a. What kinds of gender training could be used to address issues of violence at both domestic and community/national levels?
b. Can local development agents be trained to deal not only with gender as a women’s issue (equating with women’s empowerment issues) but also as an identity issue for both sexes and how these could be modified to reduce violence, inequalities, and injustices for all?
c. Particularly but not exclusively in gerontocratic societies, how can gender training be modified to incorporate issues of generation/age to make older people aware of the dangers of suppressing young people and of the pernicious effects of violence against children and youth?
d. How can community and religious leaders (especially Muslims and Christians) be encouraged to relax social pressures around issues of honour or else to refocus them away from gender-based honour that puts power in the hands of (male) elders towards personal honour that condemns violent acts and injustices of all kinds?
e. How can members of western organisations, including donors and international organisations, be trained to change their own attitudes towards both their own and southern gender identities? Note that gender issues are as problematic in the west as in the south. People who have not come to terms with gender issues in their own societies will be unable effectively to tackle related issues in the communities they work in.

6. Inclusive recruitment of military, police, security and judicial institutions to ensure they are more representative of excluded groups. In Tajikistan and Yemen (as in most countries in Central Asia and the Middle East), the armed forces and security services are selectively recruited on an ethnic, clan and sometimes religious basis, both to ensure their loyalty to the regime, as well as to satisfy patronage demands. Such selective recruitment often reduces their professionalism and efficiency, and thus their capacity to manage conflicts. Even more seriously, it increases the probability that they will be biased against and be seen as biased by excluded groups. Being predominantly male institutions, they almost invariably reinforce gender hierarchies as well. Even when women have played active roles as combatants or peacemakers during wars, they tend to be marginalised once the fighting has stopped.

a. How can donors bring pressure to bear for fair and inclusive recruitment, not just in security and law and order institutions, but also in all public bureaucracies? Is this best done through affirmative action programmes, or by informal mechanisms?
b. In particular, how can they use security sector reform (SSR) and/or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes to promote more inclusive recruitment practices?
c. How can donors anticipate and cope with political resistance by regimes and political elites to fairer recruitment, still more affirmative action?
d. How can post-conflict reintegration programmes be designed to be gender sensitive and to take into account the fact that women are not always victims and men not always perpetrators in war situations?
e. How can reintegration programmes best help women and girls who during the war were behaving in ways vastly different from the ideals of their local gender norms (e.g. by participating in combat or bearing children out of wedlock), in reintegrating into their communities?

7. **Active discouragement of the ‘securitisation’ of identities by governments and their security agencies.** Biased recruitment from ‘loyal’ clans, tribal groups, religious sects or regions (see above) is only one of the ways governments and political elites deploy identities in order to reinforce their hegemony and shut out dissent. The case studies illustrate a number of other means through which identities are ‘securitised’ – that is, embedded in security institutions and practices - including the deployment of ethnic, clan or religious militias; the use of ethnic profiling to identify and control people with ‘suspect’ identities; and the manipulation of counter-terrorist programmes to silence domestic dissent. Now that donors and humanitarian NGOs are engaging far more directly with security issues, especially in conflict-torn societies, they cannot ignore the possibility that their interventions might reinforce the securitisation of identities and potentially heighten identity-based violence.

a. How can donors monitor and build awareness of the different ways in which identities are deployed by governments and elites to establish political control and suppress dissent?

b. What are the best ways of using donor influence to discourage the ‘securitisation’ of identities: e.g. via human rights programmes; by promoting more inclusive recruitment; through security sector reform; or through behind-the-scenes diplomatic and other pressures?

c. How, on the other hand, can overarching national identities – like the sense of a shared national identity described in the Yemen case study – be used to reinforce membership of a common political community, in which security is a wider public good?

d. How can donors ensure that their own security and counter-terrorist agendas and programmes do not themselves contribute to the securitisation of identities?

e. How can they ensure that donor agencies, humanitarian organisations and peace-keeping (or peace-enforcement) forces keep a consistent line in discouraging the manipulation of identities by governments and warlord forces alike?
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Introduction

Little systematic work has so far been undertaken in comparing the nature and causes of political violence between Peru and Bolivia. In spite of their obvious differences, the two countries have much in common, in particular their Andean heritage and the survival of relatively large indigenous populations. Indeed, the frontier between the two countries is somewhat arbitrary, and up until the time of Independence from Spain, highland Bolivia, referred to as Alto Peru, was integrated politically and economically to the capital of the Spanish empire.

Despite such similarities, the two countries present some striking contrasts in their political development over the last thirty years, in particular with respect to the incidence of political violence. Measured in terms of casualties, Peru has been much more violent than Bolivia. According to the findings of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), nearly 70,000 Peruvians lost their lives as a consequence of political violence between 1980 and 2000, mainly indigenous peasants. Hundreds of thousands were also displaced from their places of origin, mainly in the southern Andean departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003). With the possible exception of Colombia, Peru has had the highest death toll from political violence in Latin America in recent times. Of those killed, just over half died at the hands of Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL), an extreme Maoist group which used tactics of unmitigated terror to build up a political and military power capable of destroying the Peruvian state. SL had no interest in political negotiation or compromise. At no point in its military offensive, (which began in 1980 and ended only in 1992 with the capture of its leader and ideologue Abimael Guzman) did SL seek to enter negotiations with the Peruvian state (Gorriti, 1990; Stern, 1998). But if Sendero was responsible for just over half those killed, the remainder were the victims of the armed forces and paramilitaries under army control. From 1980 onwards, a succession of governments sought to quell SL through a campaign of counterinsurgency. This was based on the use of counter-terror and violence designed to re-impose state control in those areas of the country where SL was active. As a consequence, the Peruvian military was accused internationally of flagrant violations of human rights.

By contrast, the death toll from political violence in Bolivia since 1980 has been modest. This is not to say that there have not been violent confrontations, particularly between state authorities and those protesting against the policies of the state (Crabtree, 2005). These have included violent clashes over water privatisation (especially in the city of Cochabamba in 1999 and 2000), the eradication of coca (mainly in the Chapare area of Cochabamba department), the distribution of land in Santa Cruz, and the defence of indigenous rights on the Altiplano. The most egregious ‘massacre’ in recent times was the killing of some 70 people in the city of El Alto in October 2003, when the government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada sent troops in to remove blockades erected by anti-government protestors to prevent food and fuel supplies entering La Paz, the country’s administrative capital. The furore over these killings brought down his government. There have been many instances of violent confrontations over the last century, but the numbers of casualties have never come near those registered in Peru in the 1980s and 1990s; even the death toll of the 1952 Bolivian Revolution, when workers' militias took on and defeated the
standing army, the numbers killed were somewhere around 2,500. Although there have been various episodes of attempted guerrilla activity, these failed to take root and never approached the dimensions of the political violence wrought by the war with SL in Peru.

Therefore, despite their similarities, the two countries represent contrasting case studies of political violence. This paper seeks to identify some of the reasons for these differences, particularly in the relationship between state and civil society. It begins with a section on poverty, inequality and exclusion, and this is followed by a section on political exclusion. It then looks at the role of collective identities, particularly indigenismo, in driving political protest, before focusing on social cohesion and the nature of state-society relationships. As will become clear, the frontiers between such concepts are often blurred. Finally, it seeks to draw together some conclusions about the nature of political violence and the possible implications for policy. The paper focuses on political violence rather than social or criminal violence, although these may be related.

**Poverty, inequality and exclusion**

Peru and Bolivia are among the poorer countries of Latin America. Although GDP per capita in Peru is substantially higher than in Bolivia, there are large parts of Peru - especially in highland, rural areas - where poverty rates are just as low as those of Bolivia. In both countries, poverty levels differ markedly between cities and rural areas and between different parts of the country. Rates of inequality are relatively high in both, and appear to have become higher over the last two decades. Historically, this seems to reflect the economic salience of extractive industries (mining and hydrocarbons chiefly) that tend to concentrate income, have few multiplier effects on the rest of society, and bring scant benefit to the localities in which they take place. More recently, inequalities have been exacerbated by economic liberalisation. High levels of inequality of income and wealth have made it hard to construct stable and inclusive democratic institutions. These are also countries where society is divided not only along lines of income and class, but also race. Racial discrimination is deeply rooted in the culture of both countries, with race reinforcing class divisions; broadly speaking income levels correlate closely with the colour of people’s skin. As we shall see, social and political conflict often has a strong ethnic dimension, and ethnic discrimination compounds feelings of alienation and dissent.

In the case of Bolivia, poverty levels have remained high in spite of the country receiving a much higher proportion of foreign aid per capita than most others in Latin America. Extreme poverty is concentrated in the highlands, especially in rural areas, though overall poverty rates are among the highest in Latin America. It is perhaps ironic that poverty levels are highest in the department of Potosí, whose capital city in the sixteenth century was reckoned to have been among the wealthiest in the world. The part of Bolivia where poverty rates are lowest, at least in terms of GDP per capita, is Santa Cruz where economic growth has been propelled in recent years by export agriculture and hydrocarbons. Differences in wealth between the highlands and Santa Cruz heighten regional tensions, and these too have an ethnic dimension. Overall, the pattern of economic development has not had much impact in reducing poverty levels in recent years; it is estimated that, as currently structured, the Bolivian economy has to grow by at least 7 per cent per annum (i.e. considerably higher than in recent years) just to stop poverty levels rising. Most poor Bolivians benefit little from the pattern of growth, except in so far as differences in incomes and living standards in highland and lowland Bolivia have encouraged large-scale migration to
Santa Cruz in recent years. Channels of social mobility are few, especially for the indigenous majority.

Likewise, in Peru, extreme poverty is concentrated in rural areas, especially in the highlands, and it is important to note that SL first took grip in the poorest parts of the poorest departments of Peru. The sierra has been largely bypassed by the process of development, concentrated primarily on the coast and particularly in Lima, a city of centralised power but divorced by geography from the Andean hinterland (Sheahan, 1999). Unequal development has encouraged massive movements of people from the largely rural sierra to the cities of the coast, a process magnified since 1980 by the effects of political violence and forced migration. As in Bolivia, the pattern of economic growth of recent years has had little impact on reducing poverty levels. Buoyant growth rates have trickled down to benefit the poor; one in two Peruvians still lives in poverty and one in five in extreme poverty (INEI, 2006). And, once again, channels of social mobility are few.

The relationship between poverty, inequality and exclusion, on the one hand, and political violence on the other is complex and not necessarily a direct one of cause and effect. Still, in both countries, it is clear that growing discontent is fuelled by the widely-held perception that an already privileged elite has been the main beneficiary of the pattern of growth, and that this can, in certain circumstances, take violent form. In both, economic liberalisation has failed to generate the increase in employment opportunities that its proponents had promised; disenchantment has led to sometimes violent protests, especially with respect to privatisation. The Cochabamba ‘water war’ was essentially a protest against water privatisation in Bolivia’s third largest city, and attempts by the Toledo government to privatise energy in Arequipa in 2003 sparked street riots in Peru’s second city (Peredo et al., 2004). Dissatisfaction with economic liberalisation was a key factor behind the emergence of Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia, although it remains to be seen whether his government will be successful in building the basis for more inclusive development and in raising the living standards of Bolivia’s poor. Likewise in Peru, dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of economic liberalisation were a major cause of the extraordinary unpopularity of the Toledo administration and the rise of ‘anti-system’ sentiment in the guise of Ollanta Humala in the 2006 general election. A recent UNDP study underlines strong feelings of alienation and dissent, especially among the rural poor.

**Political participation**

In most countries, political violence is a product of the absence of alternative forms through which pressure can be exercised in the pursuit of societal demands. A key factor to be considered, then, is the existence or not, of representative institutions and the efficacy with which these work in articulating the demands of all sectors of society. Although most Latin American countries since 1980 have been formal democracies, the quality of their democratic institutions has varied a great deal, and in most countries there are large populations who suffer from political as well as social exclusion. Peru and Bolivia are no exceptions to this rule, though – as we shall see – the way in which their political institutions work varies a good deal. In both countries, there are large sectors of the population whose interests have not been represented at the level of the state and which have generally been ignored by government policy. Although attention has been paid in recent years to trying to tackle this problem, the results have been mixed.

Peru is a country with few democratic traditions, and universal suffrage only dates from 1979. Until that time, the country was ruled mainly by authoritarian, often
military, governments. Whereas in other Latin American countries, the mass of the population came to be incorporated in the political system during the first half of the twentieth century, in Peru the only real mass-based party, APRA, was systematically excluded until an APRA government was finally elected in 1985. It was a military government (1968-80) that brought about social change, but in an incomplete way and in an extremely top-down manner. Bolivia represents a rather different story. The 1952 revolution was an upsurge from below that involved a rupture in the old oligarchic order and brought with it the inclusion of peasants and workers in the political life of the country for the first time. In 1952, all Bolivians won the right to vote, bringing with it a notion of formal citizenship. Although political power was wrested in 1964 by the military (which ruled for much of the next 20 years), traditions of political participation continued, and the authority of the government was constantly challenged by civil society organisations, particularly the unions. The strength of sindicalismo in Bolivia is unique in Latin America, pervading both the industrial as well as the rural sector (Dunkerley, 1984).

It was ironical that the eruption of SL in Peru coincided exactly with the election of the first government ever to be elected on universal franchise. At the outset, SL directed its attention primarily at social sectors for which notions of citizenship were extremely remote. The highlands of Peru had never known democratic government in any meaningful sense, where until the 1969 agrarian reform semi-feudal landlordism (gannonalismo) was the rule. Indeed, in its attempt to exercise political control over the highlands, SL effectively snuffed out any possibility of the free function of democratic institutions, as military rule became the norm. SL was not interested in functioning within the rules of representative politics; it sought simply to destroy what it saw as the bourgeois state and it characterised electoral politics as a ‘farce’. Its ideology was extreme and dogmatic. In Bolivia, ideas of political participation were much more deeply rooted, but the attempts (1978-80) to build a more inclusive political system were constantly suppressed by the military. Opposition to military rule produced a series of violent confrontations between organised groups (miners, peasants, factory workers, students, etc.) with the result that many popular leaders were killed or spent long periods in jail. Traditions of political participation continued in spite of this, and in the 1980s and 1990s a system of ‘pact-based’ party democracy took root (Crabtree and Whitehead, 2002; Domingo, 2006).

The consolidation of democracy in both countries brought attempts to enhance political participation. These went much further in Bolivia than in Peru. The Law of Popular Participation (1994) was a landmark that greatly encouraged political involvement, at least at the local level. It involved an ambitious programme of administrative decentralisation and the strengthening of municipal government, providing an infrastructure through which to tackle social problems. It increased the flow of resources and it also enabled people to take part in local politics, bringing in indigenous people to positions of power such as mayors and councillors (consejales). The achievements of Popular Participation have been lasting, helping to bring people even in remote parts of Bolivia within a state administrative system and encouraging the development of citizen rights. By contrast, in Peru, administrative decentralisation and popular participation is still very incipient, and recent moves in this direction have run into serious obstacles. Administratively, Peru remains a highly centralised country, Bolivia less so.

Political parties are key actors in providing the link between society and the state. A strong party system provides alternative channels of representation and communication that help avert violent confrontation. As in other Latin American countries, traditional parties in Peru and Bolivia have been found largely wanting in providing those representative linkages. In Bolivia, the parties that governed the
country from 1982 onwards through a series of pacts functioned primarily as clientelistic machines, widely viewed as unrepresentative and corrupt. In Peru, the parties that had emerged as actors in the 1980s, were similarly discredited in the 1990s, enabling President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) to dismiss what he called ‘the partidocracia’ (Crabtree, 2006). In Bolivia, one of the main factors that encouraged the growth of protest movements after 2000 was the inoperance of the party system in brokering social dissent on a variety of issues. The emergence of the MAS stems from these social movements. Indeed, the MAS is more an alliance of social movements than a party as such, although the process of elections and now the experience of government seems to be turning it into a party. For the first time social movements now have a strong voice in the state. In Peru, there is no equivalent to the MAS. The 2006 election campaign of Ollanta Humala, whose support came primarily from the poor and excluded, does not seem to be coalescing into a political party in the same way. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether under the new APRA government the poorest and most disadvantaged sectors manage to make their voice and concerns heard at the level of the state.

Identity politics

The force of identity politics in the Andean countries relates primarily to indigenous politics and locality. Indigenous politics, at the same time, meshes closely with the politics of class, albeit in different proportions and different times and places. It is frequently pointed out that the salience of indigenous politics is much more marked in Bolivia and Ecuador than it is in Peru, although all three countries have large indigenous populations (Yashar, 2005). However, even in Bolivia and Ecuador, indigenous movements have only fairly recently (since the 1990s) emerged as a strong force in domestic politics.

The 2001 census identified 62 per cent of Bolivians as being of pure indigenous origin (although some say that this is an exaggeration). In Peru, the indigenous population is probably less in relative terms. Both countries have experienced rapid urbanisation in the last 40 years, and this has led to a growing proportion of the population of mixed race (mestizo). Mestizaje has probably gone further in Peru than in Bolivia, and urbanisation in Peru (which tends to involve people abandoning their communities of origin and moving substantial distances to coastal cities) has led to changes in cultural identity, referred to as cholificación. Urbanisation and migration in Bolivia has also led to a diminution in ethnic identity, particularly among migrants to the tropics of Santa Cruz. Still, ethnic identity, even in an urban context, is much stronger in Bolivia than in most of Peru. This is particularly the case of Aymara speakers for whom cultural identity is stronger than most other indigenous groups.

Historically, ethnicity has played a key role in Peruvian politics since the time of the Spanish Conquest in the sixteenth century. During the colonial period and subsequently during the Republic, there were recurrent indigenous rebellions against governments in Lima in response to attempts to privatise land, introduce taxes, suppress indigenous expression, etc. This tradition of military rebellion is still alive, connected with longstanding millenarian beliefs in which, at some point, the poor will rise up and impose themselves on their colonial masters. This is related to myths such as the Inkari, the notion of the return of the Inca which persists in indigenous folklore, for instance in carnival. However, although Peru produced an important indigenista intellectual movement in the 1920s, the rise of popular parties from the 1930s on was inspired more by the politics of class than those of race (or at least a mixture of the two in which class was predominant). The Lima-based Marxist parties that emerged with force in the 1970s and 1980s emphasised class struggle, albeit in a variety of different ideological guises. Though they sought to mobilise indigenous
peoples, particularly in the highlands, they were not *indigenista*. SL, too, reflected this tradition. Inspired by traditional Maoism, it highlighted class analysis in its revolutionary praxis. Still, it is difficult to explain how its influence spread throughout the *sierra* simply in terms of its ability to terrorise peasant populations and force them into subjugation. SL’s message worked on traditional antipathies against the ‘colonial’ state and its representatives at the local level. Unlike previous guerrilla organisations, SL sought not to distribute land but to destroy that state and to build a new ‘state’ without ‘colonial’ exploitation. As the historian Alberto Flores Galindo has noted, this gave new meaning to the myth of Inkari (Flores Galindo, 1988). So without being *indigenista*, SL took advantage of ethnicity and a legacy of systematic racial exclusion.

Fifteen years on from the defeat of Sendero Luminoso, ethnicity is not at the centre of today’s political battleground. But still the problems that SL highlighted in the *sierra*, especially in the poorest parts of it, remain largely unattended. Although there have been political movements that have sought to exploit feelings of indigenous discontent, these have not been particularly successful. Humala initially sought to mobilise around indigenous issues, but his 2006 presidential bid (which was markedly successful in parts of Peru with greater indigenous populations) focused on issues other than race. More potent than ethnic politics have been those of regionalism, which play on historic antipathies towards Lima and centralised government. There have been noteworthy expressions of regional sentiment in places like Iquitos and Arequipa, but these do not—fundamentally—represent a threat to the political predominance of Lima in the way that, for example, Santa Cruz does in Bolivia.

As we have noted, indigenous issues have played a more important part in Bolivia’s recent history (Albó, 2002). As in Peru, there is a strong correlation between indigenousness and poverty, and Bolivia shares many of the enduring cultural and intellectual traditions of the Andean world that continue to influence the ways in which people think and act. However, it is important to note that the emergence of clearly *indigenista* political movements has only become a powerful force in the political life of the country in the fairly recent past (Van Cott, 2003). The *kataristisa* movement among the Aymaras of the Altiplano dates from the late 1970s, and lowland indigenous movements have only made their mark on national politics since the 1990s. Since the 1952 Revolution, a point developed further in the next section, the main form of popular social organisation has been the *sindicato*, in the mines and in both urban and rural areas. Trade unionism, inspired by the militant and class conscious traditions of Bolivian miners, has long been the driving force behind attempts to defend the popular economy and to defy decades of military rule. *Sindicalismo* tends to involve a culture of collective bargaining and negotiation.

The force of indigenous politics is particularly strong among the Aymara community whose traditional values combine with a strong entrepreneurial spirit. The strength of community is exceptional among Aymara peoples, both in Bolivia and across the Peruvian frontier in Puno. It is important to remember that SL failed almost completely to penetrate the Aymaran people of Puno. They had little or no sympathy with SL’s attempts to cut agricultural supplies to the city or wage war on the modern state. The campaign waged by Felipe Quispe, the self-styled leader (*mallku*) of the Aymaran people—invoking a sequence of sometimes violent clashes with authority—was designed to open up political space in which the rights and interests of Altiplano communities were properly represented. It was not ‘anti-system’ in the same way that SL was. Elsewhere in Bolivia, the strength of *indigenismo* is to be found primarily among lowland indigenous groups, which have become articulate defenders of territorial rights constantly violated by outsiders seeking to exploit
natural resources. They too have adopted some of the forms of protest – such a blockades and protest marches – used by highland indigenous groups.

More so than in Peru, regionalism in Bolivia is a powerful factor in national politics and one which has the potential to engender violence. This is particularly the case in Santa Cruz, the department with the most buoyant economy. However, regionalism also has emerged in other lowland departments (such as Tarija and the Beni) that echo Santa Cruz in demanding greater autonomy from La Paz, the country’s political capital. Elite groups in Santa Cruz have long used the department’s distinct, non-Andean culture to distinguish itself from the rest of Bolivia, an argument that often takes a racist tone with respect to dark-skinned ‘kollas’ from the highlands (Roca, 1980). Demands for autonomy have become more strident in recent years, particularly with respect to the issue of how the income derived from hydrocarbons should be shared out between producer departments and the poorer departments elsewhere in the country. The Comité Pro Santa Cruz (CPSC), representing the socioeconomic elite of Santa Cruz has been the main mouthpiece for greater autonomy. However, the appeal to regional identity is now less effective, and other local communities of interest are appearing with separate agendas, particularly among migrants and indigenous people. They are beginning to adopt an increasingly independent line, no longer supporting traditional local political figures, rather supporting parties like the MAS. This has led to some violent confrontations with racist-inclined youth organisations, such as the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista (UCJ). The issue of regional autonomy will be a major theme in the Constituent Assembly (elected in July 2006), but so will the sub-autonomies of groups who feel no loyalty towards elite groups like the CPSC. A key issue here is the distribution of land in Santa Cruz, which was never subject to agrarian reform. Agroindustrial development has led not just to land concentration but also to rapid expansion of the agricultural frontier. Increasingly, land distribution is becoming a contested issue and instances of violent conflict – chiefly between squatter movements and landowners – are becoming ever more frequent. There is a risk that this may lead to a spiral of violence as landowners and squatters arm themselves in self-protection. The Morales government has recently come up with proposals for settling landless peasants, but these too could lead to violent confrontation and further regional conflict.

Other forms of identity politics include gender and religion. These tend to be of secondary importance as factors explaining political violence. Although in both Peru and Bolivia, as elsewhere in Latin America, women continue to play a subservient role in economic, social and political life, this is a reality that is changing. Women are becoming more assertive and better organised. Still, there is a long way to go. In the case of Peru, it is worth pointing out that women – especially young women – played an important part in SL as guerrilla fighters. In this respect, SL contrasted strongly with largely male-dominated parties of the more conventional left. In Bolivia, women too played an important (though still probably secondary) role in the social movements that helped bring the MAS to power, and more women than ever are represented in the cabinet, the Congress and the Constituent Assembly (the latter presided over by a cocalera from the Chapare). So far as religion is concerned, this has not played a conspicuous role in movements of political violence in either country, although some have argued that SL operated along quasi-religious, messianic and fundamentalist lines that reflect a deep-rooted religiosity in popular culture. Rather church groups have played a leading role (as we shall see) in trying to mediate violent confrontation.
Social cohesion, civil society and the state

Patterns of political violence owe much to the fluidity (or the lack of it) of relationships between society and the state (Drake and Hershberg, 2006). Generally speaking, a characteristic of traditional Andean societies is a strong sense of social cohesion and solidarity, based on the Andean peasant community with all its customs of shared work, collective decision-making and reciprocity. Indeed, many have argued that the very survival of indigenous culture in countries like Peru and Bolivia is due mainly to the perpetuation of strong social identities. Where such identities persist, especially when politicised, relations with the state are often conflictive. Attempts to liberalise land tenure, for example, has been a source of conflict for at least 150 years. To some degree, this strong sense of community has been translated to the urban context, where, especially as communities struggled to establish themselves in a new environment, social cohesion became a key to survival. But urbanisation has the effect of gradually breaking down this sense of community. Mestizaje becomes more common and traditional life-styles change. The predominant urban lifestyle is individualistic, and competition between people tends to replace cooperation, for example, in labour markets where high levels of unemployment are the norm. In these circumstances, it becomes much harder for individuals, or even communities, to defend collective interests. However, the persistence of a strong sense of community in an urban contest is much more evident in places like El Alto in Bolivia, where Aymara ethnic identity and organisation remains strong, than in the urban periphery of Lima and other major coastal cities.

While Peru and Bolivia inherit this Andean communitarian tradition, the relationship between state and society differs in important respects, reflecting the different historical trajectory of each country. In the case of Bolivia, the basis of traditional social organisation was affected in important ways by the results of the 1952 revolution, particularly the agrarian reform and the nationalisation of the mines, both of which reinforced the sindicato as one of the key institutions in society, replacing the more traditional ayllu in many rural communities. Sindicalismo, stimulated by the miners and the miners’ federation (FSTMB), became highly politicised, probably more so than in any other country in Latin America. Guerrilla activities that ignored this tradition (such as ‘Che’ Guevara’s) were doomed to fail. For 30 years, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) managed to maintain an unrivalled institutional unity that prevailed over partisan infighting, giving the COB important leverage over the state. When the mines were closed in 1985, the dismissed miners took this organisational tradition of sindicalismo with them to where they eventually settled: the coca-producing Chapare, El Alto or even Santa Cruz. Their political culture has therefore lived on. While hyperinflation in the 1980s, economic liberalisation and the demise of the COB diluted this tradition of political organisation, it did not destroy it. The emergence of indigenous politics has reasserted the political importance of social cohesion. In particular, as we have seen, Aymaran communities are exceptional in their cohesion, a cohesion that persists into city life where community discipline is paramount and where failure to support community decisions is often punished. However, the strength of social cohesion varies a good deal from place to place. Degrees of social cohesion are also highly variable in Peru, and – as we have seen – urbanisation has tended to break down the community spirit. In the highlands, this is also true: Aymara speaking communities in Puno are more cohesive than Quechua ones elsewhere. The impact of SL in the sierra was to break up community structures, set communities against each other and to displace their populations. It had a major negative impact on political organisation, especially peasant unionism. In the urban context, too, hyperinflation and the collapse of living standards put enormous stress on community survival. They also had a negative impact on the standing of (largely left-wing) political parties that provided
communities with a political voice. Where community cohesion remains strong it facilitates the transmission of social demands, even though confrontation may arise where channels of political participation are absent.

The existence of a fluid relationship between social organisation and the state is therefore an important condition for mitigating violence and providing institutional channels through which social demands can be made. In this sense, Peru and Bolivia again provide interesting contrasts. In Peru, the relationship between the state and society has tended to be one more of domination and diktat than of dialogue. The nature of the state was not transformed in Peru as it was in Bolivia in 1952. It remained authoritarian and disinclined to negotiate with social actors. This was particularly clear in the way in which social reform in the 1970s was accomplished by a military regime, top-down and in ways that involved little real participation and engagement with representative institutions on the ground. This spirit of bureaucratic authoritarianism and disdain for representative institutions lived on into the 1980s as the war with Sendero precluded social dialogue, especially in the highlands where military rule continued. Similarly, in the 1990s, the Fujimori administration set up an elaborate system of clientelism that eschewed any real popular participation (Carrión, 2006). Political parties were marginalised, as we have seen, and prevented from acting as mediators between society and the state. The state thus continued to operate in an authoritarian way, disregarding civil society or interacting with it on a discretional basis. In Bolivia, by contrast, the state has historically been a weaker creature, obliged to negotiate with a civil society – or at least the better organised parts of it – that was stronger and more demanding. The relations of power were therefore more evenly matched than in Peru, and even in periods of dictatorship state authorities were not able simply to ignore social pressures from below. Situations of potentially violent impasse have therefore given way to compromise deals that, while often just postponing problems, have helped nurture a culture of dialogue and mediation.

The problem of political violence is not unrelated to that of drugs, and drug cultivation (for illicit purposes) takes place at the margins of the state where state authority is weakest (Youngers and Roisin, 2005). This is certainly the case in Colombia, the world’s largest producer of cocaine, where both guerrilla organisations and paramilitaries finance their activities from their links to the drugs cartels. It has also been the case in Peru, where SL became a far more serious military threat when it opened up operations in the central and upper Huallaga valley in the mid-1980s, defending peasant communities against US-supported coca eradication programmes. The situation in Bolivia has been somewhat different since the coca growing regions (the Yungas and the Chapare principally) are nowhere near so remote from central state authority, and where producers have been prepared to enter into political dialogue with the authorities over the terms under which coca production is to be controlled. The Bolivian coca producers have been represented in Congress since the late 1990s (amongst others by Evo Morales), and they formed the nucleus around which the MAS developed.

Conflict resolution and mediation

The experiences of Peru and Bolivia with respect to conflict resolution and mediation are fairly distinct. As we have seen, the relative balance of power between the state and social organisations in Bolivia has been such as to help provide greater space for negotiation and compromise (UNIR, 2005). This willingness to negotiate is also part of the country’s political culture where, with few exceptions, even the most militant left-wing activists have an agenda that is open to discussion and negotiation, a characteristic strikingly absent in the case of SL in Peru. Mediation, therefore, has
a quite lengthy history, going back at least to the 1970s when the Catholic Church, human rights organisations and other NGOs played a conspicuous role in forcing the pace of democratisation. The role of the Church – or rather churches – in this respect deserves special emphasis. Again and again, these have offered their services as mediators of last resort; the church(es) enjoy an exceptionally high moral standing in Bolivia in all sectors of society. NGOs (or alliances of NGOs) have also played a valuable role, often in collaboration with the church(es) and with the support of the international community. The Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos (APDH), established during the Banzer dictatorship in the 1970s, now has an institutional track record going back more than 30 years, not only defending human rights but providing a forum for negotiation at times of political crisis. In recent years, the state itself has developed specialist agencies to try to promote dialogue and defuse social conflict before it happens. The Defensoría (Ombudsman) has played a valuable role, as did the National Dialogue. An ‘early warning’ system has been instituted so that the state can pre-empt conflict. How effective this has been is unclear, but its existence indicates a keen awareness of the need to avert potentially violent confrontation. Recent protest movements, involving sometimes large-scale mobilisations around issues of rights and the use of natural resources, provided testing times for mediation, but eventually compromise arrangements (sometimes just short-lived ‘band aid’ solutions) prevailed involving a degree of compromise and negotiation on all sides. The election of a government representing social movements has greatly reduced the incidence of confrontation, at least for the time being.

Once again, Peru represents a rather different story. The military government of the 1970s offered few or no spaces for genuine social mediation. It sought to internalise conflict through corporatist mechanisms like Sinamos (National System of Social Mobilisation). It saw no reason to engage with civil society, incipient at the time. It sought to impose reforms, not negotiate them. Subsequently, the guerrilla conflict of the 1980s, which led to the militarisation of large parts of the country, offered little space for mediation. Human rights groups in Ayacucho were seen by the military as accomplices in terrorism. SL, as we have seen, was wholly uninterested in negotiation, regarding concern for human rights with contempt. In SL’s mindset, no negotiation was possible. People were either with it or against it; there was no middle path. During the Fujimori government in the 1990s, the triumph over SL offered few spaces for negotiation, and human rights groups – both Peruvian and international – were regarded in official circles with suspicion (Youngers, 2003). Although the human rights movement developed considerable influence, it did so as pressure groups at the margins of the state. It was only in the last years of the Fujimori regime that, with strong international backing, these organisations came to play any real negotiating role. The appointment of the civil society-based TRC in 2001 represented an important new departure, although many of its recommendations have been subsequently ignored.

At the same time, the Catholic Church in Peru presents some striking contrasts to that of Bolivia. The hierarchy has tended to be more patrician than its Bolivian counterpart, and less willing to involve itself in social mediation. It has also become notably more conservative in recent years, particularly since the appointment of an Opus Dei cardinal who famously remarked that he thought human rights were nonsense (‘cojudeces’). The grass-roots Church, which gained considerable sway in the 1970s, has been in retreat in recent years. Other churches, such as the evangelical churches, are also of a very conservative orientation. The collapse of the Fujimori government provided a brief period in which mechanisms of social mediation could develop. Known as mesas de diálogo, a network developed between 2001 and 2003 that covered a number of policy areas in different parts of the country. The
process of regionalisation, referred to above, offered further space for mediating conflicts at the local level, although the extent of effective decentralisation has been limited. The TRC provided an unprecedented forum for discussing the causes and nature of political violence in the 1980s and 1990s, providing important recommendations on how to avoid a repetition of such violence in the future. However, by the time that the Toledo administration ended, the space for this sort of social consultation appeared to have diminished notably, and suggestions for more democratic institutionality across a range of areas have not been adopted. It is unclear how the new García government will respond to these challenges, but the need to address problems of structural exclusion and the potential for political violence were clear as ever. The social, geographic and cultural breaches in Peru remained profound, and the bridges across them tenuous at best. Meanwhile, in Bolivia – despite its deficiencies and the problem of high expectations – the MAS government appeared more inclined than its predecessors to tackle problems of ethnic and social exclusion.

Conclusions

There are many conclusions that can be drawn from this, but for our purposes I would highlight the following:

• That the problem of political violence can vary enormously between countries, even those with similar socio-economic or ethnic structures. Colombia apart, Peru has one of the worst records of political violence in terms of human casualties. It proved impossible to mediate that violence, although a more political than military approach might have helped. Violence in Bolivia has been on a different scale, and much more susceptible to mediation and negotiation. The basic conditions that gave rise to violence in Peru still exist, whereas the problem of exclusion in Bolivia appears now to be being tackled, although it is still too early to judge the achievement of the MAS government in this respect.

  o That the conditions that give rise to political violence are often structural and deeply rooted in a country’s past pattern of development, social, economic and political. The past weighs heavily on the present, especially with respect to political culture. Understanding the causes of violence involves understanding that culture. Except in extraordinary circumstances, political culture is not susceptible to rapid change. Political culture also varies within countries, as regionalism within Bolivia shows with clarity.

• That the existence of ethnic differentiation or ethnic consciousness does not necessarily lead to ‘indigenous’ politics. Peru’s story in terms of ethnic politics is very different to Ecuador’s or Bolivia’s. In Peru, this has a great deal to do with the ‘distance’ separating Lima (and other coastal cities) from the ‘indigenous’ hinterland. It also has to do with the development of left-wing politics along strictly ‘clasista’ lines during most of the twentieth century.

• That the relationship between class-based politics and identity politics is highly complex, and in Peru and Bolivia the two are closely intertwined. In Bolivia, not everything that looks like ethnic politics is so. Increasingly in recent years social tensions are being articulated in more ‘ethnic’ terms. Similarly, class politics cut across the politics of locality and regionalism. Regional identities also combine (but often clash) with indigenous identities.
• That both regional and ethnic identities intermix with problems of resource extraction, especially where this further exacerbates problems of inequality. The politics of resource extraction can also reinforce nationalist sentiments (when the extractor is a foreign company) or more localist ones (when the extractor is national but not from the locality).

• That the existence of an illicit drug industry (cultivation of coca and manufacture of cocaine) exacerbates problems of political violence and challenges to state authority. This is particularly clear in the Peruvian and Colombian cases. In Bolivia there has always been more readiness to dialogue and negotiate drug eradication programmes.

• That ‘extremism’ is a problematic concept; what is labelled ‘extreme’ at one moment can become mainstream the next. However extremism can exist, and its nature needs to be defined. SL can reasonably be defined as such. Its methods were very violent (‘terrorist’ in the true sense of the word), its objective the destruction of existing society, and its praxis closed to any type of negotiation. But ‘extremism’ does not exist in isolation. In Peru, it fed on centuries of backwardness, poverty and pent-up resentment. Although not explicitly ‘indigenous’, there was an ‘ethnic’ dimension to SL’s activities.

• That routes out of violence depend on the existence of an underlying will to negotiate. In the case of Peru, the state has never shown much willingness to bargain with those who oppose it. This has engendered a climate of political violence that has deep historical roots and goes back to the founding of the Republic, if not before. A culture of democratic negotiation is still incipient, but a highly centralised state finds it difficult to ‘engage’ with civil society. Bolivia is different in this respect, and the tradition of negotiation (often unwilling) is well established. Where this is a matter of state-society conflict, it is easier to negotiate when there is some degree of parity of power involved. The weakness of the Bolivian state has forced it to negotiate (although there have also been plenty of cases of confrontation). In such conflicts, both sides must at least be able to speak the same ‘language’. This was not the case with SL.

Recommendations

1. Violence usually emerges from deep down in society. In order to anticipate, confront or manage violence, there is no substitute for a proper knowledge of that society and its history. The historical dynamics need to be interpreted and constantly reinterpreted. One country is never the same as another, and regions and localities have their own particular characteristics. The eruption of political violence can often be difficult to predict. Not even Peruvian military intelligence predicted the outbreak of the war with SL, and there was a general lack of understanding of social realities that lay behind it. The military counter-insurgency strategy was not based on such an understanding.

2. It is important to differentiate types of violence and violent behaviour. Some types of violence are much more amenable to reconciliation/mediation than others. This is the case when those involved in violence have an agenda that they are prepared to negotiate. Such negotiation has long been easier in Bolivia than in Peru, where those involved in violent confrontations have had such an agenda, and have been prepared to settle for (for them) sub-optimal solutions. Responses to violence are therefore multiple, and will depend on the particular
circumstances. More research is needed into the ways in which social and economic exclusion promote poverty and vice-versa.

3. Resolving problems of violence is not usually susceptible to ‘quick fixes’ or simple military solutions. Where issues of political culture are involved, change can only take place slowly on the basis of certain basic understandings that have to emerge from society itself. Those involved in mediation and ‘peacemaking’ need to have a long-term as well as a short-term game-plan.

4. The international community can help resolve conflict in countries like Peru and Bolivia. But that help needs to be disinterested and seen to be disinterested. In practice, this is often not the case. Wherever possible it needs to work through local institutions that enjoy public confidence. In Bolivia, for instance, the Church has provided such channels. They do not exist to the same extent in Peru.

5. Tackling poverty and exclusion is key, however hard to achieve. It has to involve participation and the transfer of powers and responsibilities to beneficiaries. Empowerment of the poor is much easier said than done, especially when this is not backed up by state policy. Elites (local and national) do not give up power willingly. They have to be engaged and convinced of the need to improve distribution/reduce inequality. The strengthening of civil society is particularly important in Peru.

6. Encouraging dialogue between the state and actors in civil society is important in helping to build institutional linkages. Both Peru and Bolivia suffer from weak institutions, in spite of some important advances in recent years. How those linkages develop over time can be key to resolving (or at least reducing the threshold of) violence. International actors can play an important role in helping develop or protect such institutions.

7. Encouraging the development of state policies and institutions that seek to tackle exclusion and provide people with a means to defend their rights. Support for judicial reforms in countries like Peru are important so that poor people have access to judicial remedies. Support can be given to institutions like the ombudsman, which have in both Peru and Bolivia have played a valuable role in providing ordinary people a channel to challenge administrative decisions.

8. Assisting (where possible) in forums that seek to establish more just legal and constitutional relationships. The Constituent Assembly in Bolivia is a chance to refashion the political system along more inclusive lines. Outside support and validation may be helpful in achieving this end, though care needs to be taken in not being perceived as seeking to ‘steer’ the process from outside.

9. Support for initiatives that help redistribute income and wealth. These can take a multiplicity of forms, but tax reform is one important area. Taxation has to be seen to be fair in the way it is applied. Both Peru and Bolivia suffer from deficient tax regimes, especially the latter.

10. Support for decentralisation and devolution so that state bureaucracies become more responsive to the interests and needs of the excluded. There is a growing body of experience on how to (or how not to) go about this. Care has to be taken not just to devolve power to local elites. Developing a more people-responsive police force is crucial in both Peru and Bolivia.
11. Support for curtailing the scale of illicit drugs cultivation/manufacture. However, this too has to be done in ways that involve dialogue and bring the state closer to social actors. Viable economic alternatives need to be made available to the populations affected.
ANNEX II LINKAGES BETWEEN IDENTITY POLITICS, EXCLUSION, INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN TAJIKISTAN

Fears of Tajikistan’s potential for violent conflict arise mainly because of its recent civil war (1992-97) and on the grounds of its positioning in relation to Islam. Its geographic location - bordering Afghanistan to the south and containing a segment of the conflict-prone Ferghana Valley area in the north, is also a factor. Three Central-Asian states - Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan - come together in Ferghana and it is the centre of organising around radical Islam. Finally, political repression, narco-traffic, organised crime, and poverty also provide potential fuel for violent conflict. In view of all this, identity politics, exclusion and inequality seem less likely to serve as direct routes to political violence in the near future. Nevertheless, they played a significant role in the civil war and any analysis of the political situation of Tajikistan needs to take them into account, since they are still important aspects of personal identity, and in any future conflict elites may well use identity politics once more to secure their power bases.

Politically salient identities, inequalities and exclusion

As with many southern states, Tajikistan as it exists today is an artificial construct, in this case carved out of the large land mass of Central Asia under Stalin in the 1920s. As happened in other such cases, its borders were drawn in such a way as to exclude large numbers of its own titular nationality while including significant populations from the titular nationalities of neighbouring states. This division created a serious grievance in that what are still perceived as the cultural centres of the Tajik people - especially Bukhara and Samarqand - were given to the politically stronger Uzbeks. However, the vastly superior numbers and fire power of Uzbekistan make it highly unlikely Tajikistan will be in a position to be aggressor and claim these centres for itself.

Ethnic Identities

Uzbek-Tajik ethnic rivalry continues to this day. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, the government of Uzbekistan has gone out of its way to cut all connections between the two countries and also to impose the Uzbekisation of Tajik speakers within its borders, while Tajikistan has recently tried to suppress its own Uzbek population. In the late 1990s, the attempts of Mahmud Khudoberdiev, a Tajik citizen of part Uzbek descent, to take control first of sections of the south and later of Sughd province in the north, gave rise to a serious anti-Uzbek movement, particularly on the part of the government and its agents in regard to Uzbeks from Tursunzade and southern Khatlon. This has now calmed down considerably.

Local Identities

The most important local identity divisions have been less ethnic than local. The only significant division in terms of language and religion is that between the Pamirí minority, who speak Eastern Iranian languages and belong to the Shi’ite Ismaili sect led by the Agha Khan, and the Sunni majority Tajik speakers. However, in relation to violence this difference has been no more salient than the local divisions among the Tajik majority.

Historically the high mountain ranges kept each valley-dwelling group isolated. This resulted in the development of strong local loyalties. The decades of Soviet rule did little to unite the country, particularly because the regime treated inhabitants of each locality differentially. Especially notable was the fact that the northerners or Sughdians almost invariably held the chief political positions in the Republic.
region had first been part of Uzbekistan and was only joined to Tajikistan in 1929 when it became a union republic. Sughd has a large population of Uzbeks which helps keep its ties with Uzbekistan strong. Its close political allies within Tajikistan were the regions of Kulob and Hissor. To the former was allotted the role of policing the republic. The Pamiris and especially the last important local group, whose roots are in the Gharm/Karetegin Valley area, were largely excluded from the very top ranks of government.

One other region of political importance is Qurghonteppa, the largest cotton-producing area of Tajikistan. In the 1920s and 1930s most of the original inhabitants fled across the border into Afghanistan. Subsequently, forced migration campaigns moved people from other regions to Qurghonteppa to farm cotton. Today, its inhabitants include significant populations from Gharm, Kulob, and Pamir, as well as large numbers of Uzbeks. Despite in some cases several generations having lived there, each group identifies with their original location, often to the point of retaining close ties with their ‘home’ villages.

**Gender Identities**

Gender identities have also been important for political differentiation. However, their main salience has been to demarcate Central Asian nationalities from non-Muslim, chiefly European ones. This still holds true, the struggles of the Soviet government to force Central Asians to adopt Slavic-style gender identities having largely failed.

It is said in Tajikistan that Slavs have egalitarian gender identities, while those of the Central Asians are strongly hierarchical, and it is certainly true that the most significant trait of Tajik gender identities is mature male control - that is, the control of male household heads over economic resources and family members, both male and female. As a result, adult men have enormous power over all other family members and young women’s mobility remains considerably curtailed, even if they are rarely physically secluded. However, older women also have significant power since Tajikistan is a gerontocratic society, where age has in many ways more salience as regards power relations than does sex. Mothers have substantial power over even their adult sons and most marriages have been, and still are, arranged.

While women were included in the Soviet project of building socialism, they have never had a significant political presence. Since independence they have lost many of their former gains and it remains to be seen if the current government’s plans to increase their participation will give women real political power. Although a few powerful women have become leaders, the majority, especially of young women, continue to find themselves subordinated.

The most salient aspect of gender identities for issues around violence is that of the identification of masculinity with aggression. This allows men, especially young men in the process of proving their manhood, relatively easily to be drawn into conflict, particularly if family or clan honour is at stake. Moreover, since men supposedly hold high status, it is considered beneath them to carry out menial or low-paid work, including housework and child care. Thus, in cases where they have been unable to find employment they considered appropriate for their status, they have often been largely idle. Although today male labour migrants in the Russian Federation and elsewhere are taking any kinds of jobs they can find, in the early 1990s in Tajikistan there were large numbers of under-occupied men available to take part in conflicts. This of course does not mean that only men fight; women also fought in the civil war, for instance. However, it makes it relatively easy to get men together to start wars.
Religious identities
The Soviet insistence on the abandonment of religion in favour of atheism gave rise to serious resentment on the part of the peoples of Central Asia as a whole and of Tajikistan in particular. This was the republic that most strongly resisted incorporation into a non-religious state and the only one that did so by military means. Throughout the 1920s, there was anti-Soviet opposition in Tajikistan and the threat of insurgencies continued throughout the Soviet period.

For both the Sunni majority and the Ismaili minority, Islam is an integral facet of their identities. In fact, being a Muslim is considered inseparable from being Central Asian. Even those who neither pray nor fast, who may not even have heard of the five pillars of Islam, consider themselves Muslims and, for instance, circumcise their sons, regarding it as an inseparable part of their cultural identity.

Islam was seen as intrinsic to the Central Asian gender identities discussed above, so that attempts by young people to make changes in these were considered a betrayal not only of their culture but also of their religion. While some Tajiks, notably some groups of Gharmis, managed to keep mosques open for prayer and to seclude their womenfolk, this was not for political ends. That is, they did not seek an Islamic state but rather freedom of worship.

A small minority of Tajiks became interested in strict forms of Islam in Afghanistan, first when they accompanied Soviet forces there during the occupation and later when they lived there as refugees. In the mid 1990s, a few Tajik citizens became Taliban supporters; some of these were allied with Al-Qaeda. However, to this day these remain extremely few in number.

Mobilisation of identities for war
The Tajik civil war came about through a complex mix of struggles for political control and regional inclusion along with demands for economic improvement. In September 1991, Independence left Tajikistan with less than half its previous national income mainly through the loss of turnover taxes previously redistributed to the republic from Moscow. Simultaneously, the severing of economic as well as political ties with the other republics left Tajikistan in a particularly vulnerable position. Its largest industry, the aluminium factory in Tursunzade, was totally dependent on raw materials from outside the republic. Tajikistan had no oil or gas, which had to be imported from Uzbekistan. Its only energy source came from worn out hydroelectric plants.

An annual population increase of some 3% had resulted in large numbers of un- and underemployed young men. They became easy targets for political leaders jockeying for positions of power, who were able to make use of them, first to show their political strength and later to fight in the civil war.

Ostensibly, the civil war resulted from struggles over the right to political representation. Once the monopoly of the Communist Party was broken during Perestroika, oppositional political parties could be established. In Tajikistan these were mainly formed by Pamiris and Gharmis along with urban intellectuals largely from the capital, Dushanbe. The Pamiris were looking for independence, while the rest were seeking different kinds of political freedoms, including the right to democracy and to religious freedom. The result was several democratic parties and the largest opposition party, the Islamic Revival Party (IRP). Together they formed what was later known as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO).
The war was essentially set into motion by power struggles among the elites from different localities who headed these parties. In the run up to it, Akbar Turajonzoda, a charismatic Gharmi cleric from the Qurghonteppa region who became an important opposition leader, started to organise Middle-Eastern style political demonstrations in Dushanbe. This prompted the government side - that is the neo-communists - to do the same. Turajonzoda had learned such organising as a student in Jordan and his campaign to assume political power was backed by forces in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Iran.

In retaliation, Russia and Uzbekistan, fearing the influence of these Muslim states and the possibility that Tajikistan would become their close ally and thus leave the political sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union, decided to support the government side. A visit to the president of Tajikistan by the then Secretary of State James Baker in 1992, suggested that the United States also promised support, provided, it is alleged, they kept away from Islamic influences.

Russian and Uzbek support was both financial and military. This allowed the government side to pull together sufficient personnel and weapons to fight. Thus, starting in mid 1992, the two sides were able to engage in fierce military clashes.

What started out as a power struggle among elite political leaders, who even used criminal elements to trigger violence (as they also did in the riots of 1990), degenerated into a conflict among localities. Sughd and Kulob, backed by Hisor and a majority of Uzbeks from both Sughd and Qurghonteppa region, supported the government side. Gharm and the Pamirs supported the opposition. Moreover, the conflict situation was also taken advantage of for individual purposes, with the result that many were killed in personal vendettas. For example, the Gharmis in Qurghonteppa were hardworking and considerably wealthier than their Kulobi neighbours. This occasioned tremendous resentment on the part of the latter, who under cover of the war looted, sacked and burned their homes.

During the war, as in more recent outbursts of violence, abductions and rapes especially of girls were used as a weapon of war, as a way of dishonouring enemy men.

By spring 1993 the opposition was routed. At least 60,000 people had been killed and thousands of others disappeared. Nearly 800,000 people fled, several hundred thousand to Afghanistan and Russia, while others became internally displaced. 35,000 homes were burned, 55,000 children were orphaned, 26,000 women widowed, and thousands of girls suffered rapes and/or forced marriages.

**Routes out of violence**

By late 1994, large numbers of the displaced had returned home and by the end of the decade the vast majority were back. For a time violence became an everyday phenomenon. People from oppositional localities were systematically excluded from benefits and employment opportunities. Gradually this changed as the economic decline worsened and the government, since late 1992 under the leadership of Emomali Rakhmonov, a former collective farm director from the Dangara region of Kulob province, consolidated its power. From then on, high level positions in government and state enterprises were allotted almost exclusively to Kulobis. Often people from that locality would automatically assume an air of entitlement in even casual encounters with those from other regions.
While this has produced considerable resentment there is little to suggest that Kulob as a region has benefited. It remains at least as poor as the rest of the country. This may partly explain why, despite their exclusion, those of other localities have not yet at any rate carried out any serious public demonstrations against Kulobis. Indeed, Kulobis themselves have demonstrated against their poor living conditions.

During the first years of his rule, there was little indication that Rakhmonov had significant control over the country as a whole. Besides Khudoberdiev, a number of other warlords controlled different regions for a time. Gradually, many of these were murdered, imprisoned, exiled, or co-opted into the government. In accordance with the terms of the 1997 peace agreement, a number of opposition leaders were also given government positions. A weapons amnesty encouraged many fighters to relinquish their arms, and by early in the new millennium, a large measure of peace had been restored to Tajikistan. However, there are still a number of warlords with some level of power (see below).

Not only the national government but most state enterprises and local governments are headed by Kulobis and people from other regions consider them ineffective and unproductive. Certainly, although Rakhmonov has placed a few non-Kulobis in positions of power within his administration, the highest positions remain in Kulobi hands and they have managed to do relatively little in the way of revitalising the economy. This may be related to the fact that Tajikistan has become one of the more repressive and most corrupt governments in the world. According to Freedom House, Tajikistan is not politically free and has a low level of civil liberties. Since the republic’s inclusion in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index starting in 2003, it has consistently figured amongst the top ten most corrupt in the world. This has significantly affected the impacts both of international aid and of attempts by local entrepreneurs to start up or run legitimate businesses. Nevertheless, an increasing number of local and international NGO’s, some of whom have provided very significant help to vulnerable groups, as well as other international aid organisations, have stepped in and taken over the role of the government in providing resources and social services. In the Pamirs the survival of the population has been very largely dependent on aid distributed by the Agha Khan Foundation, for instance. In some areas warlords provide social and economic assistance to local populations.

The World Bank poverty assessment update of 2005 showed a decrease in absolute poverty rates from 81% in 1999 to 64% in 2003, with the largest number of the poor being in the province that contains both Kulob and Qurghonteppa and the second largest number in Sughd. The reduced poverty was attributed to the end of violence, economic stability and a significant increase in labour migration as well as to higher world prices for cotton in 2003, cotton being the republic’s chief export earner and the main product of the Qurghonteppa region. Nevertheless, many sources suggest that organised crime and particularly narco-traffic constitute major industries in many parts of Tajikistan, especially along the borders with Afghanistan. It has been intimated that the government and the military are both significantly involved, as also the Russian military, which still keeps a presence in Tajikistan. This has had a very negative impact on morale, and increasing numbers of men and now also women have become heroin addicts. Lack of employment possibilities has sent some 20% of the population, mainly but not exclusively male, as migrant labourers largely to the Russian Federation. Many men have married Russian women and now maintain two families. Others have abandoned their Tajik wives and children and disappeared into Russia. Recently, further contingents who have managed to stabilise their employment situations have brought their entire families to live there. However, the situation in Russia is not easy. Despite agreements between the two countries
regularising Tajik employment rights, both Russian employers and Tajik officials cheat workers; the Russian police treat them as illegals and demand bribes; many Tajiks now languish in Russian prisons. Nevertheless, remittances form a significant proportion of the incomes of most Tajik families, estimated by the World Bank at 10% or more of their earnings. It has even been suggested that the total amount of remittances equals almost half the republic’s GDP.

The more control Rakhmonov has been able to exert over the nation, the more repressive his government has become. In the last few years, monopoly of power has moved from being in the hands of Kulobis as a whole to being in the hands of the president’s kith and kin from his native region of Dangara. This appears to be in response to the power position of the speaker of parliament and mayor of Dushanbe, Mahmasaid Ubaidulloev, the only serious rival for the presidency currently free and in the country. Ubaidulloev comes from the town of Kulob. The move to elevate Dangaranans rather than Kulobis in general seems to be a tactic for curbing his power base and elevating Rakhmonov’s.

For the rest, Rakhmonov has consistently found excuses for imprisoning or exiling his political rivals. Currently, the head of the democratic party, Mahmadruzi Iskandarov is serving a 23-year jail sentence and another potential rival, General Gafur Mirzoev, the former head of the Agency for Drug Control, is also in jail. In 2003, a referendum was held on amendments to the constitution, including almost without public notice an amendment allowing Rakhmonov to serve two further 7-year terms beyond the 2006 presidential elections - in other words to remain president until 2020. While some 93% of citizens supposedly voted for this, it is alleged that since nowhere on the ballot papers was there mention of this item and there was very little media coverage of the issue, most voters probably did not realise what they were agreeing to.

There is little freedom of the press in Tajikistan. Journalists are fearful of being attacked or even murdered for criticising the government. Currently, in the run up to the November 2006 presidential elections (where Rakhmonov is unlikely to meet with any serious competition), many journalists working for independent newspapers are facing lawsuits.

The judiciary system is weak and highly corrupt, making it difficult if not impossible for the poor and those with little influence to obtain favourable judgements.

Popular support for Rakhmonov is mainly based on his perceived ability to keep Tajikistan stable and prevent it slipping back into war. Now aware of the cost of this last, the population seems determined to do anything possible to avoid a repetition. This accounts for the lack of attempts to follow the example of Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and remove the president from office, despite the economic problems that have forced large segments of the population into migration for lack of employment opportunities at home. However, it is unclear how long this effect will last. In another few years when there is a generation of young men who do not remember the civil war, it may no longer serve as a deterrent to entering into political violence.

**Future potential for violent conflict**

*International/transnational conflict*

Were a serious conflict to occur between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan this would almost certainly not be over the ethnic differences discussed above but over resources. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have significant water sources, but no gas or oil, while Uzbekistan expresses a belief in its right to uninterrupted water flows from the
mountain regions into its plains without any show of willingness to reciprocate. It charges high prices to the upstream republics for its hydrocarbon resources while demanding water gratis.

Economic Issues
Employment opportunities are very limited. Without the possibility of employment outside the republic the country would be facing a serious crisis, since many families have no other options for economic survival. This is particularly true of the two poorest regions— Qurghonteppa and Sughd. Thus, migration serves as a safety valve that prevents the situation from becoming explosive.

Radical Islam
As stated above, Islam forms an important segment of personal identity in Tajikistan and today many people both pray and fast. However, the Soviet ban on religion has meant that few have in-depth knowledge of the scriptures, and the current difficult socio-political and economic circumstances have forced people to concentrate more on survival than religion. Nevertheless, young people seeking moral and spiritual values or even a fairer and more just society may be vulnerable to persuasion to join radical Islamic organisations. The poorer Tajik society becomes and the more corrupt the government, the greater the potential attraction of such organisations, especially those with considerable funds from Islamic sources in the south.

Opinions on the potential for serious outbreaks of violence in Central Asia from radical Islamists are divided. Some experts consider this a very dangerous threat; others see little serious support for political Islam, despite terrorist operations mainly carried out by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has exploded bombs in Tashkent and elsewhere. The IMU is said to be active in the Ferghana Valley region of Tajikistan. Other Islamic organisations are also active in Tajikistan, notably Hizb-ut-Tahrir, officially viewed as a terrorist organisation and banned. Despite its self-avowed commitment to peaceful organising, its members are liable to imprisonment in Tajikistan.

The government’s actions in repressing non-state regulated religious organisations (including mosques) and associated individuals and justifying this with reference to the ‘war on terror’, may also lead to the build up of resentments and eventually to exactly the kinds of violence they profess to be trying to avoid.

Inequalities and identity issues
The preference shown to Dangarans/Kulobis has not produced notable improvements in their lifestyles compared with those of the rest of the country, the Tajik population as a whole ranging from extremely poor to somewhat poor. The World Bank report referred to above shows significant percentages of even the wealthiest 20% being forced to cut food consumption to survive. However, since most of the top policemen come from Kulob, considerable inequalities among regions exist in treatment by the police, and non-Kulobis also have fewer chances of government employment and advancement.

Warlordism and local leaders
Warlords persist in many parts of Tajikistan. Although they are no longer as strong as in the past, they do retain a certain power base. In April 2004 a group of warlords, formerly members of the Popular Front of Tajikistan, together with opposition party leaders including Mahmadrzzi Iskandarov, the currently imprisoned leader of the Democratic Party, formed an alliance and publicly appealed to Parliament to overthrow Rakhmonov and his government. They claimed that if it came to serious conflict they would no longer allow themselves to be divided into factions by locality
as occurred in the 1992-1997 civil war, but would all stick together. Even without Iskandarov, this grouping may represent the greatest potential for leading the country into another war if they continue to feel excluded from power and are able to mobilise sufficient personal, economic, and military resources. Demonstrations have already taken place in Kulob in protest at the lack of services and this might provide a basis for violent opposition. Nevertheless, with large numbers of young men absent in migration, it may be difficult to organise a significant number to fight.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

To minimise the future potential for violence, the following recommendations are suggested *in addition to those already provided in Freizer and Abdullaev (2003: 50-59) that address vital issues in regard to internal and regional security*:

1. Work with the Tajik government to help them provide better (bribe free) services in relation to migration and to prevent them taking bribes at border crossings and airports from returning migrants.
2. Work with the Tajik government to help it set up institutions to tackle issues of citizens in the Russian Federation and other CIS republics being unjustly accused and imprisoned and to support Tajik citizens in CIS prisons.
3. In the wake of current attempts to impose restrictions on NGO’s, the local NGO community be supported to remain viable and independent, so that they can attend to social needs the government is unable or unwilling to deal with, as well as to those political issues discussed by Freizer and Abdullaev (2003) in relation to NGOs.
4. Work with the government to curb its tendencies unjustifiably to attack Islamic organisations and their members with the excuse of combating the ‘war on terror’ and to produce more effective approaches to reducing the potential for violent conflict (also see Freizer and Abdullaev 2003: 50, 52-53).
5. Make efforts to combat sexism, corruption and organised crime and support the development of legal and business-related infrastructures, as well as economic enterprises that can offer employment free of the clientelism currently affecting Tajikistan, as well as greater employment opportunities for women. Support the training of SME owners in bookkeeping so as to make them eligible for bank loans.
6. Support the government to make the banking system effective for business loans and to restore trust in it so that the wealthier deposit their savings in national rather than foreign banks. Also support it to decrease the taxes imposed by banks on remittances sent through them to encourage migrants to make use of the banks for this purpose.
7. Support the government to increase pay for the educational and health sectors so that bribery and corruption can be reduced. Also, support the government to improve the quality of these sectors, particularly that of education.
ANNEX III Linkages between Identity Politics, Exclusion and Political Violence in Yemen, Sarah Phillips

Since the northern victory in the 1994 Yemeni civil war, the institutions, political culture, and elite of the former northern state have dominated the country, much to the anger of many in the south. By 2005, southern grievances against the regime had reached levels unseen since the war, one professor of political science at Sana’a University noting for example: ‘There are indicators today that Yemen is travelling on the same road it took in 1994’ (Al-Faqih 2006). The perceptions of vertical and horizontal inequality in the country also exist beyond the north/south fault line, however. The increasing corruption and the narrowing group of those benefiting from state patronage fuel the propensity to frame grievances with reference to sub-national identities. As poverty deepens and traditional social networks are eroded, the popular perceptions of government corruption are compounded, and the potential for political violence increases.

This paper will first map the most salient identities in Yemen and then trace how these identities are embedded in institutions, how they are mobilised and manipulated, and how they are presented in local discourse. The consequences of some of these divisions will then be discussed with reference to the breakdown of social cohesion, and the ways that traditional social networks and, thus, traditional forms of conflict resolution have been undermined. Finally, it will look briefly at how the state attempts to manage and prevent violence and extremism, largely through co-optation. This paper emphasises the flow and location of resources as these bear more direct relevance to the potential for violence in contemporary Yemen than identity per se. Several of the questions in the TOR (such as strategies to depoliticise identities, the role of migration or diaspora in driving mitigating conflict, the interplay of different identities and the consequences for violence, and the possibility of re-imagining communities) bear less direct relevance to Yemen’s current situation and are, therefore, weighted accordingly.

1) Politically salient identities and resource distribution: regional, tribal and sectarian divisions

Regional and sectarian divisions. Contemporary Yemen exhibits a considerable array of sub and trans-national loyalties. However, for all of these cleavages, there is generally an attachment to some concept of a ‘Yemeni’ identity. Most of the literature and local discourse refers to cleavages that correspond to the demarcation between the former northern and southern states: the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) respectively. However, these divisions correspond more closely to the topographical barrier between the northern highlands (upper Yemen) and the lowlands (lower Yemen/southern highlands) than they do to the old state border. It is around the geographical boundary that the distinctions between religious sects and forms of social organisation are clearer. upper and lower Yemen are separated by the mountainous ridge that runs roughly diagonally through the country and severs Ta’izz and Ibb – the most populous and agriculturally rich part of the country – from the arid northern highland region. upper Yemen stretches from the Saudi border in the north, to Shabwa in the east, Hajja in the west, and Dhamar in the south. lower Yemen (i.e. at a lower altitude) includes the former YAR governorates of Ta’izz, Ibb, Hodeidah, and the Tihama. As grievances towards the increasingly exclusive highlands-based regime sharpen, the line between upper and lower Yemen has taken on added relevance in identity perception.
Historically, the inhabitants of lower Yemen have been the merchant class, while the inhabitants of upper Yemen have been the political leaders. This balance has shifted considerably in the Republic of Yemen (ROY), as the state’s economic resources are increasingly distributed by the highland elite on a political basis to those in their client networks rather than on merit. The disempowerment of the traditional economic elite is sharply felt but has not manifested itself violently. The heavy concentration of weapons in upper Yemen and their dominance in the military diminishes this possibility somewhat.

Broadly speaking, there is a sectarian divide between these two regions. The majority of the population in upper Yemen are Zaydi Shi’ite Muslims, who make up between 20-25 per cent of the total population, while the population of lower Yemen and the former PDRY are almost entirely Shafi’i Sunni Muslims. Historically, there has been little religiously fuelled animosity between the two groups, and any antagonistic ‘us-them’ feelings between them have been founded more firmly on cultural, social and political grounds than on theological differences.

Some media coverage of the Sa’ada uprising – which began in 2004 under the leadership of a Zaydi Sayyid family – has suggested that sectarian divisions were the primary motivation for the conflict. While sectarian lines are a factor at the very local level, at a national level Yemen’s sectarian divisions are unusually blurred and are generally not a reliable gauge for determining political allegiances. It is, however, important to note the growth in the purist Sunni strain of Islam that has been imported from Saudi Arabia (Wahhabism) in the last 20-30 years. It calls for a literal interpretation of Islamic doctrine and excludes those who do not adhere to its very specific vision for society, particularly Shi’ite Muslims and women.

What has been more significant than a sectarian split between upper and lower Yemen, however, is the distribution of natural resources throughout the various regions of the country. Upper Yemen has never had sufficient natural resources or productive land to sustain itself and has always had to look beyond the region for its basic survival. In the oil era, regions outside of the highlands still possess the lion’s share of the country’s most important resources. As government corruption manifests itself ever more boldly, feelings of dispossession and exclusion increase in the resource-rich parts of the country. Roughly eighty per cent of Unified Yemen’s oil is located in the former PDRY, the majority of which is in the Hadhramaut governorate. The coastal region, with its fisheries and strategically located seaports, is also outside of landlocked upper Yemen, and people resent the outflow of these resources from their regions.

The people of Hadhramaut have historically had a particularly strong regional identity. The oil reserves they possess strengthen the conviction of many Hadhramis that they are a viable independent state that is being milked of its resources by the poorer and more populous north. It appears that as discontent with the northern highland-led regime deepens, so too does mythologising about Hadhrami history and identity, and its viability as an independent state – a prospect that deeply concerns the Saleh regime. The desire to secede from the unified state is quite serious, but is likely held in check by their knowledge that the highland-dominated military would spare nothing in crushing an attempt.

**Tribal divisions.** Tribal identity is stronger in upper Yemen than elsewhere in the country. The distinctions between tribally and non-tribally organised regions are considerable, and there is a degree of animosity between the two. Non-tribal areas are far less cohesive than the strongly tribal areas, and they lack the capacity for mobilisation against a foreign intruder or the state. The most powerful and well-
armed tribal confederations reside in upper Yemen: the Hashid and the Bakil. The term ‘tribal’ is by no means indicative of a monolithic entity or identity, and there are many further layers of stratification that exist within tribal and non-tribal societies.

Tribes are fairly regularly involved in disputes against each other, some of which are deliberately fuelled by the state. At other times, however, tribes (including Hashid and Bakil) have rallied together against the state. Again, speaking broadly, tribal loyalties rest first and foremost with the tribe. The literature is full of anecdotes about tribes who were ‘republican by day, and royalist by night’, during the northern civil war (1962-70), and this remains a standard mode of operation. Other loyalties and alliances tend to shift according to circumstances which, as is discussed below, has helped to fuel the conflict in Sa’ada.

It is now principally through co-optation of tribal sheikhs that power and key assets such as state-awarded contracts, economic commons, and land are being concentrated into the hands of a much smaller circle. This is driving broad-based resentment towards the regime, and a knock-on resentment towards a broadly defined ‘tribalism’ in general, particularly in lower Yemen and the former PDRY.

Civil society. Other social forces, such as civil society and political opposition groups are also experiencing increasing exclusion. While some divisions within Yemeni civil society are manipulated, and some are entirely created by the regime, not all of them are a product of interference. Within the fragmented political environment, rumours and conspiracy theories surrounding which opposition members are corrupt or co-opted abound. Details vary widely and their accuracy is, in some ways less significant than the pervasiveness of the stories. The dominant perception within civil and political organisations is that local NGOs and political parties are either so internally corrupt, and their structures so undemocratic, that they are either completely ineffective at promoting political change, or function only as a tool of the regime. These perceptions are an indication of the deep divisions between the middle class and the politically aware groups, that most theories of democratisation suggest bear considerable responsibility for advancing a transition to democracy. They are paralysed by a deep lack of trust between them, which makes the establishment of larger groups with coherent mandates significantly less likely in the near future. On the one hand, this fragmentation of non-regime actors increases animosity towards the regime, but on the other, this probably also increases the cost of violent action for these groups because they are so divided in the face of the strong coercive power of the regime.

2) Identities embedded in institutions

In the pre-Saleh YAR, the northern army (which now dominates the ROY) was a regional melting pot. Today it is much more strongly tribally based, and its composition is more reminiscent of that under the rule of the Imam. The most sensitive divisions, such as the Republican Guard and the armoured division are drawn predominantly from the Hashid confederation, although Bakil is quite well represented. The most important command positions are held by President Saleh’s close relatives and members of his tribe (the Sanhan).

Contrary to what one might expect of the state, the Yemeni regime has actually encouraged a move away from some of its own institutions, in favour of tribal institutions. The government has increasingly advocated the use of tribal law over civil law, and has directed criminal cases to the tribal system for resolution, increasing the power and prestige of the sheikhs. It is widely held that the government has replaced many traditional judges with poorly qualified sheikhs that
have a record of subjective rulings for either patronage or political reasons. More concerning, the central government has resorted to ‘tribal explanations and solutions to political crimes’ (Carapico 1998) to defend their interests where it was likely that a civil proceeding would have either held them accountable or tarnished them publicly. Their use of such methods, including the occasional taking of hostages to gain political leverage, has undermined their legitimacy and worked to convince people, including the tribes, that neither the central government nor their institutions can be trusted.

Reportedly, tribal law has begun to usurp the south’s institutional legal codes, and revenge disputes (which were outlawed in 1968 in the PDRY) have reappeared in some areas since the end of the 1994 war. Tribal discourses, and even tribal poetic forms, have also gained popularity in parts of the former south (Miller 2002). Southerners are quick to complain about the regime’s efforts to reorganise Aden (former capital of the PDRY) along tribal lines after 1994. The Saleh regime has introduced the ‘aql al-hara, a local neighbourhood chief common in tribal highland society that is appointed by the regime (and therefore affiliated with the domestic intelligence agency, the PSO) who acts as a legal officer instead of the well-established southern court system, which many Adenis decry as medieval. The regime also appointed a widely disliked man to the position of Aden city’s official paramount sheikh (sheikh al-mashayikh) despite the fact that Aden has not been governed tribally for over one hundred years — another move that prompted outrage in the city. The deliberate re-vitalisation of certain specific elements of tribalism in the south is a further indication of relevance of the tribal system to the maintenance of the Saleh regime’s dominance. However, it appears that this is less for reasons of asserting or protecting tribal identity than it is about political patronage, and about keeping money and resources flowing into the resource-poor highland region.

3) Mobilising identity

The most readily mobilised groups in Yemen are the tribes. Tribes are generally mobilised by their sheikhs who are, therefore, easily targeted points of co-optation for a state in need of representatives in the periphery. The regime adopts highly contradictory policies regarding the tribes. At times they are portrayed as a pillar of support, the basis of Yemen’s culturally unique practice of democracy and a symbol of the state itself. On the other hand, the regime has claimed that the central government is continually threatened by the tribes and therefore needs to shore up their coercive power against the threat that they constitute. There is some truth to both claims. The threat the tribes pose to the central government is real, which is highlighted by the total number of weapons they possess, which is almost four times that of the state. However, it is wrong to characterise them simply in oppositional terms to the state. A disproportionate number of sheikhs and their tribal constituents are represented in Yemen’s hierarchies of power. Their domination does not, however, spread to cover any monolithic ‘tribal’ constituency, and the number excluded from power is far greater than those included.

In an interview on Abu Dhabi Television, President Saleh referred to his own reliance on tribal society, because of his ability to mobilise the tribes ‘on his command’. A source close to the president suggested that this preference lies in the fact that Saleh is extremely competent at manipulating tribal structures and norms to his political advantage, and confirmed that he encourages tribal revenge wars to weaken and divide the tribes: ‘he gives [violent conflicts] the green light; he lets them know that he will not stand in the way’. 
Recently, the tribes have played an integral role in the conflict surrounding the al-Houthi-led rebellion in the governorate of Sa'ada that occurred in various stages from 2004 (and was still on-going in mid-2006). Some tribes were drawn into battle as a result of their opposition to the strong military presence in what was traditionally a tribal stronghold with weak central government penetration. Other tribes supported the government security forces (Glosemeyer 2004). However, the al-Houthi rebellion placed Saleh squarely in between the tribes of Sa’ada that were fighting the government, the tribes he was paying to fight on the government’s behalf, and the (also largely tribal) military. The propensity of tribal fighters to swap loyalties to the highest bidder, and the readiness of military leaders to exacerbate this for personal profit, pulled President Saleh deeper into a guerrilla-style conflict than he could have intended. Tribesmen in Sana’a have voiced serious concerns that the presence of tribal forces on either side of the battlefield may set the stage for protracted violence as tribes became drawn into a cycle of exacting revenge for deaths or injuries to their kinsmen. In qat chews around the city, the accusation that the government’s purpose is indeed to fuel such tribal rivalries to expand their presence in the region is regularly made.

At the national level, religious identity is more important to framing the Sa’ada conflict than to defining it. The uprising is primarily a political challenge to the regime. At the outset of the fighting, Hussein al-Houthi called Saleh ‘a tyrant...who wants to please America and Israel, by sacrificing the blood of his own people’, which indicates the political nature of the dispute. While tribal groups are actors in the conflict, it appears again that this is less an issue of identity per se than it is of tribes resisting the state’s incursion into what was previously relatively autonomous territory, or in some cases, simple tribal profiteering. The Sa’ada conflict is the product of many grievances: a repressive and increasingly exclusive state, the state’s deliberate fanning of sectarianism in Sa’ada, and the blowback from the regime’s divide and rule tactics. However, the religious language in which the conflict has been framed is also of concern to the regime because it awakens old animosities that undermine the regime’s attempt to incorporate diverse elements of Yemeni society. While the regime has tried to discredit the al-Houthis by claiming that they have called for the re-introduction of the imamate, and that Hussein al-Houthi actually proclaimed himself imam, they deny these charges, although there is some ambiguity in their denials. The fact that support for al-Houthi has spread well beyond the Zaydi areas of the northern highland region indicates, however, that it is the political challenge to the regime’s legitimacy that resonated with Yemenis more broadly. Identities can be mobilised around this conflict but are insufficient to fully explain its motivations, which lie more with a challenge to the legitimacy of the exclusive Saleh regime, and its seeming endeavour to siphon off more of the country’s diminishing wealth.

4) Discourses of inequality

Perceptions of vertical inequality are strongly present in Yemeni discourse. Regional differences feed into the perceived divide between the tribal and non-tribal identities. These pit ‘tribal’ against ‘non-tribal’; chaos (fawda) against order (nizaam); and ‘Sanhan’ (Saleh’s tribe) against virtually everybody else. The term Sanhan has been popularly adopted as a reference to the highland region in general or as an expression of anger against the narrow circle of tribal elites that wield the most political power in the unified state. Particularly outside of upper Yemen, the regime is commonly popularly described as ‘tribal’, and the term has thus taken on connotations of backwardness (mutakhalif) and corruption.
Grievances against the excesses, corruption, and military dominance of the regime have fed into southern accusations of ‘re-tribalisation’. While a number of Yemen experts dispute that re-tribalisation exists, the claim is not entirely without basis. The highland-based regime has intentionally revitalised certain elites and practices that are commonly labelled as tribal, such as the prevalence of nepotism and patronage (mahsubiyyah). It is important to note that other aspects of tribalism, such as egalitarianism and a solid social safety net, are not being intentionally fostered by the regime. What is perceived and referred to as re-tribalisation in lower Yemen and the former south is more accurately described as the deliberate fostering of corruption and patronage within a relatively narrow circle of elites drawn from northern tribal society.

While these charges of nepotism and corruption are common sentiments in lower Yemen and the former PDRY, it is not just the south and non-tribal northerners that complain of this political style. Anthropologist Paul Dresch states that northern tribespeople feel that the regime’s political style actually represents ‘tribalism’s negation’ (2000). By simultaneously weakening cultural tribalism by severing leaders from their traditional support bases, the Yemeni system is poorly-equipped to deal with the rapid change it is undergoing.

5) Breakdown of social cohesion and traditional conflict resolution

Yemen has undergone immense changes in the last forty years, which have eroded the traditional egalitarianism of the tribal regions and introduced a more strongly hierarchical and wealth-based class system throughout the country (Adra 2006). Increasing unemployment, rapid urbanisation, the growth of rentierism (reliance on externally generated revenue – particularly oil and donor money), the politicisation of religion, and the centralisation of political power through the patronage system are all drivers of exclusion in Yemen. Each of these processes is occurring at the expense of social capital and traditional methods of conflict resolution.

In pursuing the concentration of power at the centre, the tactics of the Saleh regime have been quite successful in the short-term, but run serious longer-term risks. There are many indications of the lack of state interest in the tribes below the level of the sheikhs, of which tribes people are keenly aware. The system of patronage surrounding the major sheikhs has increasingly served to alienate them from their tribes. Resentment has been steadily building against the fortune that they have amassed – many feel at their expense. Dresch argues that many Hashidis (by far the best represented group in the state’s largesse after the President’s small Sanhan tribe) ‘seem demoralized’. As a consequence, he suggests, even the strongly cohesive tribes of the Hashid confederation are unlikely to stand behind a sheikh as forcefully as they would have even twenty years ago (Dresch 1995). A tribal sheikh and ranking government official commented for instance that ‘the interests of Sheikh Abdullah’s son are not the interests of his tribe…now he is not keeping the interest of his tribe…he represents himself and other business people’. There is a vacuum in the Yemeni system: the government needs to build the power of the tribes in order to, as President Saleh put it, ‘mobilise’ them at his command, but they must also sever their power to prevent them from uniting to destabilise his government. By including only narrow sections of the tribal population, the regime has in fact weakened its own core. It also appears to have contributed to the decay of other elements of the tribal system, such as the erosion of traditional norms that prohibit violence in certain areas such as marketplaces, and against ‘vulnerable’ people, such as women and children (International Crisis Group 2003). The decline of such sanctions among the best-armed segments of society has troubling implications for the possibility of political violence.
The rule of law has been another key casualty of the government’s short-sighted actions. With the simultaneous decay of other tribal codes and norms, particularly tribal cohesion, egalitarianism, and consultative decision-making, alongside the continued weakness and inefficiency of the state institutions that might replace them, Yemeni society wades through an uncertain transformation.

6) Extremism and efforts to prevent violence

Co-optation has been the regime’s key method of containing violence, backed with the state’s demonstrated willingness to resort to physical coercion where necessary. Yemen’s last major civil conflict in 1994 was resolved by a decisive military victory by the north, however, and the strong military presence in the former south is a vivid reminder of the physical consequences of challenging the regime.

Tribal leaders are co-opted into the state’s patronage network and bear responsibility for controlling the potential for anti-state violence in their local areas. Failure is punished with fairly crude carrot and stick methods. If there is a dispute between the government and the sheikh (or his tribe) the sheikh’s government stipend is reduced or severed, depending on the nature of the offence. Where problems persist, the government has resorted to physical force.

Similarly, the regime attempts to co-opt militant Islamists. A considerable number of radicals had been intentionally incorporated into the armed forces in an attempt to appease them into abandoning their extremism. It is of course also possible that this may facilitate their operational capacity in the longer term. The biggest threat that Yemen faces with regard to militant jihadists is a political and/or economic collapse. A power vacuum would be likely to push these groups to pursue their objectives more openly. The other major factor will be when the Yemeni fighters return from Iraq.

Yemen relies on oil for around 75 per cent of its budget, but production has been decreasing significantly. While major discoveries are still possible, it is widely believed in the oil industry that Yemen’s production is likely to have already peaked. The World Bank has even stated, as has President Saleh, that production is likely to be negligible by 2012, some ten years earlier than was previously expected. This estimate may be at the direr end of the spectrum, but was widely reported locally and certainly fuels domestic concerns about the country’s future stability and about the very finite nature of Yemen’s (relative) wealth. If the state shows signs of buckling under the pressure as oil revenues diminish, stability is likely to steadily decline and the country may become increasingly open to sudden political shifts. It may be premature to link that climate to an upsurge in jihadist radicalism, but the considerable number of armed Salafi radicals throughout the country who are currently in a tense standoff with the government, would be possible beneficiaries of greater instability. The other nightmare scenario that is sometimes heard voiced in Sana’a’s political circles is that in the event of such a collapse, the well-armed tribes descend on the cities looking for jobs, money and food.

Militant Islamists in Yemen realise that the ‘war on terror’ is directed against them and they have, at least formally, accepted the offer of a ceasefire from the regime against them. The ‘ceasefire’ was made in 2003 between the government and members of the umbrella group Qa’idat al-Jihad fi al-Yemen (Base of Jihad in Yemen), which includes the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army and the al-Qa’ida Sympathisers. Since this time there has been a fragile truce, but jihadist radicals remain the wildcard of Yemeni politics, upon whom the possibility of unpredictable
changes hinges. Militants’ bases may have been destroyed but the network remains largely intact, and they continue to have sympathisers who are well-placed within the military and security services, and probably within the regime itself. More research is needed, however on their goals and organisational structure.

**Conclusion: reducing exclusion and the potential for violence**

Increased corruption and the exclusion of most groups from access to public resources are the key drivers for possible political violence in Yemen. The route out involves the introduction of major political and economic reforms to re-direct the state’s limited resources to a larger proportion of the population. This must happen quickly. Yemen must implement reforms to encourage foreign investment to cover the gap when the decline in oil revenue becomes noticeable, which will probably occur over the next few years.

Investors have been leaving the country at a gathering pace in recent years because of the spiralling corruption and their lack of legal recourse. Addressing corruption in the civil service, the judiciary, and in the regime’s distribution of government contracts and economic commons must be urgently addressed. If Yemen does not become a safer place for investment quickly, the declining oil revenues will be extremely painful for the population and will carry the potential to lead to violence. Foreign governments should consider funding programmes that will make Yemen more attractive to investors and that will, therefore, help reduce unemployment and poverty (Burrowes 2005).

Yemen has shown in the past that it does take account of donor perceptions of the country’s political and economic trajectory, and it appears that the recent – largely cosmetic – reforms, such as the cabinet reshuffle, but also President Saleh’s lingering insistence that he would not seek re-election in September, were designed partly for this purpose. This gives foreign donors an opportunity to direct aid to the areas that it is needed most: the reduction of exclusion and corruption in its many different guises – particularly with the aim of seeking non-oil based forms of income, followed by poverty alleviation, and welfare in education and healthcare.

President Saleh is central to this process and despite his claims to the contrary, he has the power to stem corruption considerably. If he chooses to act, a considerable amount can be achieved – and probably in quite a short period of time. The level of corruption in Yemen is not as ingrained as it is in some other Arab states and Yemenis often talk of how, even fifteen years ago, corruption was considered deeply shameful. The corruption that exists at the lower levels is based much more on the need to meet living expenses than it is based on greed. Foreign governments should try to persuade President Saleh to implement advertised and merit-based hiring policies in the civil service and to pay realistic living salaries to make corruption less of a necessity. The same could realistically be done for the judiciary.

The challenges are huge, but these are two tangible areas that foreign governments could target quickly to help reduce poverty and the reliance on diminishing oil income by making Yemen more attractive to investors. Reducing the grievances of the excluded sections of the population by implementing genuine political and economic reforms that re-direct the state’s wealth away from such a narrow circle of highland elites would increase stability and reduce the potential for political violence considerably.
ANNEX IV Terms of Reference: Understanding the routes in and out of political violence: An assessment of the linkages between identity politics, exclusion, inequality and political violence in EMAD countries.

Aim: To increase understanding of the causes of political violence in EMAD (Europe, Middle East and America Division) countries in order to support new policy development and operations.

Objective:
  i. To examine the links between identity politics, exclusion, inequality, and political violence by assessing case-study evidence from EMAD countries on the routes in and out of political violence.
  ii. To draw out the key policy implications of addressing the root causes of political violence for DFID operations.

Background:

The challenges of addressing political violence are evident in DFID’s policy work. This is reflected in a focus on fragile and effective states, security and development. A recent piece of work entitled ‘a framework for understanding global identity and drivers of insecurity: responding to extremism and radicalisation in poor countries’ addresses causes more clearly through looking at routes towards political violence. These routes are global, relating to states’ international policies, and role in global networks. They relate to ineffective states, with highly unequal political participation. They also operate through the politicisation of identity where identity is chosen by people as a rallying point and means of empowerment and mobilisation to address lack of social justice and blocked political participation.

The issue of political violence, social cohesion and identity politics resonates across Whitehall. The Home Office, with their policy on strengthening society has recently developed a new strategy centred on increasing race equality and community cohesion (Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society: the Government’s strategy to increase race equality and community cohesion, 2005). This strategy recognises the importance of reducing inequality in services, jobs, security and justice. It promotes social cohesion that recognises cultural difference. The PM’s Strategy Unit recognises the importance of preventing instability, in understanding underlying causes and country capacity, across state and society (Investing in Prevention: a Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit report to the Government, February 2005). Causes relate to the strength of civil society, legitimacy of the state, degree of poverty and horizontal inequality.

The regions that constitute EMAD (Latin America, the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia) are marked by deep and often increasing inequalities that are textured by social exclusion along lines of geography, social class, gender and ethnicity. The demands of the poor and excluded are increasingly expressed as identities felt through these exclusionary processes, contextualised by culture, and voiced for example as women, as black people, as members of a religious faith or of an ethnic group. There are issues as to the extent to which these diversities divide and form the basis of conflict, or are the starting point for alliances and processes towards social cohesion. It is clear that the diverse regions of EMAD have valuable lessons to contribute to policy work on exclusion, the causes of violence and the building of effective societies and states.
The proposed study will serve multiple purposes. It will feed into the DFID discussions around White Paper III; it will strengthen EMAD operational work around social exclusion, political violence and the challenges of creating effective states, and will contribute to EMAD’s Communication Strategy. It will also add to our Whitehall contributions to the security and social cohesion agendas. It will add evidence to design, and support the development of good practice. It will provide a better understanding of the drivers towards and away from violence, of what enables and facilitates dialogue across competing claims. Causality will be examined at multiple levels (local, national, global), and in specific relation to countries within the EMAD region. It aims to examine notions of social cohesion in the context of diversity and identity politics, to support the development of policy approaches that can address the causes and drivers of political violence.

Among other dimensions of enquiry, the consultants will look at:

- the use of multiple and hybrid identities as the basis of claims, forms of empowerment and supporting citizenship;
- the extent to which tendencies to violence around these claims are rooted in processes of exclusion and identity with deepening economic, social and political inequalities;
- pathways to dialogue and the political space within which both political violence and ways forward emerge;
- the links between social cohesion, identity politics and pathways out of political violence.

Tasks

- Draw up a 3-5 page framework that conceptualises the links between identity politics, exclusion and inequality, political violence and social cohesion in EMAD countries. Present a draft to the EMAD Social Exclusion Virtual Policy Team.
- Complete three case study examples looking at the routes in and out of political violence by assessing identity politics, social cohesion, inequality and exclusion using secondary data and involving region-based researchers as needed. A coherent research methodology will be needed to ensure compatibility across case study countries. The final choice of case studies is to be determined in consultation between the consultants and DFID and will need to reflect a diversity of experience from the Middle East/North Africa, Latin America/Caribbean and Eastern Europe/Central Asia.
- Synthesis report highlighting operational issues and policy implications.
- Hold a half-day seminar in DFID to discuss and refine policy outcomes and operational implications.

Products:

A final report not to exceed 30 pages, to include:

- Executive Summary
• Framework
• Three case studies
• Section on implications for operations
• Recommendations from the policy and operational outcomes seminar

Inputs and Required Expertise

The consultant or team of consultants will have up to 40 days between them.

The consultant or team will need the following skills and experience:

• expertise in political and social analysis;
• proven experience of analytical work on political violence and familiarity with DFID’s work on extremism and radicalism; and
• familiarity with EMAD countries, ideally those listed as potential case studies.

Timetable (2006)

• 15 May Consultancy starts
• 2 June Framework finalised
• 30 June Draft of 3 case studies
• mid July Policy outcomes seminar
• 29 September Final document

The consultant will report to Emma Morley, the Team Leader of EMADs Social Exclusion Virtual Policy Team.

The consultant or team will copy Wendy Wilkin, the GSDRC Commissioned Services Manager, (ww@enterplan.co.uk) into key correspondence with DFID, particularly when finalising the framework and submitting the draft case studies. The final report document must be submitted to Wendy Wilkin, in the first instance, by 27 September 2006 for quality assurance and submission to DFID.
Annex: Potential case studies

**Tajikistan:** shifting of chosen identities moving from the Soviet Union to Regional identity and now looking to tradition and its institutions, currently expressed as religious, Islamic, for services and security not provided by the state. The coexistence of a bureaucratic culture linked to Soviet Union, with post-colonial overtones of a strong state leading to a closing of civic space, lack of means for effective political participation with the beginnings of extremist labelled incidents. Context of impoverishment, frustration with living standards.

**Georgia:** manipulation of ethnic identities in Abkhazia by a neighbouring state resulting in conflict in Georgia, and the peaceful Rose revolution two years late, by mostly young people with a shared identity and common stake in building an effective state for their own future. Shift from conflict to peaceful ways forward, with use of rights of peaceful protest and voice, self empowerment to bring about change, illustration of alternative empowerment and mobilisation where political participation is blocked.

**Yemen:** breakdown in social cohesion and co-option of civil society, with undermining of traditions of resource distribution concentrating power and key assets, particularly land. Impact on identities, increase of tension expressed through tribal identity, with religion as basis of identity in the Northern Sadr conflict over the lifting of oil subsidies. Context of deepening poverty

**Egypt:** political participation has been blocked or heavily controlled for most of Egypt's modern history. Regular single-candidate presidential and multi-party parliamentary elections have done little to increase civic engagement and reduce the exclusion of all but the regime's clients. The announcement in February 2005 of multi-candidate polls in the recent presidential election raises hopes of a change and helped to mobilise a wide range of civil responses. However, restrictions on the filing of candidacies reduced the success of the regime’s foremost opponents ‘the Islamists’ and paved the way for Mubarak's easy re-election. As a result, Egyptian society is simultaneously sceptical about the possibility of progressive political change and invigorated by improvements in press freedoms and the strong showing of rival political parties.

**Andes:** Strong mobilisation around ethnic identity, linked to options or not for political participation in formal politics of parties and elections. Linked also to autonomy and sovereignty issues, especially in Bolivia. Analysis of the Shining Path in Peru including its recent resurgence will be able to contribute to thinking around the linkages between political identity and the paths in and out of violence.

Final TORs
EMAD – January 2006
Gender Violence. Gendered Political Economy: Production and Reproduction. Gender and (International) Political Economy. Households, Families, and Social Reproduction. Gender, Care, and Welfare. Gender, Work, and the Sexual Division of Labor. Civil Society. Sex, Gender, and Civil Society. Finally, it presents an understanding of the evolution of the gender and politics subfield as well as some of the challenges that remain. Keywords: gendered nature, politics, political science, sex typing, gender. Politics as a real-world phenomenon and political science as an academic discipline are gendered. To expand the understanding of key predictors of violence among youth beyond those apparent in Kenya, it would be valuable to conduct a similar study to this one using data from multiple countries. This would enable Mercy Corps to more rigorously test its youth and conflict program theories, and to better understand the contexts in which they could most appropriately be used to inform program design. A notable exception is Mercy Corps’ Evaluation and Assessment of Poverty and Conflict/Fragility. Interventions research project. Understanding Political Violence among Youth: Evidence from Kenya | MERCY CORPS. Politically motivated violence in Nigeria. Violence or the threat of violence as a phenomenon is human activity which has been recognized in African countries as a dimension of local, national and international politics. Individuals and groups throughout history in one form or the other resorted to violence or its potential use as a tactics of political action. Political violence is endemic in most of the world’s political system today. Several of those standing against her reportedly told her to stay out of the contest and stressed that if she continued to contest the nomination, the consequences would be more than she could handle. After two weeks, the police reportedly arrested someone who confessed that he had been hired to kill her.