Obligations, Institutions and International Justice

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by

Michael Freeman

Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom, tel: 44 1206 872509; fax: 44 1206 873598; E-mail: freema@essex.ac.uk

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1 A moral dilemma

In this paper I address a central, and intractable problem of moral philosophy that is raised by the idea of international justice. This problem arises from the apparent contradiction between two strong intuitions. The first of these intuitions is that everyone owes special obligations to particular others. These special obligations have a variety of grounds: for example, the biological and emotional ties of family, the value of friendship, the duties of social roles, and the commitments of contracts. According to such obligations, I ought to devote special care to my children, accord priority to the claims of my friends, devote a considerable amount of my time to my job, and keep my promises. These types of obligations appear to have considerable cross-cultural validity, and, if this is so, it is at least a prima facie indication that they embody ethically substantial principles. Yet such obligations may not be endorsed by some influential moral theories - Utilitarianism, for example - nor conform with other intuitions that at least some people find compelling: for example, that we should give priority to the needs of those who are worst-off.

The second intuition is that important moral obligations arise from ‘common humanity’. The idea of ‘common humanity’ may not be part of all the world’s traditional cultures, some of which may recognise only a more limited ‘universe of obligation’. It has, however, deep roots in the West, arising from Stoic natural-law theory, Christian universalism and secular liberalism. It has been ‘globalised’ to a considerable extent by international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the emergence of a number of global moral commitments, such as those for world peace, against colonialism and racism, and for the elimination of world poverty. This phenomenon is frequently misidentified as ‘cultural imperialism’. This view is, however, mistaken for at least three reasons: 1) it conflates diffusion with imperialism; 2) a conception of ‘common

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1 The concept of ‘universe of obligation’ is derived from Durkheim, and has been used by Helen Fein to explain collective violence and genocide (Fein 1977).
humanity’ can be found in non-Western cultures; and 3) the idea does not accord priority to the interests of Westerners: on the contrary, it may well require redistribution of valued resources from the West to the rest.

Each of these two intuitions is so familiar that the claim that they give rise to an intractable problem may not seem plausible. Many decent persons, it may be thought, have little difficulty in reconciling the two kinds of obligation in a reasonably satisfactory way. They care for their families, are loyal to their friends, perform their jobs conscientiously, and show their concern for less fortunate people in the world by more or less generous donations to humanitarian charities, and by support for political parties and governmental policies that promote human rights and give aid to the needy. Perhaps they should do a bit more, but human beings are imperfect and altruism is limited. This problem is anyway practical, not philosophical. This laid-back, not to say complacent view of the present state of affairs is, however, quite facile. It does not, for example, take seriously the moral challenge of the enormous inequalities of life-chances in the world and the \textit{prima facie} failure of these inequalities to conform with any plausible moral justification, whether it be based on reward according to merit, need, implied agreement or the outcome of free labour and exchange. Suppose that my child ‘needs’ a school textbook that will help her education, or wants a CD-player for her birthday. Each costs £42. I have just £42 to spare. UNICEF informs me that 600,000 women die in childbirth each year, that £2 will provide care for one mother and baby in Bangladesh, £10 will pay for ten Clean Delivery kits for making deliveries significantly safer for pregnant women, and £30 covers the cost of a Caesarean section in a rural hospital (United Kingdom Committee for UNICEF 1999). How am I obliged to spend my £42? The apparent intractability of the dilemma is removed neither by manipulating the figures (for I will never have enough to meet my apparent special and common-humanity obligations) nor by meeting one type of obligation now and the other later, for the same type of dilemma will recur at any later time.

Various resolutions of this dilemma have been proposed. Peter Singer, writing from a Utilitarian point of view, famously (or notoriously) argued that the better-off should give to the worse-off until they reach the point of marginal utility (Singer 1972: 241). Many critics have objected that this prescription is utterly unrealistic, and therefore would not promote the welfare of all. Singer himself concedes that it would be very difficult to realise, and that its advocacy might be counter-productive (Singer 1979: 180-1). James Fishkin has argued that obligation necessarily limits freedom, and that excessive obligations lead to moral fanaticism or totalitarianism (Fishkin 1982). This argument provides a plausible argument for limited obligations at the cost of leaving the basic needs of many of the worst-off unmet. It reproduces the original dilemma, therefore, in a new form: injustice (or heartlessness) or totalitarianism? Brian Barry has recently attempted to resolve this problem with his contractarian theory of justice as impartiality, which distinguishes between second-order impartiality and first-order impartiality. The requirement of second-order impartiality governs the principles and rules of justice for society. First-order moral principles and rules govern everyday life and our special relations. The theory of justice as impartiality does not require universal, first-order impartiality. It

\footnote{For a similar idea in Confucianism, see Chan 1999.}
recognises that everyone has limited resources to devote to other people, and it is a necessary condition of a life worth living for everyone that each should be free to determine how to allocate such resources, subject only to certain obligations to promote the common good. Singerism would be inhuman, and therefore morally wrong. Barry’s argument is similar to Fishkin’s, but claims that first-order special obligations are endorsed by the theory of justice as impartiality (Barry 1995). Barry’s resolution of the dilemma is, however, illusory, for it leaves the competing claims of first-order partiality (special obligations) and second-order impartiality (justice) completely open. Consequently, it restates the dilemma, while asserting without demonstrating that the theory of justice as impartiality has resolved it. The theory evades the problem caused by the apparently intolerable burdens that a theory of international justice based on the basic needs of the worst-off would place on the better-off.

2 Cosmopolitanism

I shall argue that cosmopolitanism provides the best resolution of this dilemma. The resolution that cosmopolitanism provides is ‘the best’; it is not perfect, either conceptually or empirically. We should be sceptical about any claim to have discovered a perfect solution to the dilemma, for such a solution would have to show that the dilemma was tractable after all. Cosmopolitanism should not, however, claim to possess a magic wand with which the problems, conceptual and empirical, of global injustice could easily be solved. Cosmopolitanism, as I shall defend it, is not a solution at all; it is, rather, merely the best way, in comparison with all the alternative ways, of thinking about the problem. Cosmopolitanism assumes that the discovery of a better way of thinking about the problem is a significant contribution to making progress towards solving it.

It will be helpful if the explanation and defence of cosmopolitanism is preceded by the elimination of some common mistakes about it. There are at least three meanings of the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ that should be robustly rejected because they permit discussion of only trivial or extremely implausible arguments about international justice. The first of these meanings is that of cultural eclecticism. David Miller thinks of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in this way. The new cosmopolitanism, he has written, ‘holds up before us an image in which we might explore our Celtic roots on Monday, spend Tuesday celebrating the Buddha’s birthday in our neighbourhood temple, on Wednesday join in a Greenpeace demonstration against international whaling, and take part on Thursday in a critical discussion of British imperialism’ (Miller 1995: 186). Miller admits that this is a ‘teasing’ description of cosmopolitanism, but he thinks it worthwhile to criticise it. However, whatever the merits, limits and/or defects of such cultural eclecticism, its critique tells us nothing about the demands of international justice.³

The second meaning of ‘cosmopolitanism’ that should be rejected entails a necessary connection between cosmopolitanism and world government. There are several possible grounds of such a connection. The first is suggested by the

³ For a similar conception and critique of cosmopolitanism, see Smith 1995.
etymological argument that, if the ‘cosmos’ is, or ought to be a ‘polis’, the world should have a government. The second is the quasi-Hobbesian argument, that, if we desire world peace, or to get things done on a global scale, we should support the establishment of a world sovereign. A third ground for associating cosmopolitanism with world government is based on observation of the present state of affairs in the world. Since there is obviously a great deal of violence and injustice in the world, it may be thought, and since the United Nations Organisation is the best means we have to deal with the problems arising from this state of affairs, we should strengthen the UN to convert it into a genuine world government, policing the world through the rule of international law. If cosmopolitanism were necessarily committed to the recommendation of world government, however, it would be unnecessarily vulnerable to telling objections. There are reasons to believe that the existing global power structure could not be converted into a world government in the foreseeable future, if ever, since those with most power would have to give it up voluntarily or be deprived of it coercively, and neither of these alternatives seems likely. There are also reasons for believing that, if world government were possible, it would not be desirable, for such a concentration of power would be difficult to render compatible with democracy and freedom. Cosmopolitans are, however, not necessarily committed to world government. Cosmopolitanism, Brian Barry has said, is a moral outlook, not an institutional prescription. The cosmopolitan derives the value of an institution from its contribution to human well-being (or, we might prefer to say, to justice) (Barry 1997). Kant himself, the greatest cosmopolitan (Nussbaum 1997), believed that the idea of world government was impractical, and, if it were implemented, that it would lead to a ‘soulless despotism’ (Kant 1970, cited in Baynes 1997).

The third meaning of ‘cosmopolitanism’ is global utopianism. The rhetoric of the United Nations may be thought to be vulnerable to this charge. The Preamble to its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), for example, claims that ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. The serious political theorist may find this to be an embarrassing mixture of sentimental rhetoric, vague concepts and implausible (and probably untestable) empirical generalisations. Be that as it may, cosmopolitanism is not necessarily utopian. It can take the world as it is, face its horrors and failures squarely and honestly, and yet develop a theory of international justice and seek, as pragmatically as you like, the means to mitigate the worst of contemporary evils and promote the cause of justice.

If ‘cosmopolitanism’ is not necessarily cultural eclecticism, a commitment to world government or global utopianism, what makes it distinctive? I suggest that it has two components that together are necessary and sufficient to make cosmopolitanism a distinctive and compelling normative approach to world politics. The first of these components is moral, and the second is political. The moral component is expressed by the first sentence of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’. Cosmopolitanism is a theory about ‘all human beings’. It treats ‘all human beings’ as equal. To say that they are ‘born’ equal is perhaps best interpreted as meaning that cosmopolitanism requires a moral baseline of equality, such that actual inequalities of wealth, power or status may be justifiable, but they do require justification. Rawls’ theory of justice, if
it were applied to ‘all human beings’, would qualify as a cosmopolitan theory, although cosmopolitans are not necessarily Rawlsians.  

To say that they are ‘equal in dignity’ is to hold that ‘all human beings’ have, as a baseline principle, an equal right to lead a life that seems worthwhile to them. To call this a ‘baseline principle’ is to allow that certain inequalities may be justifiable by considerations, for example, of merit or efficiency, so that especially worthy persons may be praised, criminals punished and, possibly, incentives introduced to encourage creativity and productivity. The reference to freedom and rights lays the foundation for the idea of universal human rights, which, in this context, is best interpreted as an attempt to propose a set of principles that should generally be respected in order to implement the idea of equal dignity. There are good reasons - which it is not possible to set out in detail here - why cosmopolitans should support the idea of universal human rights, but they should not be dogmatic about specific human-rights principles or claims, and may, and probably should allow that the idea and interpretation of human rights can be controversial among reasonable persons. Thus ethical universalism and egalitarianism, in the senses specified here, are constitutive of moral cosmopolitanism. There is a strong affinity between moral cosmopolitanism and the idea of universal human rights, but this affinity is less fundamental and more contestable than the principles of universality and equality, since cosmopolitans may reasonably differ about the status and content of ‘human rights’, and how they should be articulated with other cosmopolitan values, including, notably, international justice and peace.

Moral cosmopolitanism is certainly a controversial doctrine, and does not rely on any ‘overlapping consensus’ of the world’s cultures, as some authors have held that the idea of universal human rights must if it is to be plausible (Milne 1986; Renteln 1990; An-Na’im 1992). It would not only be inconsistent with all cultural systems that deny either universalism or egalitarianism (in the senses specified); it is also inconsistent with those contemporary political theories that reject ethical universalism at the most fundamental level of moral theory in favour of an ethic that gives priority to the claims and obligations of particular relations (Miller 1995).

The political component of cosmopolitanism is the belief that the ‘world’ constitutes a political system, which is an appropriate arena of justice. This is also a controversial idea. A common objection is that ‘the circumstances of justice’ do not apply to the world as a whole: the so-called ‘international community’ is not a moral community, and consequently there are no international obligations of justice. A well-known, recent definition of ‘the circumstances of justice’ is that proposed by John Rawls.

The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary. Thus, . . . although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests. There is an identity of interests

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4 For a cosmopolitan reading of Rawls, see Pogge 1989. For an anti-cosmopolitan interpretation of Rawls, see Rawls 1993b.
5 On ‘overlapping consensus’, see, of course, Rawls 1993a, Lecture IV.
since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to try to live solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since men [sic] are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share. Thus principles are needed for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares. These requirements define the role of justice (Rawls 1972: 126).

It has been argued against cosmopolitanism that the world is not a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage’ which ‘makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to try to live solely by his own efforts’, since it is constituted primarily by nation-states, which sometimes engage in co-operation for mutual advantage (as, for example, in the European Union), but do not make possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to try to live solely by his own efforts. Nation-states with limited mutual co-operation are sufficient to make possible a better life for all their members than any citizen of these states would have on his or her own. Thus, the primary cooperative ventures in the world are nation-states. Even Brian Barry, in a ‘cosmopolitan’ critique of ‘statism’ and ‘nationalism’, takes this view. Universal morality, he says, consists largely in general prescriptions that generate specific obligations in the circumstances of everyday life, including the obligation to play our part in the social practices of our society. The obligation of a person to contribute to the welfare of another person who lives in the same nation-state, but not to the welfare of a person who lives in another nation-state, derives from the fact that, in the former case, the first person belongs to the same scheme of mutual aid as the second, whereas this is not true in the latter case (Barry 1997: 66-7).

However, the cosmopolitan moral principle of equal dignity calls into question both Rawls’ and Barry’s accounts of the nation-state’s describing the scope of justice on the ground that it constitutes the primary co-operative venture for mutual advantage or scheme of mutual aid in the world. Since cosmopolitanism refuses to privilege anyone, for this would violate the principle of equality, the priority of fellow-citizens is justified only if it is consistent with universal equality (which, we should recall, means the baseline equal right to a life of dignity, not necessarily equality of wealth, power or status).

Cosmopolitanism is, therefore, a theory of a just world order, based on ethical universalism. Since cosmopolitanism is a moral outlook, and not an institutional prescription, it excludes nation-states at the fundamental level of its theory. Since it can be as pragmatic as you like, it can endorse nation-states if, and insofar as nation-states promote the equal dignity of all human beings. Since cosmopolitanism is a universalist moral theory, it entails, at least prima facie, obligations of international justice. Defined thus, cosmopolitanism does not resolve the dilemma of particular and universal obligations, but the problem takes a distinctive form in cosmopolitan theory. Special obligations, on the one hand, have force in cosmopolitan theory because they are often necessary to a life of dignity. Universal obligations, on the other hand, may also have force because they are necessary if others are to live lives of dignity. Cosmopolitanism, as abstractly considered so far, cannot say how these two types of obligations should be combined, but it does rule out the exclusion or marginalisation of universal obligations. I may, therefore, have obligations arising
from my family, ties of friendship, social roles or contracts, and fulfilling these obligations may be necessary to my life of dignity. Such obligations share the moral space of my obligations, however, with my obligations arising from the right of ‘all human beings’ to lead a life of dignity.

An objection that is sometimes made to this kind of cosmopolitan morality is that it is far too demanding, or, alternatively, that its demands are so indeterminate that they lack content and are therefore empty. The thought underlying this objection is that the deprivations and injustices of the world are so great that those individuals who are relatively well-off citizens of relatively just societies cannot be obliged to ensure that all human beings lead lives of dignity without making sacrifices that it would be utterly unrealistic to expect, and which would entail the kind of ‘moral totalitarianism’ that Fishkin feared. The cosmopolitan response to this objection is that, while cosmopolitanism is an individualist theory in the sense that it endorses the right of every individual to lead a life of dignity, and values collectivities only insofar as they promote that end, it does not conceive moral obligation as running only from advantaged to disadvantaged individuals. It is in this sense also that cosmopolitanism is a political theory. Justice in a political system must be institutionalised, so that the task of cosmopolitan theory is not only to clarify the moral principles that should govern the global order, but to work out the best possible institutional forms of justice. This is unlikely to be easy; it will involve insecure empirical judgments; and consequently cosmopolitans may disagree about institutions. Faced with proposals for reform of the European Union, for example, cosmopolitans may properly be uncertain, or find themselves on opposite sides of a dispute, because, although all cosmopolitans employ the same fundamental normative criteria, their judgments of complex and uncertain empirical issues may differ. Nevertheless, institutions take some of the burdens of justice from individuals, and the universal obligation of well-off individuals, according to cosmopolitanism, is not necessarily to give all that they have to the poor (although this is not ruled out), but to support (and sometimes to create) those institutions most likely to implement the idea that all human beings have an equal right to a life of dignity. That such institutions include nation-states, especially under contemporary conditions, is certainly not ruled out a priori.

3 The particularist challenge

Ethical particularists believe that cosmopolitanism, and the ethical universalism that underlies it, are fundamentally mistaken. They sometimes argue that moral agents are formed through such particular relations as those of family, friends, communities and nations. They hold that particular relations between moral persons lie at the basic level of ethics, and generate fundamental moral obligations. Even if these moral agents do have some obligations to distant others, qua moral agents they have prior obligations to their nearest and dearest (Miller 1995: 49-51). Sartre’s famous imaginary young Frenchman who, in the Second World War, is divided between his obligation to help his widowed mother and his obligation to fight for the liberation of France, must, according to the particularist view, consider his patriotic duty, already encumbered with his filial obligations. The particularist does not necessarily insist

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6 See, for example, Bellamy 1995.
that the young man should give his mother priority over his country, but only that his obligation to his mother has considerable weight, as Sartre assumes. Further, his obligation to France, however it is characterised, is almost certainly greater than his obligation, say, to the Vietnamese, even if the Vietnamese are generally worse off than the French.

David Miller has sought to call ethical universalism in question by attempting to show that it cannot give due weight to such particular obligations. He considers various ways in which ethical universalism might recognise these obligations. The first of these ways is to appeal to the desirability of an ethical division of labour. If cosmopolitanism holds, broadly speaking, that the globally better-off have an obligation to assist, and to redistribute resources to the globally worst-off, it must specify, more precisely, who should do what for whom. Universalists might hold that we should give priority to our nearest and dearest because we can help them more.

The moral principle that universalists invoke here is that we have an obligation to help those whom we are able to help, and we have an obligation to give priority to those whom we are most able to help. It is useful to call this the ability principle. The ability principle entails an important epistemological argument. It is better to give priority to our nearest and dearest, this argument goes, because we are best able to understand what they really need. Naive cosmopolitanism, according to this way of thinking, may be tempted to give priority to distant strangers, but we may have little ability to help them, because we cannot know the needs of those who are culturally very different from ourselves, and it is not unlikely that our well-intentioned actions will be counter-productive. The ability principle is thus reinforced by the knowledge principle, which says that we should give priority to those whose needs we understand best. The knowledge principle strongly suggests that we should usually give priority to the needs of our nearest and dearest (Miller 1995: 51-2, 62-4). However, although both the ability principle and the knowledge principle are plausible, they do not necessarily favour particularist obligations over cosmopolitan concerns, for those whom we are most able to help and whose needs we best understand may be far from the neediest. Need seems to be an independent element in the theory of justice. We have no obligation to help those whom we are not able to help (since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’), and we should not try to help those whose needs we do not understand, but the needs of many people are so extreme that they do not put much strain on our understanding, and the better-off are usually able to give sufficient help to the worst-off to improve their situation. Thus, neither the ability principle nor the knowledge principle is an insuperable barrier to obligations of international justice.

Miller cites as an example of an argument from the need for an ethical division of labour Goodin’s suggestion that we have a special responsibility to those particular others whose interests are vulnerable to our actions (Miller 1995: 51-2). However, he fails to notice that this introduces yet another principle of obligation, that we may call the vulnerability principle. The vulnerability principle is distinct from the ability principle and the knowledge principle. The latter two principles identify features of moral agents that place them under special obligations (ability to help and knowledge of needs). The vulnerability principle identifies features of potential beneficiaries of the obligations of others (i.e., they are vulnerable to the harmful actions of others) and also features of particular relations between persons (P₁ is vulnerable to the actions of P₂). Those who are most vulnerable to our actions are not necessarily those whom we
are most able to help and whose needs we understand best. Common sense suggests that these three principles are positively correlated: I am best able to help my child; I know my child’s needs best; and my child is most vulnerable to my harmful actions. However, distant, needy people may also be vulnerable to our actions if we, for example, buy and enjoy products made by exploited child labour. Thus, the vulnerability principle may indicate an important cosmopolitan obligation, even in situations in which our ability to help and our knowledge of the needs of extremely vulnerable people is very imperfect. The needs of the most vulnerable (e.g., children, the elderly, widows, orphans, the sick and disabled) are a traditional concern of conceptions of justice, and those truly most vulnerable to our actions are not necessarily near or particularly dear to us.

Miller advances the idea of an ethical division of labour as a way by which universalists might endorse particularist obligations, in order to show that it fails. It is supposed to fail because the ability, knowledge and vulnerability arguments do not necessarily support cosmopolitan obligations. Miller’s polemic suffers, however, both from a conflation of these three distinct principles and from a failure to recognise need as an independent source of obligation. The fundamental cosmopolitan (baseline) principle that every human being has an equal right to a life of dignity requires the recognition of the relevance of ability to help, of the obligation to understand the real needs of others, of the principle of vulnerability, and the moral weight of need. The combination of these principles shows that the maxim that the globally best-off have an obligation to help the globally worst-off is too simple (even if the relevance of institutions is ignored for the sake of this argument). Need and vulnerability are the principal sources of obligation, and those who are relatively free from need and vulnerability have an obligation to make themselves able to help the needy and vulnerable, and to understand what they need and how their vulnerability might be reduced or eliminated. These obligations are in principle trans-national and trans-state obligations, although the argument so far leaves open the question of how much intrinsic and instrumental value the nation-state might have from a cosmopolitan point of view. Thus, the idea of an ethical division of labour is not sufficient to support cosmopolitanism in general, and the cosmopolitan endorsement of particular obligations in particular, but cosmopolitanism should recognise the need for an ethical division of labour, and this may help to distribute the limited moral energies between the needs of distant strangers and those of our nearest and dearest.

The second argument with which Miller suggests that universalists might endorse special obligations appeals to the universal right to freedom of association. Associations entail particular rights and obligations, and the right to freedom of association, therefore, entails such rights and obligations. Thus, universalism seems to entail particular obligations (Miller 1995: 52-3). Miller argues that the right to freedom of association does not, however, ground the value of nationality, because nations are not, for most people, voluntary associations. Individuals do not choose to ‘join’ nations; rather, nations constitute (in part) the identity of individuals. Individuals can, of course, choose to change their national allegiance, but this is relatively rare; national identity is normally a matter of inheritance and habit, and not of choice (Miller 1995: 59-62). This argument would apply to various other types of collectivities (such as families and ethnic groups) that may give rise to special obligations. It is, however, based on a mistake about the principle of freedom of
association, which may arise from the classical formulation of social-contract theory. The cosmopolitan does not have to require that all collectivities, to be legitimate, must be ‘voluntary’ in the sense of deliberately chosen. The universal right to freedom of association protects associations based on inheritance and habit, provided that no universalist principle is thereby violated (for example, violations of human rights). Cosmopolitans can endorse associations, membership of which is ‘voluntary’ in the sense of ‘not coerced’. They can, therefore, endorse a range of special obligations arising from such associations.

Ethical particularists consider moral agency to be inseparable from personal identity and motivation. Miller, for example, argues that universalists conceive of moral agents as rational beings who act only from rational ethical conviction. He doubts that rational conviction carries sufficient motivational force for most people. Ethical motivation is generally based on Humean natural sentiments rather than Kantian reason (Miller 1995: 55-8). Miller endorses ethical particularism because he believes that an ethical theory should provide a plausible account of how people could be motivated to conform with its prescriptions. This is a reasonable belief, but it is insufficient to support the normative role that Miller gives to natural sentiments. His ethical particularism, by closely associating identity and obligation, solves the problem of motivating obligation by identifying the good of the individual with that of the community. The cost of thus enlarging the conception of self-interest is that the collective good is a form of enlarged selfishness. Precisely that which makes it motivationally strong (self-interest) makes it ethically dubious. An ethical principle that motivates no-one is useless. It certainly does not follow, however, that a principle with strong motivational force is ethically valid. Obviously, people can be motivated rather easily to act unjustly towards others. Thus, a plausible ethic requires a sufficient motivation, but a sufficient motivation for action is insufficient for ethical action. Conflating motivation with justification is a logical error, and a dangerous one. It is dangerous, also, to locate, as Miller does, identity and motivation at the fundamental level of ethical theory, for identity and motivation are, as such, neither good nor bad, but may be the basis for actions that are extremely bad.

Whether Miller’s belief that rational ethical conviction has insufficient motivational force for most people is true or false is presumably an empirical question of psychology. Some people surely sometimes act from rational ethical conviction. The case against cosmopolitanism, then, is that not enough people do so often enough to implement the cosmopolitan project. The cosmopolitan may answer this case with two arguments. The first is that some people are sometimes motivated by sentiments of common humanity to help needy foreigners, and it is not impossible that such sentiments could be strengthened and extended (Rorty 1993). The second is that the cosmopolitan can, and should concede that motivating people to act justly is difficult. Miller defends ethical particularism on the Humean ground that it recognises the reality of limited altruism. Limited altruism is, however, a recalcitrant fact for normative theory, not an ethical ideal. Miller’s ethical particularism mistakes the former for the latter. Further, the thesis of limited altruism does not support nationalism against cosmopolitanism in the way that Miller believes. It is obviously true that people can be mobilised by nationalist sentiment on some occasions, but some of these occasions are trivial (e.g., sport) and some are dangerous (e.g., war). Limited altruism may, however, be too limited to motivated obligations to the nation,
and such obligations may consequently have to be motivated, as Burke famously suggested, by means of mediating institutions, such as families and secondary associations (Burke 1790, 1968). If mediating institutions are necessary to mobilise limited altruism to meet the demands of national obligations, then mediating institutions may help to mobilise limited altruism to meet the demands of international justice. That such institutions are at present inadequate to meet these demands may be a reason for strengthening them rather than rejecting the claims of justice.

Nationalists, on Miller’s account, can recognise obligations to foreigners. There are, he concedes, generic conditions for living a decent life that can be expressed in terms of basic rights.\(^7\) We have obligations to respect these rights of others that derive from our common humanity. However, conflicts may arise between our obligations to fellow nationals and our obligations to respect the basic rights of foreigners. Universal obligations to respect the most fundamental rights of foreigners trump national obligations, ‘provided the cost of protecting these rights is relatively small’. I shall call this the *principle of limited sacrifice*. Since shared identities generate obligations, Miller continues, local and national communities are the primary bearers of the obligation to protect the basic rights of their members. If these communities *cannot* fulfil their obligations, outsiders who can help may have the obligation to do so. If those with the primary obligation can fulfil it, but choose not to do so, the first obligation of others is to try to get those with the primary obligation to acknowledge it, by persuasion if possible, but, failing this, by such force as is commensurate with the right in question. If these measures fail, outsiders may incur the obligation to help the rights-holders directly (Miller 1995: 73-7).

Miller’s argument rests on the proposition that shared identities entail obligations, but he gives no reason in support of the proposition. The concept of ‘identity’ not only appears not to signify *obligation*; it does not seem to be a *moral* concept. A tyrannical father shares identities with the other members of his family, but no obligations can be deduced from this fact. Also, even if the proposition that shared identities generated obligations were granted, it would not follow that local and national communities were the primary bearers of obligations to protect basic rights. If need can generate obligation, the primary obligation to meet need might fall on those with the greatest *ability* to do so. Miller’s principle of limited sacrifice entails a relatively weak obligation on those with the greatest ability to help the globally worst-off. Thus, his conception of ‘basic rights’ is weak.

Miller also argues that ethical universalism implies benevolent imperialism. Those who are unwilling to endorse benevolent imperialism must recognise the severe limit that the principle of national self-determination places on the obligation to protect the basic rights of foreigners (Miller 1995: 77-8). Miller’s claim that ethical universalism is undermined because it implies benevolent imperialism is difficult to reconcile with his own endorsement of direct, coercive intervention to protect basic rights in some situations. Insofar as he appeals to the principle of national self-determination to discredit interventions to prevent, halt or ameliorate human-rights violations, the appeal is not ethically compelling.

\(^7\) For a critical examination of the concept of ‘basic rights’, see Freeman 1999. The term ‘basic rights’ is particularly associated with Shue 1980, 1996.
It does not seem plausible that obligation can depend on sentiment as Miller believes. If it could, our obligations to our fellow nationals and to needy foreigners would depend on variables that were not only fickle, but extremely vulnerable to manipulation by power elites. This is surely not solid ground for serious moral obligations. Also, the strength of sentiment is not a reliable guide to the strength of obligation. It might support family obligations that were intuitively attractive, but it might also support xenophobic solidarities that were not. We need rationally defensible principles to discriminate between just and unjust sentiments. Such principles might well endorse many kinds of special obligations, but would set limits to such obligations by appeal to a universalist conception of justice (Barry 1995).

Miller attempts to undermine ethical universalism by arguing that it cannot support particular obligations, and yet must support the right to national self-determination, in order to avoid the moral error of benevolent imperialism. Thus, he argues, universalism collapses into particularism. Miller’s defence of ethical particularism and of nationalism can, however, be undermined in a similar way. He concedes that there can be obligations to protect the basic rights of foreigners, sometimes by force, even if the obligation is very limited. More fundamentally, ‘nationality’ is, in his theory, a universal value, and the right to national self-determination is a cosmopolitan right. Miller’s cosmopolitan theory endorses a world of self-determining nations, protecting the basic rights and giving priority to meeting the needs of their members, while intervening to protect the basic rights of foreigners, subject to the severe limits of the principles of limited sacrifice and of national self-determination. The nationalist element of this cosmopolitan theory depends on according greater weight to identity than to need as a ground of obligation. As a theory of ethical justification, as distinct from one of motivation, it is not cogent. Worse, it is not coherent. Miller criticises ethical universalism for implying support for benevolent imperialism, but the obligation imposed by his theory that we give priority to the interests of our fellow nationals implies support for malevolent imperialism if that were to be necessary to promote those interests. The principle of national self-determination would not be a barrier to such a conclusion if our obligation to our fellow nationals required us to disregard the right of foreigners to national self-determination. Miller’s ethical particularism collapses into an incoherent and ethically unattractive form of cosmopolitanism. The theory may seem prima facie more appealing than cosmopolitanism because it acknowledges the reality of national sentiment. However, although there are undoubtedly strong national sentiments in the contemporary world, there are also strong sub-national and trans-national sentiments, and, as I have argued, the strength of sentiments should be distinguished clearly from their ethical force. From a cosmopolitan point of view, Miller’s nationalism might be criticised for failing to recognise that the value of world order must rest on relations between states and not on the rights of nations. Nationalism, therefore, is a sound basis for neither order nor justice.

4 A cosmopolitan contract?

Brian Barry has recently proposed a cosmopolitan theory of justice, which, he claims, finds a just balance between particular and impartial obligations. The theory is based
on Thomas Scanlon’s contractarian idea that endorses what free, equal and reasonable persons would agree to. An arrangement is unjust if those who are badly off under it could reasonably reject it. Reasonable persons know the basic facts about their society, that other societies do things differently, that their own could be different, and recognise that others attach similar importance to their beliefs and interests as they do to their own. This conception of justice as impartiality, Barry claims, is neutral between different conceptions of the good. It assumes that there is an irreducible pluralism of such conceptions. Disputes about the good, he argues are unresolvable, and there is thus no conception of the good that nobody could reasonably reject. He supports this argument by appeal to the empirical fact that no conception of the good has been universally accepted. This, he maintains, is a reasonable ground for scepticism about the possibility that there is a conception that all reasonable people can be expected to accept. Justice as impartiality seeks a basis for social institutions and public policies that can in principle appeal to every member of society, whatever his or her conception of the good. There is a sense, however, in which impartial justice is not neutral between different conceptions of the good, for it will require more restrictions on the freedom of those whose conception of the good are relatively less compatible with the requirements of impartial justice than it will of those whose conceptions are more compatible. Justice as impartiality differs from particular moral systems in that it sets the limits to the pursuit of the precepts that they endorse. It does not, therefore, constitute a comprehensive moral system. It does not give us a complete guide as to how we should live. Rather, it tells us how we should live together, given that we have different ideas about how to live. Justice as impartiality does not, therefore, have a substantive answer to every question: in many cases it endorses whatever outcome emerges from a fair procedure (Barry 1995; 1998).

Barry identifies the motive to comply with the requirements of impartial justice as the desire to act in ways that can be defended to others, which he claims has force with almost all of us to some degree. The theory assumes the existence of the desire to live in a society whose members all freely accept its rules of justice and its major institutions (Barry 1995: 10, 51, 164). Barry’s account of motivation is not well-suited to a theory of international justice, since we may reasonably doubt whether the desire to behave fairly and justify one’s actions to others is strong trans-nationally (Hardin 1998: 146). This judgement is strengthened by Barry’s defence of special obligations, albeit constrained by the demands of impartial justice, on the grounds that we have a ‘natural inclination’ to make special efforts on our own behalf and on behalf of those about whom we care (Barry 1995: 84, 121, 201, 205-6). Barry concedes that, up to a certain point, subordinating our particular sentiments to the requirements of impartial justice works to the advantage of the worst-off. He denies, however, that the complete delegitimation of particular obligations would be most advantageous to the worst-off. Justice as impartiality rules out inequalities that cannot be defended against reasonable rejection by those who lose from the inequality. Some particular obligations, for example those controlling widely-valued social goods, might fall at the bar of impartial justice, whereas others, such as intimate friendships, might not (Barry 1995: 15-17, 211-3). Impartial justice may require great sacrifice of personal relations, but only exceptionally (Barry 1995: 223-4). Yet justice entails ‘large-scale’ international redistribution (Barry 1995: 115). It is not clear how much sacrifice of personal relations this would require. Barry’s contractarian theory of justice requires both equality of opportunity and liberal
freedom (Barry 1995: 206-7, 230). The former would entail large-scale international redistribution, but it is unclear to what extent this would restrict the latter. Thus, Barry’s theory might be criticised for being very indeterminate about the extent to which it would require personal sacrifice by the better-off in order to provide fair opportunities for the worse-off. Barry might reply that ‘if something is not easy to determine then it is not easy to determine, and any theory that makes it look easy must be some sort of fraud’ (Barry 1998: 213). It may be unreasonable to require much determinacy in a theory of international justice, but Barry should say enough to show that, faced with the dilemma of particular and universal obligations, his theory does not evade it, but, rather, clarifies, as precisely as possible, how it should be resolved.

One way in which Barry reconciles particularism with universalism is by endorsing cosmopolitan nationalism. Nations, he holds, can legitimately take pride in their cultural achievements. Civic nationalism is also necessary for the successful operation of a liberal-democratic polity. Liberal democracy is, for him, the domestic aspect of cosmopolitanism, and cosmopolitan morality requires liberal-democratic nationalism. The principles of this form of nationalism, he claims, support cosmopolitan redistribution and intervention for justice and human rights. The transfer of resources from rich countries to poor ones does nothing to injure civic nationalism in the rich ones, and offers a chance to the poor countries of creating civic nations of their own (Barry 1997: 58, 61-2, 65-7). Cosmopolitan morality endorses the obligation ‘to play our part in the social practices of our society’. My obligation to contribute to the pension of someone who lives in Rotherham, but not to the pension of someone who lives in Rennes, derives from the fact that I belong to the same scheme of social insurance as the former but not the latter (Barry 1997: 66-7). Thus cosmopolitan morality endorses particular (national) obligations. This begs the question, however, as to whether we are obliged, or even permitted by a cosmopolitan theory of impartial justice to support our national scheme of social insurance in the face of global poverty. Can I both pay for pensions in Rotherham and for civic nations in the poverty-stricken countries of the world? Can peasants in Bangladesh reasonably object to pensions for Rotherham? Since it is difficult to know how we should answer this question, we may, at this point, reasonably doubt the value of Scanlonian contractarianism for the theory of cosmopolitan justice.

The cogency of this theory depends, as Barry admits, on the meaning of ‘reasonable’. Other theorists might argue that they could reasonably reject Barry’s theory. Barry would argue that this would be unreasonable. Appeals to the concept of ‘reasonable’ cannot decide between two competing conceptions of what is ‘reasonable’. The theory is also vulnerable to the objection that it requires, implausibly, scepticism about conceptions of the good and the rejection of scepticism about theories of justice. Yet Barry’s principal argument for scepticism about conceptions of the good - the historical failure to reach consensus - applies equally to conceptions of justice. Also, Barry rejects the idea of ‘overlapping consensus’ in favour of reasonable agreement as the ground of justice, but the latter depends on an ‘overlapping consensus’ of reasonable persons (Hardin 1998; Caney 1998: 91, 100; Bubeck 1998: 172; Barry 1998: 189-91, 196, 208, 212, 237).

Barry leaves our particular and our universal obligations in a potentially strong and unresolved tension. Miller’s particularism recognises universalist sentiments and
obligations, only to weaken them for the sake of national obligations, leading to an inconsistent theory of national self-determination. Thus, both Miller’s particularism and Barry’s cosmopolitanism fail to give a satisfactory account of the obligations that we have for the sake of international justice. This suggests that a new approach is required.

5 Needs, capabilities and rights

Martha Nussbaum has proposed a neo-Aristotelian, ‘social-democratic’ approach to international justice, which may take us beyond the limits of Miller’s nationalism and Barry’s cosmopolitan contractarianism (Nussbaum 1990, 1992). This is based on an account of basic human needs and functions (Nussbaum 1992: 205, 207). This account is *evaluative*, in that it values certain forms of human life and not others. It does not, however, rest on any metaphysical premises, but, rather, recognises the fact that human beings hold different metaphysical beliefs. Its account of human nature is just as strong as the *reasons* that are given to support it (Nussbaum 1992: 207-8, 212-3, 223). Nussbaum calls this a ‘thick, vague theory of the good’ to distinguish it both from Rawls’ ‘thin theory of the good’ and from theories that threaten the value of autonomy because they propose an excessively determinate conception of the good (Nussbaum 1992: 214). This theory is superior to Miller’s in at least three respects: 1) it is consistently universalist, whereas Miller’s combines particularism and universalism in an incoherent mixture; 2) it places the concept of ‘common humanity’ at its centre rather than at its margins; 3) it gives a more developed account of what our ‘common humanity’ consists of (Nussbaum 1992: 215-6). The theory is not only deliberately vague, but also open-ended and approximate, and consequently non-dogmatic, non-authoritarian and able consistently to call for ‘participatory dialogue’ about contested moral and political questions: it allows and promotes continuing debate and reformulation (Nussbaum 1992: 216, 223).

All human beings, on Nussbaum’s account, are needy and capable creatures. They share a general (though not exceptionless) aversion to premature death; the need for food, drink, adequate nutrition and shelter; the (variable) need and capacity for sex and for mobility; the capacity for pleasure and an aversion to pain; sense perception, imagination, and the ability to reason; infant dependency; the need and capacity for practical reason; the need and capacity for association, both personal and civic; the need and capacity for relations with non-human animals and physical nature; the need and capacity for humour and play; separateness and individuality (we are born, suffer, flourish and die as our individual selves, however intimately we are related to others in community). These capabilities and limits of the human being constitute the foundations of a good human life. Each is necessary, and there is, therefore, limited scope for trade-offs among them. Because the account claims to identify the constituents of our common humanity, it should be cross-culturally, if not universally acceptable. Because it is deliberately vague, it is consistent with historical, cultural and individual differences. Its vagueness not only permits, but also *requires* that its policy implications take account of local contexts and include participatory dialogue with those who are likely to be affected by such policies. It gives voice to the excluded to a greater extent than ‘thicker’ or ‘thinner’ theories, whether universalist or
relativist, could do: ‘thick’ theories are too prescriptive; thin theories too permissive (Nussbaum 1992: 216-25).

The vagueness of the theory, therefore, allows space for autonomy, while the emphasis on common humanity rules out discriminatory exclusions (Nussbaum 1992: 225-8). Nussbaum does not relate her neo-Aristotelian theory to the idea of human rights. This is surprising for at least two reasons. The first is that both the rationale and the content of these two cosmopolitan approaches to human well-being are similar. The second is that Nussbaum suggests that the concept of ‘rights’ might form the bridge between human needs and public policies, without making this clear and explicit. The Aristotelian view, she says, affirms that certain basic human capabilities exert a claim on society, and especially on government, that they should be developed (Nussbaum 1992: 228-9). This shows that neo-Aristotelian social democracy and liberal human-rights theory may converge on a common approach to cosmopolitan justice. Both provide grounds for criticising traditional cultures for the sake of a more adequate conception of distributive justice. Both provide reasons for not taking desires, subjective preferences or utility as providing the ultimate criterion of justice. Both can argue against appeals to cultural relativism and claims that different values are ‘incommensurable’. Both claim to specify the minimal conditions of a worthwhile human life. Nussbaum’s emphasis on functioning may be better suited than rights-discourse to insist on the importance of the recognised, but disputed social and economic rights, such as the rights to subsistence and education (Nussbaum 1992: 229-32). Both, however, find a way to balance particular commitments with common humanity. Nussbaum’s dialogical approach to the reconciliation of the universal and the particular is a useful modification of the legalistic discourse of human rights, which can appear monological and, consequently, overbearing (Nussbaum 1992: 236-7). Social-democratic neo-Aristotelianism emphasises the facts of human vulnerability, the capacity for compassion and recognition of common humanity as motives of actions for the sake of cosmopolitan justice (Nussbaum 1992: 237-9). In this it is more generous than Miller’s nationalism and provides a stronger motivational component than Barry’s contractarianism. The Aristotelian conception of the flourishing human being and the Lockean-Kantian idea of the life of human dignity provide the ethical basis for this cosmopolitan theory (Nussbaum 1992: 239). The sentiment of common humanity and the principle of respect for persons provide the motivation.

6 Institutions

There are good reasons for basing the defence of cosmopolitan justice on a reconciliation of the kind of neo-Aristotelianism defended by Nussbaum with a neo-Lockean account of human rights rather than on the contractarianism defended by Barry. The discourse of human rights and that of human functions direct our moral attention to the human beings who need protection from cruelty and oppression, and who need the freedom to flourish in their own way. They meet thereby the requirement that a philosophical conception of justice should resemble common-sense conceptions of justice (Barry 1995), since justice in many traditions (though, admittedly, not in all) is especially concerned with protecting the weak and vulnerable from unfair and oppressive treatment by the powerful. A theory of justice that lacked
this feature would not been recognisable as a theory of justice. These two approaches dispense with the contested contractarian concepts of the rational and the reasonable. What they put in their place – an account of basic human needs – is not uncontroversial, and it is a merit of Nussbaum’s ‘vague, thick theory of the good’ that it builds this feature into the theory, whereas the concept of human rights is sometimes presented as beyond controversy. Contractarians might respond that the admittedly contestable account of human needs smuggles the idea of the reasonable back in, because it is implied that only reasonable disagreements about human needs would be admitted to the dialogue. There is some force in this response, but Nussbaum’s approach makes it as clear as possible what the dialogue may be about, and what might count as reasonable disagreement. To adapt an example from Nussbaum herself, the theory specifies that women have an equal entitlement to food and health to that of men, so that, in a ‘reasonable’ dialogue, dissenters would have to bring forward a morally plausible reason for denying this egalitarian principle. Nussbaum suggests that this cannot be done without appealing to demonstrably false empirical assertions, such as, for example, that women in subsistence communities who eat less than men have no resultant health problems.

Nussbaum’s approach may be superior to the human-rights approach in motivating action for international justice by a plausible appeal to common humanity (which Miller admits as a reason for, severely limited, moral obligation, but, arguably, underestimates as a motive for international altruism). However, it is a common feature of human-rights activism, sometimes neglected in critiques of human-rights theory, that it makes just such an appeal. This would, I suggest, be supported by analysis of the mobilising tactics of human-rights and humanitarian NGOs. Nevertheless, the thesis of limited altruism remains a strong motivational card for ethical particularists to play, and thus must be addressed by cosmopolitans.

Ethical particularism may seem plausible insofar as it emphasises the motivational challenge of asking the rich to give up much of what they have to the poor, and especially to poor foreigners. The most plausible solution to this problem, in addition to the mobilisation of empathy, lies in mediating institutions. The nationalism that Miller defends, far from being grounded by ethical particularism and limited altruism, is vulnerable to subversion by these principles, insofar as obligations to our nearest and dearest (not to mention egoism) take priority over obligations to our nation. To be plausible, nationalism must rely on the Burkan idea that ‘secondary’ institutions must mediate between the individual and the nation, and mobilise loyalty through institutions that have value in everyday lives. If nationalists must and can mobilise particular motives through mediating institutions, then cosmopolitans perhaps must and can do so too, even if their road is longer and harder. Miller admits that nation-states should sometimes help foreigners, though not much. Barry seeks to reconcile the liberal-democratic nation-state with cosmopolitan morality, but, in holding that the idea of a national purpose is a danger to liberal democracy (Barry 1997: 66), he misses the opportunity to consider that the nation-state might be an institution that could have cosmopolitan purposes. Communities can have liberal, cosmopolitan goals (Blum 1996). Charles Beitz has argued that one may, from an impartial point of view, respect the sovereignty of states, because cosmopolitan values would be better served by doing so (Beitz 1991: 248-9). Cosmopolitans are neither nihilists nor anarchists: they may and should take the actually existing institutional structure of the world, and
consider, pragmatically, how it might be reformed so as to serve cosmopolitan ends better. Thomas Pogge has defended a form of cosmopolitanism that involves a diversity of institutions regulated by liberal and democratic principles that does not exclude a role for nation-states (Pogge 1992). Cosmopolitanism should be indeterminate about such questions as the value of nationalism, the right to self-determination and intervention, since the value of these is, from the cosmopolitan point of view, contingent and context-dependent.

Ethical particularism rests on the stubborn facts of limited altruism and the virtues that are rooted in special relations. The cost of this pervasive ethic in human suffering and degradation is obviously high. Cosmopolitans deplore this cost more than their critics do. Consequently, they tend to be more critical of the existing institutional structure of the world than defenders of actual nation-states usually are. They tend to favour supra-national and trans-national institutions, such as the United Nations, Amnesty International, the European Court of Human Rights, etc., but such institutions are to be judged by their results, and, as Pogge correctly argues, cosmopolitans should seek to balance the need for supra-national regulation with democratic control. Miller argues that there is no world community that can generate obligations of justice for the rich to help the poor. He concedes, however, that, if the rich nations were causally responsible for the violation of the basic rights of the poor, they would have an obligation to help them. Pogge find the link between causal and moral responsibility in unjust global institutions. Since Miller appears to accept that there are such unjust institutions, his view of the obligations of the rich should be closer to Pogge’s (Miller 1995: 191-2; Pogge 1992: 50-2).

Political theory does not make difficult tasks easy. It explains what objectives are worthy or obligatory, and assesses alternative strategies for implementing them. Ethical particularism is self-defeating in the sense that it normally rests on assumptions about the worth of special relations that are universalistic. In this vein, Miller assumes that the right to national self-determination is a universal right. Different theories of cosmopolitan justice would allocate the world’s goods differently, and, pace Barry, reasonable persons disagree irresolvably about theories of justice as they do about ‘conceptions of the good’. Neither the concept of human rights nor Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian conception of human well-being is beyond contestation, but there are reasons to believe that both have considerable cross-cultural appeal. Both are minimalist in that they call for the minimal conditions of a just world rather than for an ideally just world, and both leave space for dialogue and reformulation. Miller argues that nationalism should be valued as a defence against the forces of globalisation. This assumes that nationalism is good, and that globalisation is bad. The truth is that both can be good and bad. If globalisation helps to undermine brutal tyrannies for the sake of human rights, globalisation should ‘trump’ nationalism. But globalisation is not cosmopolitanism, and it may well threaten cosmopolitan values (by increasing global economic inequality, for example). The tasks for cosmopolitans are to construct institutions that can regulate global processes, be democratically accountable, and rest on the principle of universal moral equality. Miller admits that ethical particularism and nationalism are ‘mean-spirited’. That is a significant concession. That it is difficult to motivate people to be generous, compassionate and just towards foreigners is not a moral reason to give up, but, rather, to try harder. The reconciliation of special and cosmopolitan obligations
should accord considerable weight to the former, not only because the concept of human dignity grounds the moral worth of some special relations, but also because commitment to the particular can, and perhaps must provide the motivation for implementing our universal obligations. The fundamental values of cosmopolitanism are morally demanding - and here Singer is more right than Barry - but the best way to meet those demands is to press for the reform of institutions with cosmopolitan potential rather than to capitulate to unexamined sentiments or to advance unrealistic philosophical theories.

References
International institutions, such as the International Borrowing and Resource Privileges, are good examples of the ways in which international institutions can have profound effects on domestic factors which undeniably also play a role in promoting prosperity. According to the international borrowing privilege, governments may borrow amounts of money on behalf of the country and the country thereby incurs an obligation to repay the debt. Hassoun, N., 2012, Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hayward, T., 2005, Constitutional Environmental Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.