Psychopathic Criminals:
Political, Economic, Developmental, and Treatment Issues

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BACKGROUND
This paper, written in 1995, was motivated by my running groups for violent offenders for two years, as I was preparing for my doctoral internship. I had a master’s degree in clinical psychology and was halfway through my Ph.D. program. My interest was in tying together the applied, academic, political, and economic issues affecting the treatment of criminals. Corrections policies are largely reactions to recent events regarding public awareness of social issues versus economic pressures. When a particularly heinous crime is committed by a parolee incarceration is lengthened and treatment programs are cobbled together. Times of budget crunches lead to early release of prisoners. The direct cost of immobilization is rarely bucked against the indirect cost of crime. As politics drives policy there is little attention paid to long-term stability of offender treatment and management programs. This article was written when public safety was the primary concern and is being posted when government is making cutbacks. Regardless of the times, the issues are presented because, while dollar and prisoner numbers change, the issues are remarkably consistent.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
Crime became the major issue on the American political landscape, in 1994. “Three strikes and you’re out (or in)” became the battle cry of state and national legislators. Crime was estimated as costing our country $425 billion each year (Mandel et al., 1993). In early spring 1994, the United States House of Representatives authorized $10 billion for police over five years plus $7–9 billion for crime prevention, and capital punishment for more than 60 federal crimes (Outlook, 1994).

Americans turned, with frustration in 1994, to harsher punishment, including executions, as an answer to crime problems. A young man, Michael Fay, accused of vandalism in Singapore was sentence to caning — a whipping with a long stick. A Newsweek (Elliott, 1994) poll showed 38% approved of and 52% disapproved of his punishment. The public asserted its right to safety over the rights of offenders. As the political landscape changed, educational, training, social, and therapy programs were less in favor. In search for an answer to crime, retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation replaced rehabilitation as the emphasis in our criminal justice system. Public faith in treatment declined.

Nonetheless, the same experts argue for treatment, such as Dr. Judith Becker, president of ATSA (Sleek, 1994b). Her comments on the gruesome Jeffrey Dahmer case were:

“When you sit and talk to this man, he is not a belligerent or scary person to sit with and hold a conversation with ... Jeffrey Dahmer is a tragic figure. He in a sense was an incredibly lonely person who believed that nobody would elect to stay with him. He did not enjoy the act of murder. That's why he was experimenting with the kind of weird science, trying to make these people into zombies. He felt so powerless that he found that to be the only way to have power.” (Sleek, 1994b, p. 32)

She said, sex offenders “early experiences of abuse and deprivation make them angry, bitter, cynical, and disdainful of interpersonal intimacy. They are sexually aroused by dominating and inflicting pain and suffering on others” (p. 32). Dr Becker's comments certainly indicate the poor childhood interpersonal relations of perpetrators.

www.HOUD.info/criminals.pdf
The belief in incurability and lifelong treatment is not unique to sex offenders. Alcoholism has a following, particularly among Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), that contends it is an incurable “disease.” AA takes the position that the only way to fight the demon is to regularly attend AA meetings and subscribe to a 12 Steps Program to control the illness (Alcoholics Anonymous, 1976). Fortunately, alcoholics generally do not present danger to the public if they relapse; and the program is inexpensive, but depends largely upon voluntary participation. On the other hand, should we accept possible physical assaults from violent offenders by giving probation, parole, pardon, release, and maximum sentences to the unredeemable?

I prefer to call lifelong approaches management programs, because they need an aftercare budget and personnel. Management is used in accordance with its dictionary functional definition of ongoing managing, supervising, and controlling. The psychotherapeutic belief in basic structural change is important, because it aims to reduce the need for outside supervision. It is also consistent with judicial sentencing which usually has a maximum date at which corrections must terminate relationships with convicts. Inmates complain that they are never trusted and trust needs to be the credo and is implied in the name correctional institution. I painfully avoid taking sides in the political debate, but believe if we are going to use a “scarlet letter” we should be up front about it.

**POLITICAL REALITIES AND ECONOMICS**

Whatever the etiology of criminals, they cause harm to people here and now. Out of concern for personal safety, our nation is presently debating the issue of crime within the legislative and executive branches of our federal and state governments. Opinions on crime policy and incarceration of offenders vary along four axes: (1) punishment or retribution, (2) incarceration or immobilization, (3) therapy or rehabilitation, and (4) deterrence (Masters & Roberson, 1990). Retribution is our “eye for an eye” or “just deserts” punishment that takes into account society’s idea of fair revenge and moral outrage. Deterrence aims at making an example of the offender so that others may be influenced to “think twice” about committing a similar infraction. Historically, change in philosophy from punitiveness (1) to treatment (3) is reflected by changing the names of jails and prisons to correctional institutions. We are now moving away from rehabilitation (3) toward immobilization (2) with “three strikes you’re out,” which implies that, at least, the felony committing population cannot change or should not be forgiven.

Nonetheless, there is a belief that psychopaths have mid-life change at about age 40 and no longer commit crimes. Dr. Robert Hare (1993), one of the prominent scholars and researchers on psychopaths, recently asked and speculated:

> What accounts for the decrease in antisocial behavior that many psychopaths show in middle age? Several plausible explanations have been advanced: They “burn out,” mature, get tired of being in prison or in conflict with the law, develop new strategies for beating the system, find someone who understands them, restructure their views of themselves and the world, and so on. (p. 98)

Caspi (1993), in contrast, says that “an extensive database describes the continuity of antisocial behavior across the life course” (p. 343). “The explanation for behavioral continuities may be found in the genetic sources, environmental sources, as well as the interactional processes of personality functioning” (p. 344). Caspi, however, goes on to describe reasons for the stability of behavior and possibilities for change.

William James, the greatest American psychologist of the nineteenth century (Hunt, 1993), and the father of American psychology (Bettelheim, 1984), was quite clear in his opinion that there are limits on lifelong development:

> at the age of twenty-five you see the professional mannerism settling down ... [and] in most of us, by the age thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again. (James, 1890/1950, p. 121)

Last year, the APA sponsored and published a book (Heatherton & Weinberger, 1994), among others (Funder et al., 1993; Plomin & McClearn, 1993), to set about answering the question “Can Personality Change?” The editors feel “there seems to be a consensus that personality goes through many changes and transitions during childhood and adolescence” (p. xii).
The question of lifelong change is not merely of academic interest. If change is possible over the lifespan, it bodes well for psychotherapy. Whereas, if there is no basic change, remedial efforts will not be effective.

In a recent movie, Carlito’s Way, Al Pacino, as Carlito, the protagonist who is trying to get away from a life of crime, tells Penelope Ann Miller, as Gail, his lover:

“You know, it's a funny thing, this guy’s, a counselor at Lewisberg, Mr Sewald, once said to me, he said: ‘Charlie you’ve run out of steam, you can’t sprint all the way; you got to stop some time; you can’t buck it forever; catches up to you. You don’t get reformed, you just run out of wind.’”

Do criminals change or not? The problem is not only academic, it is economic as well. The cost of keeping a criminal in jail for 25 years beyond his or her fortieth birthday is a half million dollar decision, at $20,000 per year. Is it cost effective to incarcerate somebody for a decades after they are no longer a danger to society? If a person cannot be changed and is dangerous, the reasonable solution is to prevent him or her from committing another crime by removal from society. If change is possible, would it be more economical to rehabilitate and put them on the street where they can be self supporting? How much certainty do we want to invest in a positive change theory when Beta errors (the possibility of assuming a change and being wrong) are fodder for 60 Minutes and the plethora of other investigative television shows modeled after it. It only takes one Willie Horton example to enrage the public, as the 1988 Bush-Dukakis presidential campaign demonstrated.

Nevertheless, economics are a consideration and we need to weigh the cost of incarceration against risk and the efficacy of treatment. Today, many of the treatment programs are morally, politically, and economically rationalized. Quality versus costs are rarely considered.

**SEMANTICS AND TREATMENT**

Successive editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual’s (DSM, Pub: American Psychiatric Association), in order to be politically correct (Cleckley, 1986), changed the designation psychopath to sociopath to antisocial personality disorder. Prior to the DSM this class of people were labeled with constitutional psychopathic inferiority and moral insanity. Wulach (1983) also wants the term antisocial personality discarded. He feels “there is enough stereotyped reaction to crime in our society without the need for the mental health professions to reinforce it with an official diagnosis that supports the popular misconception that most offenders are inherently bad, incorrigible, and all the same” (p. 338). Herein, the terms will be used interchangeably, depending on the context and nuance that I wish to achieve.

My inclination, at this time, is to differentiate types of criminals until we know more about them. Sex offenders, violent offenders, con men, and embezzlers may be different types, at least in outward appearance. People in corrections tell me that the sex offender units are the best duty for a guard to pull. The residents are neat, orderly, and well behaved. Violent offenders tend to be more histrionic and refer to sex offenders pejoratively as “snappers” because they dislike them. My experience is with violent offenders. Therefore, this paper will concentrate on these people who inflict non-sexual physical harm on other people. It behooves us to use a differential approach, at least until we know more.

Cleckley wrote the first edition of his seminal *The Mast of Sanity* in 1942, and it went through several editions. The fifth edition (1988) is in print with a private publishing imprint. Dr. Hervey Cleckley presented case after case of psychopaths. The underlying theme is the self-destructive nature of this group of people, however, there is a group of successful psychopaths which Cleckley cannot explain. The violent offenders that I worked with generally fell under the unsuccessful psychopath rubric. They act impulsively and get caught.

One seemingly intelligent member of a treatment group, who was initially resistant to treatment, told the assistant superintendent of the jail and myself at graduation from an orientation group, of 8-weeks, 16-sessions, that he had learned much from me and would lead a new life. He told us that...
he was motivated by a wish to return to his wife and children whom he loved dearly. His homework was excellent. Graduation was on Wednesday afternoon, and on Thursday evening he literally went “over the wall” with 5 other inmates. When working with criminals, we cannot delude ourselves into thinking there is predictive value to prosocial verbalism and behavior in a controlled setting.

A member of our twice weekly, long-term (1 year), ongoing, slow-open, community treatment group faithfully and punctually came to 25 sessions and always did her homework. Her participation was good and she regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings. At a meeting of the group, she reported separation from her husband, whom she married at an AA meeting just before joining the group. She did not attend the next meeting and was put on escape status, expected to have left the state. The moral is: regular participation and flawless cognitive presentations are not indicative of basic change.

Wulach (1983) gives a useful “simplified synopsis of the adult antisocial manifestations [that] includes an erratic employment history, child abuse or neglect, illegal behavior, lack of an enduring sexual relationship, fights, defaulting on debts, aimless traveling or wandering, repeated lying, and drunken driving or recurrent speeding” (p. 333).

How do people become criminals? This is not only a rhetorical question, because crime carries such a real cost in dollars and human misery, both for perpetrators and victims. There are biological, sociological, and psychological explanations (Masters & Roberson, 1990; Reid, 1988). Yochelson and Samenow (1976, 1977/1985, 1986) wrote an impressive three volume set of books that asserts criminals have 52 separate cognitive distortions (1976) that must be individually corrected (1977). I reduce them to three: they lie, manipulate, and exploit. These are important considerations, because therapists must be aware of clients attempts to deceive, even in the most remorseful and heart rendering presentations. The conniving nature of sociopaths needs to be understood, before developing or engaging in a treatment approach.

Beck, Freeman, and Associates (1990) specifically point out that Axis I disorders are relatively plastic and erroneous schemas moderate as the dysfunction subsides. Axis II disorders are “structuralized” and built into “normal” cognitive organizations. Therefore, change takes much more time and effort. From a psychodynamic point of view, antisocial personality is ego syntonic, so the person does not exhibit internal motivation to change. Therefore, impetus for change must be externally applied, or mandated, a concept foreign to many traditional psychotherapy approaches.

Beware! Sociopaths exude a compelling attraction that draws therapists into their web and play on sincere desires to help (Allen & Bosta, 1981). Besides, advocacy is not the function of therapy and can destroy the therapeutic relationship. Neutrality and non-judgmental acceptance is not the same as bestowing favors. Therapists need to provide safety, security, and confidentiality for the client to wrestle with inner turmoil effectively. Getting hooked on a cause plays into the manipulative underpinnings of the psychopath's personality. Police need to protect, lawyers need to defend, corrections personnel need to supervise, judges need to decide, and therapists need to maintain the integrity of the therapeutic relationship. This must be done in a corrections environment that wants to draw everybody into the security decision conclave. People who are doing well in therapy, however, should eventually project themselves differently. There is no need for the therapist to be an informer. This reality smacks in the face of a system that wants to involve everybody in the decision process to spread the risk and responsibility against the risk of making a poor decision. On the other side, there is a compelling desire on the part of some new therapists to want to play god and affect person's freedom. Also, to react to highly frustrating individuals.

It, is helpful to have a theory that accounts for psychic structure and developmental process of criminals. What in the etiology of a violent offender leads to antisocial behavior? A disturbing consideration is how violent criminals fit into humanity. The approach herein will be to consider the relationship of the criminal to the normal population, not to discard them as some mysterious social aberration. Karl Menninger (1968) took a more benevolent position than I will take when he wrote:
Violence is a part of life, a component of the personality of every one of us, and only more conspicuous in criminals because it has — for many interesting reasons — escaped control in a way that hurt or frightens us. (p. 189)

Menninger’s mission was to normalize deviant behavior. My preference is to look at the underlying structure of personality and how and why it got that way. That is, what do they do (symptomology), and how and why did they get that way (etiology)? It is comforting to console ourselves by differentiating psychopaths from the rest of us and our clients. Nevertheless, I will argue that they are narcissists, which generalizes to those among us. Before we can address causation, however, we must define the salient characteristics of these harmful people with impulsive self-destructive behavior.

**SYMPTOMOLOGY**

Cleckley (1988) has an excellent list of “what the psycho-path is in terms of his actions and his apparent intentions . . .

1. Superficial charm and good “intelligence”
2. Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking
3. Absence of “nervousness” or psychoneurotic manifestations
4. Unreliability
5. Untruthfulness and insincerity
6. Lack of remorse or shame
7. Inadequately motivated antisocial behavior
8. Poor judgement and failure to learn by experience
9. Pathological egocentricity and incapacity for love
10. General poverty in major affect reactions
11. Specific loss of insight
12. Unresponsiveness to general interpersonal relations
13. Fantastic and uninviting behavior with drink and sometimes without
14. Suicide rarely carried out
15. Sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated
16. Failure to follow any life plan.” (p. 337-338)

I have some reservations in including lack of shame (6), as they are often hypersensitive to slights. Also, while most inmates seem fairly intelligent (1), although many have not graduated high school, they cover a range of IQ. Maybe their intelligence is misjudged because of the ongoing scheming and manipulation that fascinates this writer.

Narratively, Cleckley (1988) created a summary statement to describe psychopaths:

*The history shows that he has failed repeatedly to make a satisfactory adjustment to the social group. His actions indicate serious impairment of judgement and show that he cannot be relied upon to conduct himself with ordinary regard for the safety of himself or of others. His irrational and unacceptable behavior has, furthermore, occurred without normal of adequate motivation. He shows no real insight into his condition and tends often to project the sources of his troubles to the environment. His emotional reactions are grossly impaired and he has repeatedly shown inappropriate or inadequate affect*[italics added]. (p. 368)

Cleckley is describing the psychopath in the above quote, but with an additional sentence the description changes to a schizophrenic: “We may say, then, that he is psychotic, incompetent, incapable of carrying on the usual activities of life, and in need of close supervision” (p. 368). One word, “psychotic,” changes the diagnosis from psychopathy to schizophrenia, or Axis II to Axis I.

The above description is a good pointer toward Cluster B of the personality disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), including 301.70 Antisocial Personality Disorder, 301.83 Borderline Personality Disorder, 301.50 Histrionic Personality Disorder, and 301.81 Narcissistic Personality.
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Disorder. These overlap, but I observed that narcissism is the core feature of violent offenders (if not most chronic criminals) and the other features of the cluster modulate the manifestation of the core narcissism. “Psychodynamic theorists have come to view the psychopath as an aggressive and pathological variant of narcissistic disorder ... whose intrapsychic functioning relies on primitive splitting and dissociative mechanisms” (Gacono, Meloy, & Heaven, 1990, p. 271). Gacono et al. (1990) also show that many authors have pointed out an association between antisocial personality and hysteria. Lilienfeld et al. (1986) confirm the co-occurrence of hysterical and antisocial symptoms and the high prevalence of criminal histories among the hysterics. They see them as illnesses emanating from the same pathogenesis.

Pathogenic similarities are also seen in the relationship between borderline and narcissistic disorders. Gerald Adler holds “these [borderline] patients bear a developmental relationship to those with narcissistic personality disorders — that is, borderline patients, as they improve in therapy, may attain functions and capacities that make them appear diagnostically similar to patients with narcissistic personality disorders” (1981, p. 46; 1985, p. 86). Kohut (1977), however, sees borderlines and narcissists as distinct from one another. Kernberg (1975), on the other hand, sees narcissists as a variety of borderline personality organization. Meloy (1988) contends:

The weight of clinical research supports the hypothesis that psychopathic personality organization is one subtype of narcissistic personality disorder, albeit an extreme and dangerous variant. Likewise, narcissistic personality disorder represents personality function and structure at a relatively higher developmental level of borderline personality organization. (p. 17)

Cleckley (1988) and Korolev (1983), a Russian author, and many others, emphasize the basic sanity of the psychopath. “Their acts result not from a deranged mind but from a cold, calculating rationality combined with a chilling inability to treat others as thinking, feeling human beings” (Hare, 1993, p. 5).

Criminals and psychopaths are not out of control in the sense that psychotics are driven. The looseness in referring to criminals and sane psychopaths, implied in my last sentence, is a reason Korolev (1986) complains

the term psychopath, equated in the Western literature with the terms criminal and antisocial personality, has become so vitiated that it has been suggested that it no longer be used at all and replaced with some other term. (p. 51, Note 2)

Cleckley (1988) would support this demarcation, but I do not agree with his clear distinctions between ordinary criminals and psychopaths. The connection, as I see it, is rooted in the lack of “moral regulations” (Dorpat, 1979). Psychopaths and criminals are deficient in conscience, or superego.

Hare (1993) disagrees with me: “Is there honor among thieves? Scratch the surface of the average prison inmate and you'll find some sort of moral code — not necessarily the code of mainstream society, but a moral code nevertheless, with its own rules and proscriptions” (p. 83). Yochelson and Samenow (1976) state “The ‘code’ is a myth, in that it is contingent on what is going to happen to the criminal in question” (p. 241). For popular examples consider how many criminals become state’s evidence. Perhaps, there is a class of convict that commits non-violent crimes, such as petty thieves and speeders, that can be separated, but the separation is blurred as the crime gets more violent. It behooves us to consider how people develop into psychopaths or criminals because of their basic destructiveness and disregard of the rest of us.

I believe that much can be gained by paying attention to the similarities between convicts and unindicted sociopaths and the rest of society. Extremes of behavior are an excellent indicator of more subtle problems. To cast convicts into prison, ignore them, and delude ourselves that they are a unique group of deviants, not like the rest of us, and not amenable to treatment, is unwise. Incarceration is an expensive proposition and we must weigh the alternatives. Understanding and treatment is not synonymous with being soft on crime. Until we have a cure, incarceration is an
expensive alternative to protect the populace but diminishes the cost of crime. Nonetheless, we must search for an etiology for cost-effective, if not for humane, reasons. History of the deinstitutionalization or regionalization of the mentally ill has shown that isolating a class of people and expensive solutions, sometimes under the guise of humanity, creates other problems (Johnson, 1990).

ETIOLOGY

Meloy (1988) considers the biological substrate of psychopaths along with developmental paradigms. Felson and Tedeschi (1993) advocate the social interactionist perspective on violence and aggression. “A social interactionist approach is critical of the view that aggression is ‘pushed out’ or ‘compelled’ by inner forces, such as aggressive energy, instincts, hormones, brain centers, thanatos, and frustration” (p. 2). Toch’s (1992) social psychological approach to violence is less confronting and he earned a “Forward” by Bertram Karon, past president of the APA Division (39) on Psychoanalysis. Dr. Karon laments: “Why is so much useless information presented? Because there is so little real information” (Koch, 1992, p. vii). Dr. Koch is making an attempt at using relevant theories and empirical studies to understand the problem of violence.

In that spirit, I will outline a compelling developmental approach to psychopathy, realizing that it is just a piece in the puzzle. Psychodynamic accounts of psychopathy in the past had not led to empirical study, however, recently there have been attempts to establish congruence between theory and practice (Hare, 1993).

This search for understanding is helped by working within a theoretical construct. Otto Kernberg (1985) follows from the psychoanalytic tradition of Freud, and integrates object relations and ego psychology, which he acknowledges were once in conflict. Major contributors to his approach are Margaret Mahler (1975) and Edith Jacobson (1954). In essence, the child's relationship to significant objects is considered a prerequisite to a sense of self and interpersonal relationships in adulthood.

Edith Jacobson's classic paper (Kernberg, 1985), “The Self and the Object World” (1985), which later became a book (1964) with the same name, has an enticing description of the development of the self and the ego. Her description of the process and structure of the self is:

with advancing psychosexual and ego development, with the maturation of physical abilities, of emotional and ideational processes and of reality testing, and with increasing capacity for perception, self-perception and introspection, the images become unified, organized, and integrated into more or less realistic concepts of the object world and of the self.

By a realistic concept of the self we mean one that mirrors correctly the state and characteristics, the potentialities and abilities, the assets and the limits of our bodily and mental ego: on the one hand, of appearance, our autonomy and our physiology; on the other hand, of our conscious and preconscious feelings and thoughts, wishes, impulses and attitudes, of our physical and mental activities. (p. 87)

Edith Jacobson builds upon the Freudian tradition of drives and conflicts so psychosexual motives are inherent in the development of her theory. At the same time there is the influence of Margaret Mahler's (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975) phases of developmental readiness. Parental relatedness is important to both of these women's theories. These are not indulgence models, however, as Overgratifications ... tend to induce regressive experiences of reunion between self and love object, processes that will be discussed in connection with the identifications. Prolonged persistence of the mother-child unit, with constant overgratification, may therefore delay the child in establishing firm boundaries between the objects and the self, and hence in reaching the stage of normal independence. (Jacobson, 1954, p. 90)

Boundaries and personal identity are key parts of the self. On the positive side, parental love is the best guarantee for the development of healthy social and love relations and of lasting identifications, and hence for a normal maturation of the ego.

...
On the way to this goal the child passes through rough avenues of continual hurt, frustration and disappointment in his parents, which arouses intensive feelings of ambivalence. Although dangerous, the child's ambivalence conflict can be utilized by the ego for very constructive purposes. ...

Frustrations, within normal bounds, reinforce in principle the process of discovery and distinction of objects and self; they throw the child back on his own resources, stimulate progressive forms of identification with the parents, and enhance the narcissistic endowment of his ego. (Jacobson, 1954, p. 90)

Psychoanalytic theory is involved and complicated and rooted in drive theory. Even Melanie Klein’s “British School” of object relations was an extension of Freud's theory (Greenberg, J. R., & Mitchell, 1983). W. R. D. Fairbairn challenged the view of libido being pleasure seeking and advocated object seeking. Whatever the underlying motivation, there is a need to relate. Classical psychoanalytic historical baggage seems to be a problem for many people to digest as it rests on sex drives and oedipal themes.

John Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) may provide a parental relationship theory that is more palatable. The child’s proximity seeking behavior toward the mother mediates attachment (Bowlby, 1969) and separation from the mother results in anger (Bowlby, 1973). Meloy (1988) points out some of the actions of mothers that can interfere with the attachment, include emotional abuse, nonresponsiveness, alterations between enmeshment and disengagement, and withdrawal of mothers to protect their own emotional equilibrium. Often, when the child and mother were not directly interacting, they felt a complete lack of connection. Unfortunately, these early pioneers focused on mothers and we need to learn more about fathers and family systems. It is beyond the scope of this paper, which is focusing on narcissism, but many realized the importance of fathers in family systems, among them Murray Bowen (1978) and Theodore Lidz (1985).

We cannot conclude without mentioning development of conscience or superego. Robert Hare, a respected researcher on psychopaths, a developer of the Psychopathy Checklist (Hare, 1985), titled his popular book Without Conscience (1993), thereby getting at the essence of the problem. The populace is amazed by the psychopath's lack of guilt. Kernberg (1992) says:

these narcissistic patients present some degree of superego pathology, including the incapacity to experience self-reflective sadness, deep mood swings, a predominance of shame as contrasted to guilt in their intrapsychic regulation of social behavior, and a value system more childlike than adult; that is, they value physical beauty, power, wealth, and the admiration of others as against capabilities, achievements, responsibilities, and relation to ideals. (p. 74)

Jacobson (1954) describes superego formation as a complicated process involving many reaction formations and compromise solutions that requires a certain amount of developmental maturity. For this process to proceed the child must not only fear retaliation from the “bad mother” but must perceive a pleasure premium from satisfying the “good mother.” In a rejecting environment there is no good love object to allow the superego development to proceed. The good news is in the concluding words of Jacobson's (1954) paper: “The fact that in the course of life our Weltbild (world view) may undergo further radical changes indicates that even after maturation and stabilization our concepts of the object world and of our own self may be profoundly influenced and altered by our life experiences and the biological stages through which we pass” (p. 126). Perhaps, we are not “cast in plaster,” after all.

**POSTSCRIPT**

Many times throughout this paper, I have emphasized the economic over the humane foundation for considering therapy. Bleeding hearts and bullies have had ample opportunities to prove their methods do not work (Hare, 1970; Weinberger & Sreenivasan, 1994). It is now time to consider serious therapeutic interventions measured against cost-performance and outcome research. To do
this, in addition to the cost of incarceration, analysts need to consider the expenses of property loss, police investigations, legal defense and prosecution costs, plus many other tangibles and intangibles.

Programs that incarcerate people for several years and then six months before release provide a cosmetic treatment program waste resources. Under this delusional system, the inmate has used most of his or her sentence to perfect the art of crime and social malfeasance. If we are to be serious about rehabilitation, it must be an overall integrated operation starting from day one of the sentence. Otherwise, let us stop kidding ourselves. The only safe alternative it to incarcerate everybody for life with the first offense.

Therapy must maintain the requirements of safety, security, and confidentiality. In is counter-therapeutic for the therapist to have a say in increased or decreased punishment, except as spelled out under Tarasoff duty to warn laws and other generally accepted legal and ethical principles that apply to everybody. The understandable need for prison case managers and parole officers to involve the universe in their decisions must be stopped. The desire on the part of therapist to advocate for their client must also be stopped. Psychopaths are manipulative and can woo the unsuspecting therapist with tales of a horrible existence that are heart wrenching (Allen & Bosta, 1981). People who change need to eventually be able to convince the warden and judge.

This is not a paper on therapy, although directions are implicit. Nevertheless, it behooves us to let treatment guide our research and vice versa. Theory without a practical application remains an academic curiosity. Warmed-over Axis I approaches do not transpose directly to Axis II disorders.

Our country's heightened interest in crime control is an understandable reaction to the havoc that was and is wrought by violent offenders. In this environment, a little hope for change is desired. Nevertheless, we must consider prevention and rehabilitation, or else immobilizing criminals will bankrupt our economy. Thus, I will end with a quote from Gerald Adler (1981): “These defects can be repaired in therapy when the patient learns that the therapist can survive his fury and continue to be a caring, protective individual who does not retaliate or abandon his patient” (p. 48).

REFERENCES


In strictly economic terms, economic development means the capacity of a national economy whose initial economic condition has been more or less static for a long time to generate and sustain an annual increase in its gross national product (GNP) at rates of 5% to 7% [4]. Economic development is a concept that refers to a change on means of production, technology, infrastructure. For example, the United Nations (UNs) declared from 1975-85 the UN decade for women. These initiatives recognized that development that excluded women could not really be termed development, but in many cases the approaches did not really address the root issues of gender inequality and disadvantage, or involve women in making decisions about their lives (ibid).