Facing Terrors: Klossowski and Kojève reflect on history
G. R. Beckett

One of the first questions asked of the French Revolution by English conservative Edmund Burke was ‘Were all these dreadful things necessary?’ 1 This is a question which can be asked of all enslaved human beings who have violently freed themselves from a tormentor. Two questions are being asked: first, is violence necessary for liberation? And second, having spilled blood, is it possible to then reinstate peaceful, non-violent relations? This paper addresses these questions by exploring what it meant in France in the late 1930s to contemplate the political violence of neighbours. Facing terrifying events at two borders with Spain and Germany, the French were also marking the 150th anniversary of their own bloody revolution. Two lectures at George Bataille’s College of Sociology gave radically different readings of the Terror and questioned whether relations forged in blood will ever supersede violence and become peaceful.

Russian émigré, philosopher, and instigator of the French turn to Hegel, Alexandre Kojève thought dreadful things were necessary, arguing in his celebrated lectures at the Ecole Practique on Hegel that ‘it is only thanks to the Terror [...] that the State is born’.2 Kojève argued that social relations are fundamentally established by our willingness to risk life. Those who fear their own death remain slaves. French Revolutionary Terror for Kojève was the ultimate blood-soaked encounter. The bourgeois becomes revolutionary as he watches heads roll. Like Hegel, Kojève argued that historical progress is ultimately determined not by reasoned declarations, but by fear. However, Kojève also believed that in becoming revolutionary, violence can also be overcome, that bloodshed between neighbours can end.

Pierre Klossowski, in contrast, argues that the mind cannot move on from death. In December 1938 he concludes:

when the members of a political community wish to limit themselves to racial ties, they cannot live the fraternity of these ties in simple affirmation; they can only do so by becoming a community based upon the negation of others; as with the terrorists of 1793, it is perhaps in the very extermination of a social and racial minority that the national socialists have sealed their fraternity.3

In his reading of the Terror, he argues that in watching the guillotining of others spectators do not feel fear but rather, long for their own death. Klossowski suggests that a state forged through bloodshed remains stained, unable to overcome its deathwish. He equates Robespierre’s Terror with the political violence of the Nazis. He uses the Republic’s language of ‘fraternity’ to describe the way the Nazis bond and equated the ‘negation of others’ in 1793 with the ‘extermination of a social and racial minority’.4 Doubting progress, Klossowski – like Nietzsche – sees history as a vicious circle.

Since publication in 1967 of Klossowski’s book, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, in which he explicitly challenges progressive, Hegelian history, it has become well understood that his work addresses Kojève. When, in 2005, diacritics produced a special edition on Klossowski, one of the editors, Russell Ford, noted the ‘enormous importance’ of Klossowski in what Gilles Deleuze calls the ‘generalised anti-Hegelianism’ of the 1960s.5 His work in the 1930s, in contrast, is seen as ‘borrowing heavily from Alexandre Kojève’.6 Ian James, building on an old but unprovable claim that Klossowski attended Kojève seminars,7 characterised the relation as master/student. This leads him to ‘question the rigour’ of Klossowski’s interpretation of Hegel.8 Yet Jean Hyppolite, and most subsequent commentators describe Kojève’s lectures on Hegel as ‘going beyond a literal reading’.9 Assessing whether Klossowski lacks ‘Hegel’s rigour’ by comparing him to Kojève is at best an oblique strategy and full of traps. The clash over the Terror suggests that the antagonism, which surfaces in the 1960s, can be traced to the 1930s, and therefore the idea of an uncontested Kojèvian/Hegelian hegemony in France from the 1930s to the 1960s should be contested.

Both Klossowski and Kojève lectured on Terror at the College of Sociology, George Bataille’s esoteric anti-institution. The College of Sociology defined its lectures as assessing ‘the collective psychological reactions aroused by the imminence of war’.10 I will argue that Klossowski’s lecture ‘The Marquis de Sade and the Revolution’, delivered in February 1939, is best understood as

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4. Ibid., p. 17.
9. James, op. cit., p. 75.
answering Kojève’s December 1937 lecture on ‘Hegelian Concepts’. Klossowski confronts Kojève on his history and what it meant in 1939 to give thanks to the Terror. In writing about the Revolution they both confront the past and the crisis of their own period.

To understand this pre-war argument about violence I will follow a chain of accounts of the Terror from Hegel to Kojève and from Sade to Klossowski. Their responses to violence in the French Revolution enable us to see where Kojève and Klossowski stand in relation to each other, the past, and contemporary politics.

Hegelian Terrors

Kojève, interviewed in July 1968, confirmed that the French Revolution was central to his understanding of Hegel:

I read The Phenomenology of Mind again, and when I got to chapter 6 I realized it [i.e., the end of History] was Napoleon. I started giving my lectures without preparing them. I just read and commented, and everything Hegel said seemed crystal clear [...] It’s all to do with the end of History. It’s very funny. Hegel said it himself. But when I explain that Hegel said it himself, said that history is over, no one will accept it: no one can stomach it. To tell the truth, I thought it was nonsense myself, but then I thought about it some more and saw it was brilliant.11

Of course Kojève realised he was being ‘brilliant’ rather than following Hegel when he saw the end of History as Napoleon. The brilliance comes from the fact that, contrary to his claim, Hegel did not say it, Kojève did.12 This is why Judith Butler characterises his lectures as ‘both commentaries and original works of philosophy’.13 So before we can see what is ‘original’ about Kojève’s history, we must see what is commentary and whether Hegel produced a history of the Terror. In doing this, I am not attempting a full account of Hegel’s position on the Revolution, but looking for a basis from which to examine how Kojève’s history uses, supplements, and alters Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit neither the French Revolution nor Napoleon are named explicitly, while in the later Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Hegel refers explicitly to the French Revolution as a ‘great individual event’,14 and to Napoleon as a ‘world-historical individual’.15 However, in the Phenomenology Hegel adopts a strategy of not-naming. For example, in the section ‘Absolute Freedom and Terror’ he gives an account of ‘the actual revolution of the actual world’.16 Calling his revolution ‘actual’ suggests that Hegel is referring to events that have happened, but he could be discussing all or any revolution that actually happened. This not-naming pulls Hegel’s analysis away from specific events towards archetypes.

One could stop there and ascribe all the French history in Hegel to Kojève’s ‘brilliant’ intuition. But the archetypal event, which Hegel calls the ‘actual revolution’, is given a skeletal structure and this ‘history’ can be compared with the order of events in France. In Hegel’s revolution ‘sheer terror’ is introduced as a historical period when an idea of freedom takes hold of people’s minds. This produces ‘a new shape of consciousness, absolute freedom’.17 This period of freedom echoes the period after the French declared: ‘Men are born and remain free and equal in rights’.18 In Hegel’s revolution, following the declaration of ‘Universal Freedom’, there is a period of ‘revolutionary government’, which Hegel characterises as ‘anarchy striving to be anarchy’, where ‘what is called government is merely the victorious faction’.19 When this faction arbitrarily exercises its will an individual’s death is as meaningless as cutting the head off a cabbage; a famous simile that seems to link to the guillotine, the mechanical instrument of Robespierre’s Terror. Hegel shivers as he describes this anarchic time, when things are ‘coldest and meanest’.

Terror is more than a dreadful thing to be endured. In the lord/bondsman account, the bondsman must experience the ‘absolute fear’ of his life being in jeopardy before he can be liberated and in a revolution this happens collectively in the ‘sheer terror of the negative’ by which society moves from ‘meaningless death [...] into absolute positivity’.20
Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength.\(^{21}\)

Death has to be held fast with ‘the greatest strength’. The bondsman needs to witness the bloodshed, because it is only by genuinely realising that life is finite that individuals will be strong enough to realise ‘universal will’. In Hegel’s revolution a period of terrifying violence is crucial. However, it is unclear exactly who is ‘holding fast’. Hegel does not imagine it is lords killing lords, but he does not distinguish between those for whom this period requires a lack of feeling – those for whom the death of opponents has no more significance than cutting off the head of a cabbage and those sat watching in fear. There is no class analysis applied to the violence. Both the killers and the fearful must have been bondsmen, and it is not clear if having conquered fear in this revolution, all bondsmen then become callous killers.

In his 1930s seminars on Hegel Kojève names Hegel’s ‘actual revolution’, putting specific historical events into Hegel’s narrative:

the French Revolution [...] completes the evolution of the Christian World and inaugurates the third historical World, in which realized freedom will finally be conceived by philosophy: by German philosophy, and finally by Hegel.\(^{22}\)

For Kojève the French Revolution is not one of several revolutions that might have inspired Hegel. The ‘actual revolution’ is the French Revolution, and Napoleon’s Empire is the ‘final synthesis’. Kojève locates Hegel’s period of ‘universal freedom’ where individuals experience ‘sheer terror of the negative’ as Robespierre’s Terror:

the working-Bourgeois, to become a ‘satisfied’ Citizen of the ‘absolute’ State, must become a Warrior – that is, he must introduce death into his existence [...] It is from himself [...] that he must free himself. And that is why the liberating risk of life takes the form not of risk on the field of battle, but of the risk created by Robespierre’s Terror. The working Bourgeois, turned Revolutionary, himself creates the situation that introduces into him the element of death. And it is only thanks to the Terror that the idea of the final Synthesis, which definitely ‘satisfies’ Man, is realized.

It is in the Terror that the State is born in which this ‘satisfaction’ is attained. This State, for the author of the Phenomenology, is Napoleon’s Empire. And Napoleon himself is the wholly ‘satisfied’ Man, who, in and by his definitive Satisfaction, completes the course of the historical evolution of humanity.\(^{23}\)

Kojève makes several historical assertions, some of which have no exact parallel in Hegel. For example, he applies a stronger class analysis to the violence. Like Lenin, he sees 1789 as a bourgeois revolution because the individuals who write the Declaration of Human Rights and now experience fear are ‘the working-bourgeois’. In viewing the mass guillotining, the working-bourgeois experience their own lives as at risk, without having to go into battle, and thus are able to accept the Revolution into their hearts. Those left ‘coldest and meanest’, in Hegel’s memorable words, are defined as a class in Kojève’s analysis. It is the not-bourgeois who are the killers. For Kojève, as for Hegel, fear is the means by which the mind changes, but he contemplates this fear with notable equanimity. It is ‘thanks to the Terror’ that the French State can be born. There are no rhetorical equivalents to match Hegel’s beheaded cabbages. He seems inured to the horror. A biographical reading of this might emphasise that death was introduced into Kojève’s existence with the double loss of a father and father-figure. His father had died in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese War, and in July 1917 he witnessed the murder of his stepfather by looters. Aged sixteen he was imprisoned by the Bolsheviks and became a communist.\(^{24}\) For Kojève himself ‘the liberating risk of life’ had taken the form not of ‘risk on the field of battle’, but of the spectacle of death and imprisonment. The schoolboy bourgeois, turned revolutionary could contemplate his past fears without fear.

In making Hegel’s ‘actual revolution’ definitely Robespierre’s Terror, Kojève holds onto fear of death as the key agent of change; terror is more important than reason. However, Kojève leaves it unclear what happens to pacify the class of killers – the executioners and violent mobs – after the
bourgeois have lost their fear. This will be the gap into which Klossowski wriggles.

Klossowski

‘Sade and the Revolution’ is usually now read as the first of three chapters of Klossowski’s book, *Sade mon prochain* (Sade my neighbour). It ends with a chapter affirming the presence of God through the existence of evil, which he wrote in the early 1940s, and later renounced as a ‘homage to the Virgin’. This chapter has coloured interpretations of Klossowski’s early work. However, the essays of the 1930s taken on their own do not address belief. They face history. I aim to show that Klossowski uses his account of the Terror in 1939 to question if Kojève got history right.

Klossowski made his intentions clear from the start in ‘Sade and the Revolution’. He launched himself not at God but straight at a key historical problem: the causes of the French Revolution. Facing the College of Sociology audience a year after Kojève’s lecture, Klossowski doubts Kojeve’s dialectical reading of history. By reading the Marquis de Sade he begins taking Hegel apart.

Klossowski understands Sade as a type – the libertine. Libertines are ‘grand bourgeois or enlightened aristocrats, dreamers or systematic minds, libertines in their minds or in practice’, an identifiable group of people who cannot be understood simply by their class roles. Klossowski looks for historical sources outside the usual Left history ‘complex’ of revolutionary forces (king, aristocrats, bourgeois, peasants). He suggests that it is in the mind of the captive libertine – whom he opposes to ‘the amorphous mass of average man’ – that the violence of the Revolution can be understood. The abnormal libertine mind, he posits, in exploring the limits of its abnormality knows something about the working of all minds that cannot be understood by historians examining their predictable historical forces.

Klossowski sees what happens at the guillotine as the place to understand the Revolution. For Kojève the bourgeois mind was transformed through overcoming the fear felt when watching heads roll. Against this Klossowski presents Sade as an actual witness. Klossowski quotes from a letter Sade wrote in 1795 after Robespierre had been executed: ‘My state detention, with the guillotine right under my eyes, made me suffer a hundred times more than all the imaginable Bastilles ever had’.

Sade was imprisoned during the terror in Picpus hospital; the guillotine was outside his window and he claimed to have witnessed 1800 guillotines in thirty-five days. Watching the Terror from his window produced in Sade an intensity of suffering and a dulling of fear. His lack of fear when contemplating the guillotines contrasts markedly with the fear felt by Kojève’s ‘working bourgeois’ watching the same event. In choosing to focus on a prisoner who is on the list to be guillotined, rather than the bourgeois in the crowd, he makes the absence of fear facing central to his account.

If not fear then of what is Sade (the writer of an appalling catalogue of horrors) thinking when he watches 1800 people guillotined through his window? Klossowski turns to Sade’s fiction for an account of what the libertine recognises in the suffering of another:

> There is one essential thing lacking to our happiness. It is the pleasure of comparison, a pleasure born of the sight of wretched persons [...] Wherever men may be found equal, and where these differences do not exist, happiness shall never exist either.

Sade sees happiness dialectically. A man’s happiness cannot exist without the unhappiness of another. But it is dialectics stripped of the idea of progress. Klossowski elaborates on this:

> Through the need for comparison, the strong man is putting into question his own strength; by comparing his situation with that of the wretched, the fortunate man ineluctably identifies himself with the wretched one. In torturing the objects of his lusts in order to derive pleasure from his suffering, the debauchee will represent to himself his own suffering, his own being tortured, and in so doing will represent his own punishment [...]
Inspired by Kojève’s interpretation of the master/slave relation, Klossowski focuses on the mind of the master, the ‘strong man’, who like Kojève’s master needs to master to establish his own mastery. However, unlike Kojève’s master, the strong man knows his own duality. He identifies with the ‘wretched one’ because he derives pleasure from suffering. In 120 Days of Sodom the libertines routinely submit to humiliations after inflicting them on others. In torturing another, he proves his strength but also represents his own suffering to himself. At the root of this there is a need to suffer and inflict suffering. Sade suffers, rather than fears, because in watching the guillotine and contemplating suffering he does not – like Kojève’s bourgeois – fear death, but rather contemplates his desire to kill and recognises therein his desire to be killed.

In Klossowski’s systematic account of Sade’s thought, the king is the ultimate libertine master because he has the most power over life and death. In killing the king, slaves become libertine kings. For Kojève, the not-bourgeois are the killers; while in Klossowski’s account freed slaves become killers. The libertines understand this because already freed from all constraint – including religious belief and work – they already recognise their own ‘bad conscience; they know the morally uncertain content of their existence, as they knew the problematic structure they have developed within themselves.” Klossowski sees mastery and slavery occurring within each freed mind, so he argues that a political regime ‘already in crime’ – and striving towards freedom – will ‘only be maintained by many crimes’. A society based on free will cannot eradicate its own will to die. He argues that Sade is ‘far from finding some kind of moral satisfaction in revolutionary violence’. Indeed Sade argues against nature which is intrinsically violent; Rousseau’s savage is murderous: ‘Savages, the most independent of men, the nearest to Nature, daily indulge in murder, which amongst them goes unpunished’.

Klossowski reads Sade overturning Rousseau to unmask the reasonableness of Revolutionary history. He confronts his audience in Paris in 1939 with the horrifying idea that the urge to kill cannot be overcome. This bleak view, which by 1947 he retracts and then partially restates in 1967, denies violence a history because there can be no beginning or end to an instinct. Standing with Sade, as his neighbour, Klossowski suggests French ‘children of the Fatherland’ are no different from the children of the German Fatherland (the Nazis). Both states, as Klossowski reads it in 1939, are founded on ‘dark forces camouflaged as social values’.

Klossowski’s pre-war essays on Sade are commonly read as a call ‘to a faith that has forgotten its name’, or perceived as ‘borrowing heavily from Alexandre Kojève’. However, Klossowski, like Kojève, is better understood as engaged with history. Like Hegel and Kojève he sees the Terror as a denial of reason, yet Klossowski sees history itself as having limits. For him there are things that might be better understood as instincts, and this insight leads him to challenge fundamentally Kojève’s account of what happens at the guillotine. Klossowski denies that the mind can move on from what is dreadful. History is a ‘vicious circle’ with no end.

Conclusion

Understanding the Terror is one of the defining problems in French history but debating this in 1939 was not to turn away from the concerns of the period. Eric Hobsbawm reads the Leftist cult of Robespierre in the 1930s as a preparation for violent patriotic resistance against the Nazis and Kojève’s war record in the Resistance seems to bear out this view. Dreadful deeds must be done, as the only way to change the minds of invading neighbours and hospitable French collaborators will be through use of terror. However, wars record crimes as well as heroism and Klossowski’s lecture seems to predict some of the internal psychological traumas France would experience after 1940.

The debate on terror continued throughout the war in France and elsewhere. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, who knew Klossowski, concluded their chapter on Sade in Dialectic of Enlightenment strongly echoing his conclusions:

In Sade [...] private vice constitutes a predictive chronicle of the public virtues of the totalitarian era. Not to have glossed over or suppressed but to have trumpeted
far and wide the impossibility of deriving from reason any argument against murder fired the hatred which the progressives (and they precisely) still direct against Sade and Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{41}
NOTES


11. For a dispute about this see Roth, ‘A Problem of Recognition: Alexandre Kojève and the End of History’, and Riley, ‘Introduction to the Reading of Alexandre Kojève’.


Kojève offers this understanding of historical process in the famous note on post-history that he wrote in the appendix to the twelfth lesson of his Introduction to the reading of Hegel. This note is composed of two parts: the first, smaller, written in the first edition of book (1946), the second, longer, added in the second edition of the same work (1948). I will quote a passage from the note of second edition. Observing what was taking place around me and reflecting on what had taken place in the world since the Battle of Jena, I understood that Hegel was right to see in this battle the end