Terrorism and Mass Media

William E. Biernatzki, SJ, PhD
Editor, Communication Research Trends
Terrorism and Mass Media

I. Definition: What Is Terrorism?

A pejorative “social construction”

When can an act of violence properly be called “terrorism”? This is a fundamental question, but it is one that often is passed over without due attention in routine journalistic practice. In the wake of September eleventh, and of President George W. Bush’s declaration of a worldwide “war on terrorism,” however, it has become vitally important to determine who is a terrorist and who is not. Jennifer Jane Hocking has noted, that “terrorism” is a social construction, and once an action has been given that label, it becomes difficult to treat it in a value-neutral manner.

Replete with implied moral opprobrium, a socially assigned value and meaning, an imputation of illegitimacy and outrage, ‘terrorism’ can never fit the apparently value-neutral typologies much used in the social sciences. . . (Hocking 1992: 86)

Peter Alan Sproat also called for extreme care in defining and applying the term “terrorism” for much the same reason:

The labeling of a particular group that has implemented such actions as terrorist per se is either theoretically impossible because it is the individual acts that are terrorist; or all-embracing, and any organization that has carried out such an act must be called terrorist forever more regardless of its latest activities. Thus, a carefully considered, and universally applied, comprehensive definition of terrorism is urgently required. . . (Sproat 1991: 27)

As David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, and N. T. Anders Strindberg have pointed out, the very use of the word terrorism prejudices and undermines objective and effective research into the phenomenon. “The terrorist discourse is inherently pejorative and hostile toward its research subject . . . entails a normative judgment . . . [and] disposes the researcher to prejudiced views and attitudes.” They call for a holistic approach that studies terrorists as people in their social context and recognizes their widely disparate range of characters, motives, etc. (Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg 2001: 19).

Official definitions

The United Nations General Assembly offered one definition of terrorism that has apparently been deemed serviceable for most purposes:

criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes...whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them (as quoted by Koh 2002: 148)

Despite that UN definition ambiguity remains. For example, the limitation of terror to “criminal acts” seems to rule out acts by governments, which are the authorities who determine when an act is “criminal” and when it is not. A definition used by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a similar limitation in its use of the word “unlawful”:

Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (As quoted by The Terrorism Research Center 2002)

State terrorism

The failure of these definitions to allow for government-sponsored terrorism seems to overlook the most prominent historical use of the term, terror, to describe the coercive policy of the French Revolutionary government in the 1790s. Capitalized, and in historical context, “The Terror” invariably refers to the revolutionary government’s terrorism in the period from March 1793 to July 1794.

The observation that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” frequently can be applied to statements about terrorist actions made by both governments and the mass media. The use of allegedly “terrorist” guerrilla actions by an unjustly oppressed and desperate people with no access to the mass media and no military force to contest their oppression on an open battlefield is not necessarily morally justified, but it is very
different from the daily terror they may be subjected to by a dominant state system.

An obvious example of the ambiguity of definitions of “terror” can be seen in the nuclear “balance of terror” that prevailed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which fits most requirements of the two definitions quoted above, but which most commentators would hesitate to classify with the act of a suicide bomber in a crowded market. What saves the “balance of terror” from being “terrorism,” in the UN’s and FBI’s sense, seems to be that it was sanctioned by the governments involved, and therefore was not “criminal” or “illegal.” Also, the use of state-sponsored nuclear terror remained only a threat during the Cold War. Nevertheless, parallel threats by non-state actors to commit violent acts—as when a threat is made to bomb an airliner, but not carried out—are quite clearly classified as “terrorism” as popularly understood. Is it possible that the UN inserted the word “criminal” in its definition to avoid tarring some of its state members with the same brush as it tarred non-state entities?

Paletz and Vinson distinguish among state terrorism, used against a state’s own people, state-sponsored terrorism, directed against the people of another state, and insurgent terrorism, carried out by non-state entities (1992: 1). Paletz and Boiney recount a debate on television, in 1990, in which a Palestinian representative and U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman clashed over whether Israeli violence against women and children should be defined as terrorism just as much as should armed actions by Palestinians. “Both men, and the institutions they represented, understood the centrality of the definition of terrorism to their debate: It automatically influenced, even determined, their statements, responses, and conclusions” (Paletz and Boiney 1992: 24).

*The erratic search for precision*

Awareness of this problem of ambiguity dates back at least thirty years, but as A. Odasuo Alali and Kelvin Eke pointed out a decade ago, interest in the topic and especially in defining a proper role for the media regarding terrorism has fluctuated. After a high profile terrorist incident the media’s role is at the forefront of everyone’s attention, often accompanied by much journalistic introspection and sometimes breast-beating, but interest then quickly drops off until the next such event. The result, according to Alali and Eke, is lack of sustained research, leaving “a paucity of literature on the subject” (1991a: 2).

The same authors credit Walter Laqueur as being one who traces the history and “grapples with the intricacies of the term terrorism and the label terrorist” (Alali and Eke 1991b: 3, citing Laqueur 1987: 11-12). In his work on political terrorism, Paul Wilkinson distinguished it from three other types of terrorism: criminal, psychic, and war (Alali and Eke 1991b: 4, citing Wilkinson 1974: 17). Wilkinson went on to list three subtypes of political terrorism: “revolutionary,” “sub-revolutionary,” and “repressive.” The first is in support of demands for changes in political structure, the second urges policy changes within existing structures, and the third is carried out by the state or its allies in the interest of maintaining the status quo (Alali and Eke 1991b: 4, citing Wilkinson 1974: 36-40).

Russel F. Farnen feels that terrorism is a “mainly international problem,” and that, since it is international, “the power to name, label, and define terrorism is especially relevant to this discussion, since terror is so distant and beyond the average person’s experience” (Farnen 1990: 103). Whether, if he were writing after September 11, 2001, Farnen would continue to maintain that terror is “distant and beyond the average person’s experience” is uncertain.

Although Andrew Pierre admitted difficulty defining international terrorism, he described it as “acts of violence outside national boundaries, or with clear international repercussions.” Pierre is quoted as adding that “international terrorism is usually by non-state actors” (Alali and Eke 1991b: 4, citing Pierre 1984: 85).

While Wilkinson acknowledges that common usage has distinguished “state terror” from non-state “terrorism,” he adds that “nevertheless we should not lose sight of the fundamental truth that one cannot adequately understand terrorist movements without paying some attention to the effects of the use of force and violence by states” (Wilkinson 1981: 467). His own view is that “terrorism, because it involves taking innocent lives, is never morally justified,” even when a viciously repressed population seemingly has no other recourse (ibid., p. 468).

Definitions used by United States government agencies have varied considerably, and several authors have commented that the variations often are influenced by the sponsorship of the acts, as well as by policies of the defining agencies or those agencies’ “use of resources” (Alali and Eke 1991b: 5-6). Or, as it might be restated more bluntly, “only our enemies can be labeled terrorists, never our friends.”
For the purposes of this issue of *Trends*, the following descriptive definition should be adequate:

*Terrorism is the exercise of violence or the threat of violence against an unarmed and/or unsuspecting population to coerce it to meet the demands of the aggressor.*

In this context, terror usually has as its target a civilian population not a military force, unless the latter has had little or no reason to anticipate hostile action against it. For example, suicide bombers exploding their bombs in a crowded market place would be terrorists, but small boys throwing stones or even gasoline bombs at tanks in a riot would not be, while the tanks, themselves, could easily become instruments of state terrorism. While this definition may not be agreeable to all readers, and certainly not to all the authors of works to be cited below, it establishes a parameter within which a highly fluid topic can be more coherently discussed.

II. Mass Media: Collaborators with Terrorists?

*Recent changes in mass media*

In the course of the last decade revolutionary changes have occurred in the mass media, especially in the news media. These changes have been sketched by Ignacio Ramonet, editor of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, and Professor of communication theory at the Université Denis-Diderot (Paris-VII) (Ramonet 2002). Growing in parallel with increasingly fierce competition and commercial pressures and complicated by the fact that “many top media executives today come from the corporate world, and no longer from the ranks of journalists,” has been the burgeoning dominance of the visual. Television has become the leading news medium, with newspapers only supplementary to TV’s instant, live, emotional coverage. Ramonet feels that “we are at a turning point in the history of information” in which TV news shows “have set up a kind of new equation for news, which can be summed up like this: ‘if the emotion you feel by looking at the pictures on TV news programmes is true, then the news is true.’” This has given rise

. . .to the idea that information—any information—can always be simplified, reduced, converted into mass pictures, and decomposed into a certain number of emotion-segments. All this being based on the very fashionable idea that there exists such a thing as “emotional intelligence.”

“Emotional intelligence”, if it exists, would be the justification for always allowing any news material...to be condensed, simplified, boiled down to a few pictures. To the real detriment of actual analysis, which allegedly bores the audience. (Ramonet 2002)

In Ramonet’s view, “television imposes its own perversions on the other information media, beginning with its fascination with pictures. And the basic idea that only what is visible deserves to be news.” Television thus tends to set the agenda of all news media, focusing all other media on the spectacular events on which TV itself thrives.

Events which produce strong pictures . . . consequently go to the top of the news hierarchy . . . even if, in the absolute, their importance is secondary. The emotional shocks that these pictures produce . . . is altogether on a different scale from that which the other media can bring about . . .” (Ramonet 2002)

*Recent changes in terrorism*

Terrorism has been practiced throughout history, but it has taken on special characteristics in recent decades, largely due to its interaction with the modern mass media, whose recent evolution was described by Ramonet. Brian Jenkins has said flatly that “terrorism is a product of freedom, particularly freedom of the press” (Jenkins 1983: 160, as quoted by Alali and Eke 1991b: 8). Birgitte L. Nacos acknowledged that “Getting the attention of the mass media, the public, and decision makers is the raison d’etre behind modern terrorism’s increasingly shocking violence.” (Nacos 1994: 8). In a 1976 article in *Harpers* magazine, Walter Laqueur said that “the media are the terrorist’s best friends... the terrorists’ act by itself is nothing, publicity is all” (Laqueur 1976: 104, as quoted by Farnen 1990: 105) Although Grant Wardlaw had earlier seen a symbiosis between terrorism and media (1982), he later qualified that, disagreeing with Jenkins by saying
that “there is no clear evidence that publicity (by the media) is responsible for significantly affecting the occurrence of terrorism” (Wardlaw 1989: 78, as quoted by Alali and Eke 1991b: 8-9).

**Terrorism and media: A symbiosis?**

Many authors have agreed more with Jenkins than with Wardlaw. Miquel Rodrigo quotes three prominent modern thinkers, Umberto Eco, Jean Baudrillard, and Marshall McLuhan as positing an intimate causal relationship between the mass media and terrorism, although Rodrigo, himself, holds the opposite view (1991: 27). Government officials have tended to link the media with terrorists’ success or failure, as then-British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher expressed her view, “democracies ‘must find ways to starve the terrorists and hijackers of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend’” (Picard 1991:50, quoting a New York Times article, dated 1985). More recently, Peter C. Kratcoski has wryly commented that, “if one of the elements of terrorism is the wish to obtain publicity for a cause and create propaganda, the media has obviously overreacted in responding to this desire” (Kratcoski 2001: 468).

The French sociologist Michel Wieviorka (1988) denied that terrorism and the media are in a “symbiotic relationship,” arguing that terrorists relate to the media in any of four different ways, from “pure indifference” to media, through “relative indifference,” then to a “media-oriented strategy,” and finally to “coercion of the media” (Wieviorka 1988: 43-45, as cited by Wilkinson 1997). Paul Wilkinson directly challenged Wieviorka’s four grades of the relationship, saying that channels of communication always are used by any terrorist. In the first case, “pure indifference” to any desire to terrorize a population beyond the immediate victim of violence, Wilkinson says that “if there is no aim to instill terror then the violence is not of a terroristic nature.” The “instrumental relationship” between the terrorist and the media, which Wieviorka places only in his third category, is said by Wilkinson to be “intrinsic to the very activity of terrorisation” (Wilkinson 1997).

**Diverse views**

In a sampling of social science publications of the 1970s and 80s, as annotated by Signorielli and Gerbner (1988: 201-219), the following opinions were indicated: Yonah Alexander says that the media provide terrorist groups with useful tools that serve their propaganda and psywar ends (1978). M. Cherif Bassinouni says that the psychological effect of a particular violent act may be considerably more significant than the act itself, and that that effect may be largely a creation of the media (1981). J. Bowyer Bell saw the media-terrorist relationship as symbiotic, with the media coverage spreading the effect of a spatially limited act to a wide public (1978). Ralph E. Dowling characterized terrorism as a rhetorical genre, whose violence gives it access to the media that its perpetrators cannot achieve through ordinary forms of discourse (1986). Walter B. Jaehning says that terrorists recognize that their best route to public recognition is through appealing to traditional news values: drama, conflict and tragedy—as fueled by competition among the media (1978). Patricia R. Palmerton sees the rhetoric of terrorism as in part depending on media coverage for its impact (1983, 1985). Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf discerned certain elements in the Western media that encourage the use of violence and can “to some extent precondition the response of readers to terrorist news” (1982, as annotated by Signorielli and Gerbner 1988, and quoted by Simmons 1991: 24). Bell has said that the key to the success or failure of a terrorist act can be measured by its media coverage. “Once a terror-event is launched before the camera, the drama by definition is a success” (1978: 49, as quoted by Hocking 1992: 87).

Robert G. Picard (1991[1986]) and Miquel Rodrigo (1991) agree more with Wardlaw’s position than with that of Jenkins, both saying that although the mass media form an important part of the environment in which terrorists operate there is no credible scientific evidence that establishes “a cause-effect relationship between media coverage and the spread of terrorism” (Picard 1991[1986]:51). Rodrigo goes further, to say that not only can the mass media not be scientifically shown to be the sole source of the complex phenomenon of terrorism, but that terrorism cannot even be shown to be “fundamentally” an act of communication (1991: 28). He bases this latter position on the grounds that although some terrorist acts clearly are done with the intention of seeking publicity, others are done without that intention, and some are even done in secret (ibid., p. 29).

**Models of the terror/media relationship**

Kevin G. Barnhurst has distinguished two models of the media-terrorism relationship that divide authorities on the topic (Barnhurst 1991). The culpable-media model sees “a causal link with terrorism that calls for regulation.” The media are an intrinsic part of a vicious cycle: “As media cover terrorism, they incite more ter-
torism, which produces more media coverage.” But a second dilemma uncovered by this model involves a cycle of control: If government or the media censor coverage, the controls tend to harm the credibility of the government and/or the media. The terrorists . . . may resort to even greater violence. (Barnhurst 1991: 125)

On the other hand, the vulnerable media model sees the media as only victims, not causes of terrorism:

Any control on coverage, even a natural one, will be ineffective because terrorists can shift to other forms of communication by striking vulnerable points in the infrastructure of liberal societies . . . although the mass media are involved, they present no escape from terrorism. (Barnhurst 1991: 126)

Barnhurst reviews some of the most significant research up to that time, but has to conclude that, although a causal link may exist it cannot be firmly established “without falling into the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy” (Barnhurst 1991: 133).

A “new age” of terror?

Peter Kratcoski believes that the world, at the turn of the twenty-first century, is on the “threshold of a new era in the relationship between terrorism and media reportage,” and bases this view on H. W. Kushner’s stress on the increasing competition among media and on their ability to broadcast live from any part of the world (Kratcoski 2001: 469, citing and quoting Kushner 2000: 2).

Kratcoski goes on to assert that “research has demonstrated a link between media coverage of terrorism events and the creation of traumatic reactions from those who view them.” Viewers not only react in fear of further victimization, but they also undergo “a desensitization . . . to depictions of violence and reduced concern for its victims” (Kratcoski 2001: 469, citing Krafla, Linz, Donnerstein, and Penrod 1997).

Nacos has outlined a “calculus of violence” that distinguishes among different “target types that enter into the terrorists’ objectives.” While domestic terrorists tend to target high-level political, diplomatic, military, or corporate leaders as immediate victims . . . international terrorist spectaculars directed against the United States have mostly affected random victims who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time . . . In most instances the imme-
major U.S. newsmagazines’ reporting on terrorism (1991). Simmons tested three hypotheses:

1. (H1) U.S. newsmagazines will label terrorists with a more negatively perceived term when their acts impact U.S. citizens.
2. (H2) U.S. newsmagazines will label terrorists with a more negatively perceived term when their acts oppose U.S. foreign policy.
3. (H3) There will be a significant positive correlation between the degree of carnage resulting from a terrorist act and the use of a negative label by U.S. newsmagazines. (Simmons 1991: 24).

Statistical analysis of the findings showed support for the first hypothesis, but failed to support the second and third hypotheses (ibid., p. 31). With regard to the second hypothesis, the author concluded that his “study found the media to be admirably fair in their treatment of those groups favoring, opposing, and neutral toward U.S. policy” (p. 33). The findings concerning the third hypothesis led to the conclusion that “Neither the positively perceived nor negatively perceived labels seemed to have a monopoly on any level of carnage” (ibid.).

Although Simmons’ findings gave the three U.S. newsmagazines credit for fair labeling of acts opposed to American foreign policy, American news media have drawn increasing fire since the September eleventh events, both domestically and internationally, for allegedly distorting their coverage of the “war on terrorism” in ways that support U.S. government policies. Tim Franks of the BBC has remarked how the use of patriotic logos by American television networks has been criticized by his BBC colleagues as threatening those networks’ reputation for impartiality (C-Span 2002). Mike Wendland reports on efforts to track instances of retaliation, usually by media management, against reporters who write pieces critical of the government’s anti-terrorism policies (Wendland 2001). One journalist was even fired for simply criticizing President Bush’s lack of visibility in the hours immediately following the attacks, flying as he did to Louisiana and Nebraska before returning to Washington.

A “dismaying” record

After surveying a large number of studies done up to that time, David L. Paletz and John Boiney concluded that, with some exceptions, “the bulk of the literature on the relationship between the media and terrorism is dismaying . . . assumptions abound, terms go undefined, and arguments are untested” (1992: 23). The same two authors called for research that brings into consideration many factors not usually studied, including the highly variable effects of public opinion in different contexts, source reliability, program formats, terrorist goals, and international comparative studies of the characteristics and behavior of both media and government with regard to terrorism (ibid. pp. 24-25).

“During the past two decades the literature associating media with terrorism and implicating media as a contagion of such violence has grown rapidly,” according to Robert D. Picard (1991: 50). He goes on to state:

As one reviews the literature it becomes shockingly clear that not a single study based on accepted social science research methods has established a cause-effect relationship between media coverage and the spread of terrorism. Yet public officials, scholars, editors, reporters, and columnists continually link the two elements and present their relationship as proven. (Picard 1991: 51)

Research-based responses

Media studies scholars are making efforts to remedy the heretofore largely impressionistic and subjective character of writing on this topic. David P. Fan, Hans-Bernd Brosius and Frank Esser, for example, have focused on content analysis methodology by comparing manual and computer coding of stories in two German-language newspapers concerning violent attacks on foreigners as well as counterterrorist, or “anti-xenophobic,” demonstrations in Germany during the period 1990 to 1994 (Fan, Brosius and Esser 2001). A computer method, the InfoTrend program, although developed for English-language material, was found to be as useful for German-language texts as for English (ibid., p. 161). Both hand and machine methods had advantages. “For the hand scoring, the anti-xenophobia information share increased earlier because of the more subtle discussion of the topic that was found by hand but not by the machine using the limited machine parsing criteria” (ibid., p. 160). On the other hand, “the computer method has the advantage that it is unnecessary to decide on all useful categories before coding starts.” For example, the importance of the root word lichterkette in anti-xenophobia text was not recognized “until the InfoTrend count of dictionary words found in the text showed that this word occurred quite frequent-
ly.” Recoding to take this factor into consideration was easy with the computer program (ibid., 161-162).

In contrast to Munich’s Süddeutsche Zeitung, Zurich’s Neue Zürcher Zeitung, was “preoccupied by Swiss attitudes and actions toward foreigners,” and drew on sources other than the Deutsche Presse Agentur news agency. Nevertheless, the two papers’ “coverage of German events was similar,” and the authors see this as “consistent with the concept of pack journalism (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991, pp. 101-104) extending across national boundaries, with the same treatment given to news by both the foreign and domestic press” (Fan, Brosius and Esser 2001: 162).

Drawing heavily on data from public opinion polling and oriented by her earlier work on the interaction between American presidents and the media in times of crisis (Nacos 1990), Brigitte L. Nacos has done a detailed and nuanced study of the interactions between terrorists, governments and the public (1994). She focuses on the United States between the hostage situation at the American embassy in Iran, in the late 1970s, and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, February 26, 1993. A preface, added to the paperback edition, also discusses the Oklahoma City federal building bombing of April 19, 1995, and the “Unabomber” case which came to a head in the summer of 1995 (Nacos 1994 [paperback 1995]: ix-xxvi).

Nacos discerned significant differences between terrorism inside and outside a target country in terms of the effect of media coverage on terrorist goals and the mediating effect of government and elite information sources. “When terrorists hit their enemies at home, they can inflict greater damage but they lose in the battle over media access and predominant perspectives.” The effect on terrorists’ goals of “staging spectaculars outside a target country’s borders,” which “shortcircuit the dominance of government officials and other establishment elites as news sources,” is more complex (1994: 47).

International terrorists, according to Nacos, have three universal goals: to “seek attention by spreading fear and anxiety among their target audiences” and thereby to “demonstrate the impotence of a targeted government . . . to seek recognition of their demands, their grievances, and their causes . . .” and to gain “a degree of respectability and legitimacy in their target societies.” Noting that “several students of terrorism” have charged that the media are central to accomplishing these goals, she offers a research-based critique of that view, saying that “My comprehensive content analyses of terrorism coverage in television and newspapers substantiate some but not all of their intuitive assumptions” (Nacos 1994: 54). As she summarizes her findings:

. . . the media’s reporting of terrorist spectaculars helps to facilitate two of the universal goals of terrorism. Terrorists gain attention when the volume and placement of news coverage affects the public agenda. There is also evidence that thematically framed stories that refer to specific grievances influence public attitudes about the roots of politically motivated violence. (Nacos 1994: 74-75)

Respectability and legitimacy, on the other hand, are “only sporadically achieved by terrorist groups” (ibid. p. 73).

A media “sin of omission”? The social matrix of terrorism

Imbalances in the flow of news and information among nations have been spotlighted by advocates of a “New World Information and Communication Order” (NWICO) since the 1970s. Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf related this issue to insurgent terrorism in their book, Violence as Communication (1982: 175-225). Although recent developments such as computer based communication have brought the technologically less developed and more developed countries into closer contact than they were two decades ago, conditions in the two “worlds” remain so dissimilar that mutual understanding still is difficult. Schmid and de Graaf say that their “basic premise is that insurgent terrorism can be better understood if it is viewed in the first instance as communication rather than as mere violence” (ibid., p. 175). They therefore feel “that this type of terrorism has to be explained in relation to the prevailing information order and the news values that are paramount within this order” (ibid.).

The same authors point out that, while an international “free flow of information” sounds like a principle that cannot be contested on democratic grounds, in practice it gave freedom of communication chiefly to those who controlled the media. Quoting A. J. Liebing, they note that “Freedom of the press is limited to those who own one” (Schmid and de Graaf 1982: 177, citing Mander 1978: 19). Since that control was centered in the West, chiefly under private management in the United States, the international media came to be dominated by western interests and perspectives—and “news values” that pandered to sensationalism and
entertainment—to the exclusion of the interests of poor people in the less technologically developed nations. The serious needs of those nations are generally neglected in the Western media, prompting a violent response which will attract the attention of those media:

We see the genesis of contemporary insurgent terrorism, as it has manifested itself in the Western World since the late 1960s, primarily as the outgrowth of minority strategies to get into the news. (Schmid and de Graaf 1982: 215)

III. Information Sources: A Minefield for the Media

A Pentagon briefing

David Samuels reported on his observations at a Pentagon news briefing in an article in Harper’s Magazine (Samuels 2002). His comments give some insights into the ways the military deals with the media, as well as the ways the media react, in a situation which all recognize contains fundamental conflicts between the basic needs, goals and interests of the two institutions. Samuels faults the journalists for not being aggressive enough in their questioning of the government interpretations of various aspects of the “War against Terrorism.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as a result of long experience in his role under two administrations, has, according to Samuels, developed 154 rules for interacting with various agencies and entities, including the media. He says that “Rumsfeld’s rules” are available to the public on the Pentagon website, defenselink.mil. Samuels formulates an additional rule that seemed to apply to the briefing he attended as,

. . . to manage the expectations of the press, I imagine Rumsfeld thinking, in a style that will meet with the approval of the public and also of those segments of the elite who take their cues from the editorial boards of the New York Times and the Washington Post. The reporters know nothing. They lack imagination. They put the lives of American soldiers in danger. Besides this is not their war. (Samuels 2002: 54)

The author cites then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney (now U.S. vice-president) as having said, during the Gulf War, that “the press has absolutely no capacity to police itself” (p. 58). Samuels also notes a phrase often used in the Pentagon, “the Vietnam Effect,” which implies that the media caused the loss of the Vietnam War (p. 59).

Samuels was struck by a comparison of the War on Terrorism to the Cold War, in Rumsfeld’s opening remarks at the briefing:

The campaign will be waged much like the Cold War, in the sense that it will involve many fronts over a period of time, and will require continuous pressure by a large number of countries around the globe. (Samuels 2002: 55, italics his)

The author faults the assembled journalists, himself included, for not questioning Rumsfeld further about this comparison. “Not a single representative of the press . . . [asked] the Secretary to expand on his invocation of the Cold War” (Samuels 2002: 56). The implication of that invocation could be a recurrence of the specter that has haunted U.S. military planning since at least the Second World War: planning designed to fight the previous war instead of meeting the different demands of the new war.

Media vs. military: Irreconcilable goals

Phillip Knightley, writing from London for The Public i: An Investigative Report of the Center for Public Integrity, recognizes the obvious conflict between the legitimate goals of military leadership, on the one side, and journalists, on the other (Knightly 2002 [2001]). “Governments and their armies go to war to win and do not care how they do it. For them, the media are a menace” (ibid.). Governments usually have the upper hand and easily go beyond the reasonable need to control information that would endanger their own forces. They often must approach this process with subtlety.

In democracies like Britain and Australia, with a powerful press and a tradition of dissent, or like the United States, where freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, the media cannot be coerced into supporting the war. They have to
be seduced or intimidated into self-censorship. (Knightley 2002 [2001]).

Knightly lists civilian casualties, antiwar marches, and the motive of using a pacified Afghanistan as a route for a pipeline to bring Central Asian oil to the sea, as topics studiously avoided by the U.S. and British media. He cites as a symptom of general distrust in both government and media an occasion in 1999, when an American congressional fact-finding mission visited Yugoslavia “because they felt that they could trust neither their own government nor the media to tell them what was really happening there” (ibid.).

Divergent treatments: Europe and America

A panel discussion at American University, Washington, DC, on U.S. and European media coverage of the war on terrorism, broadcast live on C-Span, January 28, 2002, elicited the following comments on U.S. media coverage by panel members drawn mostly from among foreign media correspondents based in Washington: The U.S. tendency to want to portray everything in “black and white” hinders presentation of an accurate understanding of terrorism. On the other hand, American media are more fastidious about attributing sources than are British media, which sometimes are accused of making up quotations from “unnamed official sources.” British and American treatments of news differ, partly because of the more competitive newspaper market in Britain. The American media are more interested in personal, human interest stories, while European media, including those in Britain, prefer to describe the broader picture. Many at the BBC were taken aback by the over symbols of patriotism that appeared on American television after September eleventh, feeling that this reaction hindered impartial coverage, and insisting that similar displays would never be allowed in Britain (C-Span 2002).

European journalists were said to have been irked by CNN’s ability to arrange to have its representatives flown into Kabul by American military helicopter, while the others had to find their way there by land under adverse conditions CNN’s tendency to ritually invoke the loss of life in the September eleventh attacks whenever Afghan civilian casualties were being discussed also was resented. Ironically, the refusal of the U.S. Army to allow individual interviews with soldiers created the paradox that the best-known American combatant in the war to date is John Walker Lindh, captured while fighting for the Taliban. Polls have shown a great decline in the British public’s trust in the media, along with declining trust in other public institutions. The pro-Israeli stance of much of the American media was suggested by a much higher level of skepticism about Yasser Arafat in the American, than in the European media (C-Span 2002).

Alternative news sources

In the prevailing atmosphere of distrust of official sources of information, and impatient with a lack of of information from established sources, journalists often turn to more off-beat sources, many of them based in countries nearer the current scenes of action. An outstanding example of this is the Al Jazeera television station in Qatar, which in the early weeks of the war broadcast the video tapes made by Osama Bin Laden, but which also carried statements by American diplomats. Like every news medium, Al Jazeera has a point of view, which has been described as “a fundamental mindset of Islamic nationalism and anti-Americanism” (Krimsky 2002). On the other hand, Lilli Gruber, of RAI-Uno, commented that Arab media are unhappy with Al Jazeera because it is too independent of a doctrinaire pro-Arab position. She remarked that Al Jazeera personnel are very well-trained journalists, many of them having served previously with the BBC or Voice of America (C-Span 2002).

An Associated Press report (Al-Issawi 2002) quotes Al Jazeera’s Kabul correspondent, Tayscer Allouni, as saying that he “was subjected to intense psychological pressure” in the course of an interview he obtained with Osama bin Laden, was given “a list of questions that were imposed on him,” and “told to air the interview in full or he would be harassed.” Accordingly, Al Jazeera decided not to broadcast the interview “since the circumstances under which it was conducted did not represent the minimum limit of objectivity and professionalism.” CNN obtained the tape and aired parts of it, violating, in Al Jazeera’s view, a prior agreement between the two media organizations (ibid.). The dispute between the two networks is now said to have been resolved, with CNN launching an Arabic-language website and Al Jazeera “testing an English voiceover track for US audiences,” according to Transnational Broadcasting Studies, based at American University in Cairo (TBS 2002).

At the other end of the spectrum of Middle Eastern politics is the DEBKAfile (www.debka.com) based in Jerusalem. Published in both English and Hebrew, it is heavily used by Western media because of its record of delivering news on diplomatic, intelli-
gence and military activities not available elsewhere and frequently anticipating major events. Often, too, it has been accused of failure to check its sources, presenting unfounded rumors as fact. An example of this was a DEBKAfile report in October 2001, that China was, in effect, sending an army to aid the Taliban and thereby stave off the threat of American and Russian influence in Afghanistan. One on-line publication that criticized the DEBKAfile concerning that report also commented on the attribution of its stories to such nebulous authorities as “intelligence sources” and “military sources,” rarely naming names (MAI-not Forum 2001). Although claiming to be independent, “self-financed, has no axe to grind and speaks for no government, group, organ, institution, political party or interest” (DEBKAfile 2002), it has an undisguised pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian policy. An indication of its popularity is its claim of 1,239,000 visitors to its website per week (ibid.).

Similar in sponsorship to DEBKAfile is the International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism, whose board chairman is a former director of the Israeli Intelligence Agency (Mossad) (ICT 2002).

Obviously, sources such as Al Jazeera, DEBKAfile and ICT, like overtly government sources or other sources with a strong ideological, political or even religious commitment, have to be approached and used with great circumspection by journalists who are looking for accurate and ideologically untainted information. Rather than too little information, too much is available from a vast diversity of online, print and broadcast sources. Ignacio Ramonet perceives “an insidious new form of censorship” developing. This “democratic censorship” arises from “the accumulation, saturation, excess and overabundance of information. Somewhat dramatically, he says that

> Newspapers and television networks have a space problem. They are collapsing under an avalanche of data, reports, files . . . which . . . distract them from the essential. Moreover, it encourages them to be lazy, since they do not have to look for information any more. Information comes at them of itself. (Ramonet 2002)

In the present media atmosphere, where the demand for verifiable news on terrorist activities far exceeds the supply and powerful incentives prevail to get a “scoop,” a strong temptation must exist to use everything, no matter how questionable. That atmosphere was characterized by Raymond Cromley, at age ninety-one “by far the oldest living reporter at the Pentagon,” who described the biggest change he had seen in his career in the Pentagon press corps as “Sloppiness” (Samuels 2002: 61).

**Media impact on policy**

The impact of journalistic criticism on government policy may or may not be significant, depending on multiple factors, but a record for fair and balanced reporting can help ensure critics a hearing. George A. Krimsky cites the example of award-winning and personally courageous London *Independent* reporter Robert Fisk, who “seldom avoids taking a venomous swipe at American and Israeli behavior, while dismissing British Prime Minister Tony Blair as a Washington puppet,” implying that Fisk loses potential influence by being too predictable in his analyses. Krimsky quotes Edward S. Walker, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs that, “while it’s important for policymakers to keep their finger on the pulse, predictability is usually a discount factor” (Krimsky 2002).

Robin P. J. M. Gerrits (1992) and Cynthia L. Irvin (1992) have studied research uses of material originating from terrorists themselves, which can shed a different light on the motives of terrorists than usually emerges from media accounts. Gerrits says that researchers agree that “insurgent” terrorists seek publicity, but state terrorists want secrecy. The researchers disagree on the ways and degree to which the insurgent terrorists use and manipulate the media. For some, terrorists depend on media; but others “stress the skilled and professional ways in which terrorists actively . . . manipulate the media” (Gerrits 1992: 30). William Catton, Jr. (1978) is quoted by Gerrits as saying that terrorists’ acts are a form of theater, playing to an audience (Gerrits 1992: 30).

In concluding the discussion of terrorist memoirs, Gerrits says that while “the tactical uses of publicity . . . can turn terrorism into a powerful weapon . . . one should not exaggerate the admittedly large role the media play in terrorist strategy” (1992: 59). This caution is based on the fact that terrorists “do not depend exclusively on radio, television, and newspapers to accomplish their psychological aims” (ibid.). Instead, they spend a great deal of time and energy on other ways of promoting their movements and ideals” (ibid.). Also, “there are significant differences in the degree of ‘professionalism’ with which terrorists handle the instrument of publicity . . . A tradition of political violence, for instance, seems to be important,” a tradition
that accounts for much of the success of the Provisional IRA, in Ireland, according to Gerrits (ibid.).

Irvin has studied information about terrorism derived from media interviews with terrorists and information from organizations such as the IRA (Irish Republican Army), ETA (Basque separatists in Spain), and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), which she prefers to call by the non-pejorative term, insurgents, even though they may sometimes use terrorist methods (Irvin 1992: 64). She notes how interviews with representatives of even the political arms of such organizations are discouraged and their publication prevented by the governments with which they are in conflict. This prior censorship prevents the organizations from presenting their positions to the public and clears the way for public acceptance of unchallenged official versions unfavorable to the organizations, for example accusing the whole insurgent organization of complicity in terrorist acts performed independently by extremist factions. “This paradigm maintains that by giving any coverage to ‘terrorists,’ particularly in a format that allows them to voice their views directly to the public (i.e., live interview), investigators grant them legitimacy and strengthen their position” (ibid.). Reactions from the three organizations mentioned suggest that such government restrictions place the insurgents at a great disadvantage in explaining their legitimate complaints to the public. Mark Blaisse, whose own work has involved seeking interviews from terrorists, faces the issue squarely: “There is no solution to the dilemma some critics feel reporters ought to be in: Is it chivalry or approach the people who throw bombs into school buses? Isn’t news just news?” (Blaisse 1992: 159).

Irvin traces “how both the tactics for obtaining publicity and the type of publicity sought by insurgent organizations change during different stages of the movement” (1992: 76-83). She relates C. U. Larson’s (1973) listing of four stages in the development of any social movement to the “minimum of six possible target audiences for terrorists” as seen by A. P. Schmid (1990):

1. world opinion
2. the national majority that is opposed to the goals of the terrorists
3. the national minority or social class for which the terrorists claim to fight
4. the national government that is the direct opponent of the terrorists
5. rival political movements, both terrorist and nonterrorist

Irvin says that her study of “statements and internal documents from three insurgent nationalist organizations provides empirical support for the claim that insurgent ‘terrorists’ are more likely to view the media as, at best, reluctant allies and, at worst, hostile and powerful enemies” (Irvin 1992: 84). She calls for more empirical insurgent-based research regarding the role of the media in the strategy of insurgent ‘terrorist’ organizations if we are not to fall into the practice of seeing only what we wish to see in this relationship, with the dangerous result of elaborating counterproductive policies based on faulty perceptions. (ibid.)

Summarizing the main tendency of the best empirical work on terrorism and the media, it must be said that while the media are an important element in the considerations of the terrorists they are not the only element nor the only means the terrorists have to get their wishes known to their target audiences. The mass media can play either a positive or negative role, from the terrorists’ perspective, arousing either support or rejection of their efforts. Some terrorists simply let their explosions speak for them, others may prefer not even to be known as their activities function anonymously to disrupt the status quo.

IV. September Eleventh

Research lag

Given the lead-times necessary for both serious research and book publication, little empirically-based publication on the new “war against terrorism” is yet available that fully meets the criteria for scholarly research. Writing in the The Christian Science Monitor, reviewer Jonathan Tepperman commented that the problem of commentators on terrorism in the wake of the September eleventh attacks has become, “there’s too much to wade through (though opinions still tend to vary too little)” (Tepperman 2002).
Opinions of experts

Several books on terrorism in relation to September eleventh were assembled in record time and published while the World Trade Center ruins still smoked. Tepperman, in the course of reviewing one of these, *The Age of Terror*, edited by Yale scholars Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda (2001), expresses greater regard for *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War*, edited by Gideon Rose and James F. Hoge, Jr., both editors of *Foreign Affairs*, where Tepperman is also senior editor (Rose and Hoge 2001). The editors of both these books had the advantage of quick, persuasive access to top authorities in relevant specialties, Talbott and Chanda among their colleagues at Yale University, and Rose and Hoge among the contributors to *Foreign Affairs*. Inevitably the contributors had to draw heavily on their previous store of knowledge and to apply it hastily to a developing situation. Disappointingly, both works are short on references and bibliography, and only Talbott and Chanda’s book has an index.

Unfortunately, too, for our purposes, neither deals very extensively with the role of the mass media. Charles Hill, in the Talbott/Chanda volume, does implicate both journalism and diplomacy in contributing to a pattern of U.S. government behavior that, while retaliating in limited ways to past acts of terrorism ultimately failed to follow through—thereby causing threats of sustained retaliation to lose credibility. He cites the failure to eliminate Saddam Hussein’s control over Iraq as the worst example of this, enabling the latter to reestablish himself “as a formidable presence in the Middle East and as the owner of an increasing array of weapons of mass destruction” (Hill 2001: 88). Hill saw declining interest in international affairs among the American public and a “deterioration in the quality and attention span of press coverage” (p. 89) precisely at a time when the U.S. was becoming increasingly involved in a globalizing world.

The media turned inward, along with the White House, closing overseas bureaus, replacing foreign affairs coverage with personal lifestyle features, growing less interested and less informed year by year. . . . The media failed to report when U.S. foreign policymakers set deadlines but failed to enforce them, made threats but never carried them out, blamed others—such as the United Nations—for American failures, and altered long-established principles for some marginal advantage in domestic politics, steadily losing credibility with both allies and adversaries. (Hill 2001: 88-89)

Diversification in a changing landscape

Niall Ferguson comments on how the diversified and more abundant communication channels available today make it much more difficult for governments to monopolize their people’s sources of information than was true in the past. The same would apply to non-governmental forces.

Even if it were possible to terrorize Americans away from flying, opening their mail and even using the Internet (imagine a devastating computer virus), other channels of global communication would still remain open. (Ferguson 2001: 131-132).

But another form of diversification taking place in the modern world has Ferguson concerned. It includes not only the multiplication of small, independent countries—the total number of countries having risen from 59 on the eve of the First World War to 192 by 1995—but also the growth of religious and ethnic conflicts which threaten to fragment multicultural nation-states. At the same time, supranational organizations, such as the United Nations, designed to provide some sense of international order, are financially weak and often ineffective. Cultural globalization, too, is frequently superficial, and “promotes an accentuation of local identities as a kind of a bloody-minded reaction” (Ferguson 2001: 132-134). He lists a number of reasons why he feels that the only solution to the problems this global fragmentation has spawned, including international terrorism, is the assumption of a more aggressive and “imperial” role in world affairs by the United States, but he wonders if any leaders have the “guts” to move in that direction (p. 141).

Harold Hongju Koh also sees a need to embrace a more aggressive policy of globalization, but he warns against what he sees as a “growing insistence on ‘patriotic correctness’” that would threaten to destroy the openness, tolerance, pluralism and democracy that he regards as precisely the values of American society that the current crop of international terrorists are most intent on destroying (Koh 2001: 168-169).

Non-USA media have been critical of alleged chauvinistic, sycophantic and unbalanced coverage of terrorism-related news by American mass media since September eleventh. George A. Krimsky (2002) and Andrew Stroehlein (2002) have addressed these charges in survey articles. Krimsky acknowledges the
“unprecedented effort by the U.S. media to report every facet of the terrorist attack and its aftermath,” but he credits such non-US media as the BBC, Pakistani journalists, and the independent Qatari TV station, Al Jazeera, which was first to broadcast the videotapes made by Osama bin Laden, with more journalistic objectivity and initiative than most U.S. media have shown (Krimsky 2002).

Stroehlein, a London-based American who founded the award-winning online Central Europe Review, admits that it is not unusual “for patriotic fervor to distort good editorial sense during wartime,” but he feels it is time for U.S. journalists to “get back to doing their jobs independently.” He cites as “one of the most frightening things anyone so senior in news production has ever said” the alleged comment of respected CBS newsman Dan Rather that, “‘George Bush is the President. He makes the decisions and, just as one American, wherever he wants me to line up, just tell me where’” (Stroehlein 2002). In the course of what he calls “the U.S. media’s temporary insanity,” Stroehlein feels “they’ve thrown out their old, reliable moral compass and sense of professional ethics. Everything’s changed, so anything goes” (ibid.).

In an almost violent dissent from the views expressed by Bush and Rather, French writer Jean Baudrillard, while acknowledging that the attack on the World Trade Center was “immoral,” nevertheless sees it as “a symbolic act of defiance . . . in response to globalization, which is itself immoral,” and was represented by the twin towers (Baudrillard 2002: 15). Earlier in the essay, he had juxtaposed the two “immoralities”:

When the world has been so thoroughly monopolized, when power has been so formidably consolidated by the technocratic machine and the dogma of globalization, what means of turning the tables remains besides terrorism? (ibid., p. 14).

But Baudrillard has no solutions to offer, and seems to see the world in a nihilistic spiral of terror and counterterror that intimately involves the media:

Any violence can be forgiven, as long as it is not transmitted by the media (“Terrorism would be nothing without the media.”) But this is all just an illusion. There is no such thing as a good use of the media. The media are part of the event, they’re part of the terror; in one way or another they play along. (Baudrillard 2002: 18)

V. Secrecy: To Tell, or Not to Tell?

A need to conceal; a need to reveal

While recognizing that “secrecy is, of course, often essential for intelligence work and for military planning,” Maxine Singer emphasizes that different conditions prevail in the case of domestic security in a free society (Singer 2001: 204). When possible chemical or biological attacks are at issue, “there is a tremendous advantage to a well-informed public” (ibid.). For example, the many thousands of local officials and other emergency personnel must be prepared to deal with emergencies on site and at short notice. The author notes that chemical companies, for example, may be happy to conceal from their neighbors the dangerous potential of their plants, but that widespread and detailed knowledge about such locations is essential for effective local responses to terrorist attacks as well as to other crises. She faults the U.S. government for removing information about such dangerous sites from websites “to keep the information from would-be terrorists,” and for calming protestors against this policy by insisting that the government was prepared to cope with any contingency. But local officials, especially in dispersed locations, need immediate access to the fullest possible information in order to react effectively to emergencies. Also, people “are much less likely to panic if they know what is going on” (Singer 2001: 205).

The fundamental conflict between a government’s need to protect sensitive information and the mass media’s responsibility to report the news as fully and accurately as possible has been mentioned, above. In the eyes of public opinion, it might be noted, the government is at a disadvantage, since the press has the last word. The government’s awareness of this disadvantage can conduce to “overkill” in efforts to protect sensitive, or not-so-sensitive information. Phillip Knightley quotes an American censor at the height of the Second World War as saying his policy toward the public would be: “I’d tell them nothing till it’s over and then I’d tell them who won” (Knightley 2002 [2001]). As mentioned above, fear of a “Vietnam effect” still
influences the U.S. military’s relations with the media (Samuels 2002: 59). BBC broadcaster Sir Robin Day is quoted by Phillip Knightley as doubting whether a democracy could ever successfully fight another war, given the negative impact television news seemed to have had on the American effort in Vietnam (Knightley 2002 [2001]).

Deception as a weapon

A U.S. Department of Defense official, at a Pentagon briefing on Taliban and Al Qaeda propaganda and disinformation efforts early in the American involvement in the war in Afghanistan, was quoted by Gerry J. Gilmore of the American Forces Information Service as noting that “denying information to an enemy or deceiving an enemy ‘has a long, long history’ in warfare and politics” (Gilmore 2001). The same official went on to say

information denial includes ‘key information about your military forces, leadership, the status of your country, the effect of the adversary’s campaign on your country, its infrastructure,’ the official remarked. Denial techniques range from hiding in caves, as currently seen in Afghanistan, to erecting fake buildings (ibid.)

What the official said about “denying information to an enemy” applies equally to both sides in any armed struggle, in this case to the Pentagon, itself, as well as to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In November 2001, the Pentagon created an Office of Strategic Influence “to aid U.S. efforts to influence countries overseas to help or at least support the war against global terrorism.” But the office came under increasing criticism “since a New York Times report that the office would plant false press releases in foreign media outlets to manipulate public opinion.” The criticism felt that such reports would inevitably be picked up by U.S. media. Since this eventuality “would be entirely contrary to DoD’s [Department of Defense’s] policy on the dissemination of information to the public,” Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld felt that the office’s mission “clearly was so damaged that it’s pretty clear to me that it could not function effectively. So, it’s being closed down,” he said, and went on to deny that disinformation was a DoD activity (Gilmore: 2002).

Maintaining secrecy has become an especially complex challenge at the turn of the century, with the multiplication of online newsletters and other sources of information, rumor and disinformation flooding the World Wide Web. Sifting among all these sources to separate the wheat of truth from the chaff of rumor, unverified reports and outright lies has become a parallel challenge.

A worthwhile byproduct of this may be an increased realization by governments that their own relations with the media must be more open and the information they make available must be accurate; since eventually their own disinformation efforts will be exposed by one or more of these “wildcat” sources.

Media and counterterrorism

Hocking says that “the development of a detailed framework for media ‘cooperation’ or ‘voluntary restraint’ in reporting incidents of terrorism” has become “of crucial importance in contemporary counterterrorism techniques” (1992: 88). Openness, or at least the appearance of openness with the press is increasingly recognized as a desirable policy in government counterterrorist efforts. Sir Robert Mark, who headed the London Metropolitan Police in the early 1970s, is cited by Hocking as showing special sensitivity to this, not only regarding counterterrorism but in all police work.

There were two main strands to Mark’s media strategy: the establishment of direct personal links between higher police officials and media executives, together with the more specific tactic of limiting access to certain information to select journalists . . . through the use of special police press passes. (Hocking 1992: 89)

This approach obviously limited access to selected journalists from established media, to the exclusion of freelancers and fringe media. An effort to transplant Mark’s strategy to Hocking’s home country, Australia, involving special identification cards for selected journalists, met with only limited success. “After several years of operation the police press card system was abandoned in 1985, and replaced by police recognition of the standard Australian Journalists’ Association membership card” (Hocking 1992: 90). Adjustments to meet criticisms and special Australian needs also proved problematic. The government approach that prevailed in 1979, included controversial provisions that “suggested action against media organizations that do not cooperate with government and security guidelines.” Another suggestion distasteful to the media was that “if the media use their own equipment to monitor police and other official communications, the police ‘must have the necessary technical resources and capacity to counter such monitoring’” (Hocking 1992: 93-94).
Brigitte Nacos closed her book (1994: 160-161) with a recommendation that democratically-elected officials in a free society should do all they can to give their people as much information as possible about terrorist threats, then trust them to make the right decisions.

When terrorists strike, the president should use the bully pulpit to explain the terrorist scheme and the pros and cons of various response options at hand. Of course, such an approach will only succeed if the public is convinced that the intention is to educate, not to manipulate or to lie, as has occurred in the past. (Nacos 1994: 161)

Miquel Rodrigo has likened the relationship of the media to terrorism and to the underlying social causes as that of a thermometer to a fever and to the disease of which the fever is only a symptom. The media detect the presence of the fever of terrorism and aid in diagnosing the underlying socio-political disease. “It would be an absurd prescription to break the thermometer” (Rodrigo 1991: 30).

In a speech to a meeting of airport security personnel, in 1987, James E. Lukaszewski, a security and crisis management expert, frankly described challenges to accurate media coverage of terrorist acts that impact business organizations. While critical of newspeople, he recognized their legitimate complaints in trying to achieve accurate coverage of crisis events in general and terrorist events in particular. He told the assembled airport security officials that “75 percent of your media relations problems” could be solved if they did three simple things in responding to reporters’ questions:

* Package your information into little stories with beginnings, middles, and ends.
* Anticipate the kinds of questions you know reporters are going to ask and prepare yourself to respond.
* Eliminate jargon from your answers and talk more about people and in terms people can understand. (Lukaszewski 1987)

Lukaszewski closed his talk with the following recommendation: “The best way to call your tune successfully is to be on-the-record, on-the-table, in the open and as responsive as possible” (ibid.)

VI. Hostages: A Special Problem

A more complex challenge

Direct action by terrorists, such as bombings and assassinations, are relatively straightforward situations compared with hostage-taking and kidnapping, where the officials attempting to resolve the problem are faced not only with the need to apprehend the terrorists but also with the overarching need to protect the lives of the hostages or kidnap victims. The role of the mass media in such cases also is much more sensitive. Among other things, the constant quest for “human interest”—weeping relatives, etc.—may put undue pressure on the negotiators, benefit the terrorists and possibly increase the danger to the victims.

Brigitte L. Nacos devotes considerable attention to the hostage situation at the American embassy in Iran from 1979 to 1981, and especially to the multiplicity of pressures on U.S. presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan as they attempted to deal with the problem. Nacos cites the evolution of the crisis as reflected in fluctuations in public opinion polls—favorable to the President at first, then becoming negative as the crisis stretched out, seemingly with no end in sight (Nacos 1994: 103-112)—and press coverage from diverse sources (ibid., pp. 23-30). She emphasizes the power the terrorists can exercise in such cases:

During hostage incidents like the Iranian crisis, the TWA hijacking, and the long captivity of Americans in Lebanon, international terrorists manage to cut even a superpower down to the size of a roaring mouse—mostly by creating this dilemma of the individual versus national interest. And there is little doubt that news coverage is the principal reason why governments in democratic states have such a hard time making choices that best serve the national interest. By emphasizing the human interest aspects of terrorist events . . . the media tilt their coverage toward the more personal concerns of the victims and their loved ones while at the same time paying less attention to government officials and others who represent the broader interests of the nation as a whole. (Nacos 1994: 125)
Miquel Rodrigo has emphasized the special characteristics of hostage-taking. It lacks a spatial/temporal locus, since it is necessary for the terrorists to keep the hostages hidden from the authorities. The victims, too, do not know where they are, and the length of time they will be held is unknown both to the victims and to the authorities. Rodrigo acknowledges that all terrorist acts may be “spectacular,” but he attributes a special spectacularity to hostage-taking. The degree of spectacle depends on variables such as the identity and personalities of the victims and the degree of danger to which they appear to be subjected. He characterizes terrorist events in general as “centripetal,” in that the terrorists seek out victims who are more central to political or social attention and will therefore attract more attention from government, media and public opinion, and thereby be newsworthy. (Rodrigo 1991: 34-35).

VII. Counterterrorism: Effectiveness and Human Rights

Walking a thin line

The sources quoted above have been selected because they bear on freedom of the press and freedom of information; but terrorism and efforts to counter it also impact on other freedoms and some of the most basic human rights. Furthermore, deprivations of the right to collect, communicate and receive information inevitably affect other freedoms, as well. Panicked and ill-thought-out reactions to terrorist acts can do more damage to legitimate freedoms than they do to the cause of the terrorists.

The need for research

Jerrold M. Post has called for deeper study of the variety of terrorist motivations and psychologies as a prerequisite for developing counterterrorist policies:

In evaluating an antiterrorist policy designed to deter terrorists from their acts of violence, policymakers should consider what makes terrorists tick. In point of fact, much of the policy debate really does not reflect the differentiated understanding we are now developing of terrorist motivation and psychology. (Post 1990: 65)

Post urges a four-fold “long-range strategy,” aimed at “decreasing the lure of terrorism, producing dissension within the groups, reducing external support, and facilitating exit” of individuals from the terrorist organization (Post 1990: 68)

Laura K. Donohue studied the responses of various United States government agencies to terrorist threats during the period 1960-2000. The many branches of government introduced many measures, resulting in a vast and complex tangle of rules, procedures, regulations, surveillance activities, etc., that in themselves posed a growing threat to civil liberties, threatened the rights of minorities, in particular, and tended to annoy other countries, as well as being expensive (Donohue 2001).

Bruce Hoffman has highlighted a tendency among counterterrorist officials, in common with many officials in other agencies, to fail to respond to developments in experts’ understandings of important factors in their areas of responsibility. He is mainly concerned with the potential use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by terrorists. He says that a wide “intellectual chasm” separates “the academic and policymaking communities” over CBRN terror potential, since the academics doubt that such weapons can be employed effectively, but the policymakers stick to a “policy process that is already plowing full steam ahead” (Hoffman 2001: 426). This bifurcation of views may be due in part to alarmist rhetoric and hyperbole employed by both the policymakers and the media in response to an incorrectly perceived danger.

As Russell F. Farnen comments negatively on the presidential report of a government “security and terrorism commission,” in 1990, that ignored the need for research into the fundamental causes of terrorism. “Media have helped to convince taxpayers that they must support the defense budget . . . [but] nowhere in the commission’s 60 recommendations does the report endorse or highlight ideas such as researching the causes of terrorism . . .” (Farnen 1990: 138). In short, the media encourage big-budget defense spending—possibly with pork-barrel benefits for certain legislators—but governments are unwilling to expend much smaller sums on ascertaining more precisely why terrorist events occur and how they might be diverted at the source. Those preventive measures would certainly
include eliminating some of the injustices against which the terrorists are reacting.

**Amnesty challenges Arab counterterrorism**

Amnesty International has reacted to a meeting of Arab Ministers of Interior in Beirut, Lebanon, in late January 2002, at which the ministers reaffirmed “implementation [of] the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism 1998.” Amnesty called “for the convention, which it describes as ‘a serious threat to human rights,’ to be amended to conform with international human rights and humanitarian law” (Amnesty International 2002).

Specific complaints about the Convention cited by Amnesty include “absence of any monitoring requirement, . . . likelihood that measures will be taken in secret,” failure to “conform with the obligations of member states of the Arab League under the UN Charter and international human rights law,” as well as “many other rights and obligations enshrined in human rights and humanitarian law.” Furthermore, the Convention’s “definition of ‘terrorism’. . . is so broad that it lends itself to wide interpretation and abuse,” and other key terms are not defined (Amnesty International 2002).

Other provisions of the Convention “aim to strengthen the ‘media services’ of the security forces,” fail to “require judicial review or prior judicial authorisation when surveillance and monitoring measures are used,” lack “safeguards in relation to surrender of individuals or extradition” or “safeguards for the rights of detainees, including guarantees for the right to be promptly brought before a judge, and to be tried within a reasonable time, or released.” It does not prohibit arbitrary detention, does not have “a clear prohibition of torture,” and has “no provisions to allow for challenging the lawfulness of detention.” It gives the executive wide powers without requiring judicial review. It “widens the scope of the death penalty . . . , could provide impunity for perpetrators of certain crimes, including those that fall clearly under the responsibility of the international community to investigate,” fails to protect the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, and “could lead to arbitrary prohibition of asylum-seekers or refugees from entering or residing in the country...on the pretext that...[they] can be considered to be ‘terrorist elements,’ a term that is not defined.” The Convention’s provision for wide extradition powers could allow individuals to “be returned to countries where they will face serious human rights abuses” (Amnesty International 2002).

**An open media: “the only recourse”**

The relevance of media controls to such threats to human rights is made clear by Jennifer Jane Hocking, citing an analysis by B. Bonanate (1979a, 1979b). Hocking concludes that

in countries that have experienced terrorism, the imposition of stringent security measures (and in particular media controls that would deny independent knowledge of the causal factors precipitating violence) will not only fail to resolve the root causes of terrorism, but will also place formidable obstacles in the path of the “democratization” that Bonanate sees as essential for that resolution—thereby exacerbating the already blocked political structure. . . .

Not only is it not sufficient, therefore, to introduce stricter security controls over the media in response to terrorism, it may well be generating the structural conditions within which the potential for violence is realized. (Hocking 1992: 102)

Robert G. Picard has suggested that “the idea of opening media to alienated and disenfranchised persons and groups as a means of reducing violence seems preferable to nearly any other option for controlling violence, but the chances of the idea being widely accepted are very slim” (Picard 1991: 60). Airing the just grievances of repressed and disenfranchised groups could not only reduce the incentives to violence among them, but also might encourage reforms and greater respect for human rights. But “perspectives that conflict with the government’s views are rarely carried” (ibid., citing Schlesinger, Murdock, & Elliot 1983). Consequently, this most promising means of fighting terrorism through the media is only rarely adopted.
VIII. The Media’s View: What Role Is Appropriate?

The critical imperative

Perhaps it would be well for today’s journalists to apply the words of the Chinese revolutionary author, artist and intellectual Lu Shun [or “Lu Xun”] (b. 1881-d. 1936) to their own situation: “The role of the writer is to criticize.”

The Dutch journalist Mark Blaisse has been especially critical of the structural characteristics of the “free” media that make them susceptible to pressures that distort any attempt they might want to make to speak or write the objective truth. He cites the deterioration of news into mere entertainment, dominated by the profit motive and monopolistic tendencies. “The press is free: If you have the money, you can buy all the newspapers and radio and television stations you want” (Blaisse 1992: 138). He goes on even more harshly:

To a growing extent, media mean money—lots of money. . . . As long as the reporters score, the media are free. As long [as] they get their scoops, reporters are free. . . . There is very little the men and women of the press would not do to “score,” to be “number one,” to get “prime time.” Facts are sometimes distorted, sometimes invented. Enormous risks are often involved, and humiliations. . . . it is all part of the game. . . . The media are free, but it is frequently someone else who writes the rules. . . . The media are free, free to be lured this way and that. Relationships tend to play quite a role in the game. . . . you rarely get something for nothing. . . . The less political power you represent, however indirectly, the “tricker” you will have to be. (Blaisse 1992: 139)

Interviewing terrorists

Blaisse encountered many ethical dilemmas in his efforts to interview Abu Nidal, “the most elusive of all the superterrorists” (Blaisse 1992: 152), in the 1980s. Although he concludes that “there is no solution to the dilemmas some critics feel reporters ought to be in,” with regard to bribes and other questionable practices in their efforts to obtain news, reporters and their media are not the only problems. “. . .Walter Laqueur’s notion that without media coverage there would be no terrorism does seem to ring true. But what about the role played by governments?” (ibid., p. 159).

Moral obligations of reporting

Journalists also have responsibilities regarding the form in which their findings are presented. Blaisse quotes Walter Ruby, New York correspondent of the Jerusalem Post, who felt that “Americans had a distorted picture of Palestinians—and vice versa. It was not the articles about terrorism—and counterterrorism—that were dangerous in themselves, Ruby felt, but simply the tone and style in which they were written” (ibid., p.168). According to Blaisse, the media should be interested in terrorism, but must be allowed to report freely, “as an obstacle to excesses of all kinds. Without truly free media there can be no democracy” (ibid.).

Journalists, editors, broadcasters, and even the publishers of online newsletters clearly have obligations in their reporting of terrorism-related news, obligations that are not only “ethical,” but also moral, since what they report or do not report may make the difference between life or death for thousands of people. Even if no “symbiosis” between terrorists and media can be proven, David L. Paletz and Laura L. Tawney point out that

. . . the media are the central connection in the terrorism-government-public nexus. Which terrorist activities are reported, how prominently, how framed, with what emphases, and whose views predominate—all influence the behavior of terrorists, the reactions and responses of government officials, and the views of the public. The media, moreover, can often become more than chroniclers of terrorists’ actions: They may contribute to or interfere with the resolution of an incident by transmitting terrorists’ communiqués; they may become a party to the negotiations; they may even jeopardize the lives of hostages by broadcasting personal information. (Paletz and Tawney 1992: 105)

A Christian Pacifist View

A book by Lee Griffith, which has the seemingly post-September eleventh title, The War on Terrorism and the Terror of God, but was titled and mostly written a year earlier, presents a radically pacifist, anti-capital-
istic, anti-globalistic argument that, while not addressing the role of the media directly, does critically describe the culture from whose assumptions the media interpret terrorism (Griffith 2002: ix). In Griffith’s view, all violence is wrong, including the retaliatory violence of the American-led “war on terrorism.”

There has been no change whatsoever in the governing illusion that the problem in the world is evil people and that the answer is to eliminate them. On September 14 [2001] at a prayer gathering in the Washington National Cathedral, President Bush asserted, “Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history, but our responsibility to history is already clear to answer those attacks and rid the world of evil.” (Griffith 2002: 271-272)

Griffith goes on to note that certain prior factors...could have motivated the suicidal violence of the attackers—factors which might have included the perception of the U.S. and Israel as condoning and precipitating all sorts of terrorism as long as the victims are Arab, and the perception of the hegemonic military and economic presence of the U.S. in southwest Asia as an insult to Islam. (Griffith 2002: 272)

President Bush’s typification of the targets of the war on terrorism as “evil” is juxtaposed, by Griffith, to similarly “Manichaean” typifications of the U.S. as “the Great Satan” by many in the Middle East (ibid.). On both sides, “there has been no change in the view of some that God is a tribal deity attended by court prophets and palace priests” (ibid., p. 276). But Griffith discerns a “maddening” surprise for those bent on revenge in the Biblical tale of Cain and Abel: “The guilt of Cain is palpable, but God spares him with a mark of protection and a place of refuge (Genesis 4:1-16)” (Griffith 2002: 276-277).

Schmid goes on to caution that editors are always in company with, and in competition with other editors, some possibly with fewer scruples, and might be challenged by reporters whose “scoops” they might not want to publish. In an age of instant communication, time also is a factor, pressing gatekeepers to make instant decisions about the propriety of publishing or broadcasting certain items, decisions that can be influenced more by expediency than by rectitude (ibid.).

**Perspective**

_The media-saturated society_

Possibly the most accurate description of the relationship between the mass media and terrorists is that the media have come to constitute such a major portion of modern culture that most of today’s terrorists have factored them into their tactics in one way or another. This incorporation creates the impression of a symbiosis: that terrorism requires the participation of the media, and that the media, in their turn, rely on terrorist acts to provide much of the sensationalism upon
which the media thrive. This impression fails to take account of the long history of terrorism prior to the development of mass media and of the occurrence of terrorist acts which do not seek, and may even avoid, publicity. One could as easily say that government officials and insurgent terrorists are in some kind of symbiotic relationship, the officials using the terrorist threat in one way or another to strengthen their own hold on power, and the terrorists referring to officials’ wrongdoing to justify their own violent acts. In fact, the interrelationships among media, terrorists and government are extremely complex and multivalent.

Nevertheless, many terrorists do seek publicity and perpetrate their violent acts to gain publicity for their causes or to obtain concessions such as the release of comrades from prison, precisely because the mass media quickly spread awareness of their acts to a wide audience in ways the terrorists alone could not do. The mass media, in general, are so totally addicted to expanding their audiences and thereby their profits that they are tempted to use any and all means of doing so. Sensationalism attracts audiences, so the media are especially vulnerable to manipulation by terrorists who are willing to use violence to publicize their causes. On the other hand, the media can be enemies of the terrorists, carrying counterterrorist propaganda and using criticism and innuendo to discredit the terrorists’ motives and goals as well as their methods. Apart from questions of “symbiosis,” various observers also comment on the “sloppiness” of much journalistic sourcing and research, a fault that opens the media to both errors and manipulation, as well as to the greater fault of failing to explore fully the social and economic situations underlying terrorist events.

Research challenges

Research on terrorist uses of the media is often difficult because the terrorists are usually in hiding and hard for journalists to reach for interviews; and if reached, their responses may be unreliable. Research on the media’s uses of terrorist events is easier, but often is limited to content analysis or analyses of public opinion surveys. Statistical methods for analyzing these sorts of data are constantly being refined and becoming more capable of discerning such details as the types of coverage of different kinds of media, reactions of various audiences, and the development of these and other factors over time. The impact of terrorist acts on society is so broad that a wide range of methodologies, qualitative as well as quantitative, need to be employed to understand them as fully as possible, including rhetorical analyses, ethnographic interviews, psychological studies, etc.

Truth, rhetoric and definitions

Many researchers refer to the “rhetoric of terrorism,” a concern that focuses on how terrorist events are reported to the public rather than on the bare facts of the events themselves. Fundamental to any discussion of terrorism and media is the need to define what is meant by “terrorism.” Not every insurrection is terrorist, and not every state response to insurrection can be absolved from an identification as terrorist if it assaults innocent populations.

Definitions and their implications were discussed at length in the first section, above. Counterterrorist efforts can be corrupted by failure to define “terrorism” precisely, and can even become a source of terror, themselves, if because of their lack of precision they harm innocent parties or stimulate new terrorist responses by alienating different groups. Even if official counterterrorist agencies get it right, the media can continue to spread false understandings among the public by their own careless use of the term. One result of such carelessness can be incitement of inter-ethnic fears, as recently seen in the United States in regard to popular profiling of “Middle Eastern appearing persons.”

Throughout history and into the present, ethnic insurgents and militant nationalists, both terrorist and non-terrorist, often have claimed religious authority for their actions. Religion is usually deeply involved in ethnicity, contributing to people’s sense of both group identity and personal identity. But frequently the religion is misused as a flag to rally co-religionists to causes that, at root, are ethnic and nationalist, not religious. Examples of this are abundant: the Taliban’s use of Islam, the IRA’s use of Catholicism, even the Ku Klux Klan’s use of Protestantism in the United States. Victims and opponents of such movements can easily be drawn into the trap of stereotyping all followers of the religion as followers of the cause—as “terrorists” if the militants are terrorististic. Mass media must use great care to avoid such stereotyping, both because of the damage it does to the innocent followers of the religion and because it makes the militants seem to be operating on behalf of a larger population than they actually represent.

Context, connotation and other subtle characteristics of words describing terrorist or allegedly terrorist acts can create either positive or negative impressions of events not strictly based on the facts. Reporters, editors and commentators need to keep their own ideologies out
of their writing and broadcasting about violent acts or they will be in danger of making a bad situation worse.

Mass media are not all-powerful, but they are omnipresent in contemporary society and contribute to setting agendas. As someone has said: The media “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling [them] what to think about” (Cohen 1963: 13). The responsibility of the media to tell the truth, and the whole truth, consequently remains great, while their difficulty in finding out the whole truth about particular “terrorist” acts—as about other events—becomes increasingly more difficult in an information world saturated by conflicting messages.

References


Adam Center for Television Journalism, American University in Cairo. Received by Communication Research Trends from TBS@aucgypt.edu on 28 February 2002.

Additional Bibliography
Alexander, Yonah, and Michael S. Swetnam (eds.). 1999 and 2001. Cyber Terrorism and Information Warfare. 4


Forthcoming (as of January 2002)  
(Source: *Books In Print*)


**Acknowledgments**

Carlos Arnaldo—Paris  
Marcia Deering—St. Louis  
John Kavanaugh, SJ—St. Louis  
Walter J. Ong, SJ—St. Louis  
Miquel Rodrigo—Barcelona

**Book Reviews**


Sexual abuse of children is a worldwide and age-old evil which has assumed a new dimension with the development of the Internet. Because of the “frontier free” character of the Internet the international character of this crime falls under the mandate of UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. UNESCO assembled an “Expert Meeting on Sexual Abuse of Children, Child Pornography, and Paedophilia on the Internet: An International Challenge,” in 1999, in Paris, to study ways to combat the problem. This book, edited by Carlos A. Arnaldo, former Chief of UNESCO’s Section for Communication Policies and Research, is a result of that meeting.

This volume is organized thematically, based on
the submissions and interventions of the participants, as well as on a limited amount of other relevant material made available to the UNESCO Secretariat. (p. xviii)

Part I, “The Problem and Its Context,” features a section outlining the problem worldwide, the role of non-governmental organizations, and case studies from five countries: Sri Lanka, Philippines, Kenya, Brazil and Albania. A second section attempts a definition of child pornography and pedophilia from the perspective of psychology and the roles of media, associations and research. A third section concentrates on the Internet, the special dangers to children from its use by pornographers and pedophiles, and the need for research.

Part II, “Combating Child Pornography and Paedophilia on the Internet,” first asks, “Where to draw the line,” in terms of rights of privacy, free speech and freedom of information. It then reviews legal aspects and international law enforcement—with case studies from Central America and Hong Kong—and finally asks, in seven chapters, how to deal with the problem.

Part III, “Where do We Go from Here?” includes the texts of the “Declaration” and the “Plan of Action” issued at the conclusion of the meeting, an explanation of the “World Citizens’ Movement to Protect Innocence in Danger,” intended as implementation of the Plan of Action, and an “Epilog: The Child Is a Person,” written by the editor “from the perspective of two years’ endeavour to carry out the recommendations of” the 1999 meeting. He concludes,

The ultimate question is not whether the problem of child abuse can be solved once and for all through meetings or books or the media, or even through law enforcement or medicine: it is one of knowing why child abuse occurs, and whether through continuing research, juridical analysis, medical and psychiatric diagnosis, and even the study of cultural anthropology, we can gain a better grip of the forces that motivate child sex offenders and so learn how to minimize the dangers hovering over the child. (p. 180)


An index is included, as well as a list of abbreviations and notes on contributors.

Further information, including news, topical questions and archives, can be found on the World Wide Web at http://www.InnocenceInDanger.org/.

—William E. Biernatzki, SJ


A product of the Public Religion Project funded by the Pew Charitable Trust, this book presents eight essays that seek to explicate the relationship between public religion and politics in the United States. The essays themselves focus on a case study of evangelicalism, which as a group grew in public and political prominence in the last 30 years. According to Martin E. Marty, writing in the Introduction, “About one-fourth of the American people identify themselves as evangelical or fundamentalist or Pentecostal or conservative Protestant (as in Southern Baptist or Missouri Synod Lutheran)” (p. 3).

Jean Bethke Elshtain situates American religion in her essay, “Religion and American Democracy,” noting that the West has resisted theocracy and consistently differentiated politics and religion. Even though the two are constitutionally separated in the United States, religion still plays an important public and political role. She attempts to sketch this out by careful reading of historical and sociological works as well as of film. Laura R. Olson (“Toward a Contextual Appreciation of Religion and Politics”), like Elshtain, begins with Alexis de Tocqueville’s observations on America and then continues with a review of what political science can tell about the situation. Among other things, she directs attention both to the “culture wars,” which have addressed morality and involved public religion, and to the roles played by denominations and clergy in American politics.

The legal setting for religious liberty is chronicled by John Witte, Jr. in “A Page of History Is Worth a Volume of Logic”: Charting the Legal Pilgrimage of Public Religion.” In it he examines two models of religious liberty: that of Thomas Jefferson and that of John Adams, arguing that the latter prevailed for much of U.S. history until 1940, when the former moved to the forefront of legal interpretation. Former U.S. Senator Paul Simon provides a pragmatic look at the nexus of religion and politics in his chapter (“Politicians,
During FCC consideration of which color TV system should become the US standard, Hennock’s was the sole dissenting vote against the CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) color system, in 1950, and in favor of the RCA (Radio Corporation of America) system as standard. Her position was motivated by the belief that RCA’s “compatible” system would not “disserve more than 7 million set owners,” who would be unable to receive color broadcasts on the CBS system, and also that “the CBS system threatened the possibility of educational television, the creation and development to which Hennock was deeply devoted and which represented her political aspirations” (p. 64). Although the FCC initially adopted the CBS system, the industry rebelled, and the RCA system became the standard in 1953 (ibid.).

Although she backed UHF (ultra high frequency) TV development, with a single-minded view to promoting educational television, Hennock failed to recognize some of the technological flaws in UHF and the policies affecting it. “Unlike educational television, her efforts to salvage UHF failed completely” (p. 92).

Her greatest achievement was the campaign to secure channel reservations for educational television which, in her mind, would accomplish two important goals. First, it would democratize education in the United States by delivering educational material to the entire country via television programming. Second, it would provide a much-needed alternative to network-provided commercialized programming. (p. 152)

After asking President Truman to withdraw her nomination for a federal judgeship, in 1951, which had been opposed by some in Congress, she left the FCC in 1955, married and successfully practiced communications law in Washington, but developed a brain tumor from which she died, in 1960. The author concludes her evaluation of Hennock’s career by saying that “Above all, Hennock continued the political legacy started by women of the New Deal, who demonstrated that they could ably serve in powerful political positions” (p. 157).

An index and list of works cited are included, as well as ample footnotes. —WEB

Chan, Joseph M., and Bryce T. McIntyre (eds.). In Search of Boundaries: Communication, Nation-States and Cultural Identities. (Advances in Communication and Culture series). Westport, CT/London: Ablex,
This book is composed chiefly of papers presented at an invitational colloquium held in Hong Kong in June 1999, to discuss communication across national borders and its impact on cultural identities. A key question asked of the participants was, “How are the cultural boundaries defined and redefined in this age of globalized communication?” (p. vii). Both editors teach in the School of Journalism and Communication at The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

One theme of the book, which becomes increasingly evident as globalization spreads throughout the world, is that local cultures have surprising resilience, reconstituting, reorganizing and reasserting themselves in ways that maintain their distinct identities despite the homogenizing influence of globalization.

The Introduction, by Joseph M. Chan and Bryce McIntyre, treats boundaries as social constructions and notes the special challenges the social sciences face “when established boundaries dissolve” (p. xxiv).

In chapter one, Joseph M. Chan and Eric Ma reinterpreta cultural globalization in terms of a “transcultural perspective,” as an alternative to extreme “liberal” and “critical” perspectives. They consider cultural boundaries as always in flux, indigenizing foreign culture according to “the needs of the receiving culture at a given time” (p. 4). A globalization of “multiple modernities” thus occurs, that “presumes that significant differences still exist between societies that are being transformed by globalization” (p. 7).

Part two consists of five chapters discussing “dissolution of boundaries” through such influences as Mickey Mouse, the international trade in cultural labor, and the electronic and on-line newspaper.

Part three deals, in six chapters, with the reassertion of boundaries through various national answers to the global challenges.

Part four, “Crossing Boundaries,” shows, in three chapters, how in transculturation media organizations “scour the foreign cultural gene pool for inspiration and new materials” (p. 243).


An index and list of contributors are included.

__WEB__
lems faced by Hindi theater, theater news from around India, a Hindi adaptation of the play, “Mother Courage” by Bertolt Brecht, and book reviews.

—Stephen C. Koitharayil, SJ


Jia states that “Chinese face practices lie at the heart of Chinese culture. These practices constitute a systematic grammar of action and a unique way to life, both of which are proving unequal to the challenges of modern instrumental rationality. They must be transformed” (p. xi).

Changes in Chinese, or any, culture impact directly on the self-identity of all the members of the society that possesses that culture. An effort to change a culture therefore should not be undertaken lightly, but “entails an appropriate perspective and method” (*ibid.*). The author therefore believes that “the living Chinese tradition and modern Western culture must be creatively and selectively merged, allowing Chinese culture to emerge as a rejuvenated, open, and flexible culture that is both sustainable and adaptable” (pp. xi-xii). In pursuance of this restructuring, the author insists that “the study of the Chinese concept of face (*lian/mian*) has become urgent” (p. 2).

The theoretical approach adopted in the book is that of “a realist version of social constructionist writings in communication” based on work such as that of Vernon Cronen, James Averill, John Shotter, and others. “This body of theory is significantly informed by American pragmatism” (p. 8). Chapter three is a social reconstruction of *lian/mian*, mapping the concepts’ developmental history. In chapter four, past studies of *lian/mian* are reviewed and subjected to a social constructionist critique. The research methodologies used in this book in “an attempt to formulate a methodological orientation consisting of a continuum of situatedness-historicity-culturality,” are described in chapter five (p. 89). Chapters six and seven are case studies of situations involving face drawn from contemporary Chinese society and analyzed by the methodological approach outlined in chapter five. In chapter eight, the author outlines “a social constructionist model of *lian/mian* transformation,” arguing that “the social constructionist model is a better choice for contemporary Chinese society because of its maximum openness, which allows unlimited and creative two-way communication with other cultures” (p. 165). Chapter nine offers a “theoretical discussion,” noting that “the responsibility of social constructionism is not only to transform modernity into postmodernity,... but also to transform tradition into healthy modernity, in the Chinese context” (p. 178). Chapter ten concludes the book by proposing a way to “begin to remake the Chinese character” (p. 180).

References and subject and author indexes follow.

—WEB


Born in Korea, Dr. Eun Y. Kim became an American citizen and now heads an international management consulting firm in Austin, Texas. The book is designed—as the title suggests—to juxtapose and contrast the dark (Yin) and light (Yang) sides of American culture. The book is divided into two main sections, consisting of brief descriptions of, first, many positive, or Yang, traits of Americans, and second, those on the negative, or Yin, side. The two sections are given equal space. A brief third section suggests how American virtues and vices might be, respectively, harnessed and corrected to correspond with a list of “ten top global virtues” that will help Americans better fulfill their role as citizens of what has become the world’s only superpower.

The positives and negatives are too numerous to even list in their entirety. Some examples from among the twenty-three “Yangs” are “dreaming the impossible,” “seeing everybody as equal,” “competitive spirit,” “releasing human potential,” “volunteerism,” and “generosity.” Among the twenty-seven “Yins” are “insistence on rights,” “refusal to grow up,” “insufficient emphasis on filial piety,” “poor basic education,” “exaggeration and overconfidence,” and “tolerance of violence.”

The ten “global virtues” advocated in the final part include “know your own culture,” “respect the divine,” “remember your responsibilities,” and “invest in human relationships.”

After criticizing both the U.S., for reducing domestic cigarette consumption while vigorously pushing cigarette sales overseas, and governments with
tobacco monopolies, for limiting imports of foreign cigarettes while promoting sales of domestically produced cigarettes, the author has the following advice:

If America wants to be a moral leader, it should hold a higher standard for itself. The ancient Chinese characters for business meant life with meaning. American business leaders should keep this in mind when they seek profits around the world. (p. 202)

Her advice could apply to others, as well, but she is writing for Americans.

There is no index.

—WEB


This book reports on a study of 11,000 children, aged six to sixteen, in eleven European countries and Israel, concerning their “access to, time spent with, uses of, and meaning ascribed to a range of ‘new’ and ‘old’ media” (back cover). “This volume was inspired by parallels between the arrival in the family home of television in the 1950s,” as documented in the studies by Himmelweit, Oppenheim, and Vince, Television and the Child (1958), and by Schramm, Television in the Lives of Our Children (1961), for Britain and America, respectively, and “the present-day arrival of new media” (p. vii). Much is similar, but much has changed in forty years, and it continues to change.

Jay Blumler, in his Foreword, gives some of the book’s contributions as being “a definitive account...of the role of the new media...in the lives, identities, and social relations of young Europeans in the late 1990s,” and as a model both of how to go about “high quality communication research in general” and of what can be learned from such research (pp. xi-xii).

Part I, “Researching Young People and the Changing Media Environment,” consists of two chapters delineating the context of childhood in Europe and the design of the research. Part II, “A Time and Place for New Media,” discusses access and ownership of old and new media in the home, how long and why children use different media, media use styles, and media genres and content preferences. Part III, “Contexts of Youth and Childhood,” has four chapters covering domestic interactions and regulation of media in the home, the privatization of media use, the role of media in peer group relationships, and computers and the Internet in schools. Part IV, “Emerging Themes,” deals with the identities of the new media users, gendered media meanings and uses, young people’s perceptions of global media, and “children and their changing media environment.”

In that final chapter, on the changing media environment, editor Sonia Livingstone notes the difficulty of giving an overview of the study’s findings, especially in view of the cross-cultural differences in the children’s environments, but she feels that some general conclusions are warranted. For example, “within the freedom allowed by nationally specific constraints, we find that children and young people from different countries structure their media use in common ways and according to common meanings.” Thus, the researchers were able to trace the emergence of a transnational media culture that reflects a variety of factors—the strengthening of the youth market, the diversification of leisure opportunities, the growing importance of the home as a privatized leisure space, and the spread of the English language, among others. (p. 331)

Nevertheless, Livingstone cautions against making value judgments or policy interventions based on the study’s findings. Both positive and negative tendencies can be seen in the data. For example, “children may be reading fewer books, certainly in some countries, but gaining skills in information technology” (pp. 331-332).

Appendixes contain country abbreviations, a listing of participating institutions and research teams—including the authors of the various chapters, and the method of measuring time use, with tables of media time use data.

Author and subject indexes are provided.

—WEB


In 1994, California voters passed Proposition 187, which “sought to eliminate public health, welfare,
Mass communication research forms the core of a great deal of communication study. Perry situates this tradition within a larger context, attempting to make it accessible to an audience wider than students intending careers in broadcasting. To this end, he places the development of media theory and research within the history of science and within the philosophical context of pragmatism. (An appendix on this philosophical context provides an understandable and quite helpful introduction to the key issues.)

Though he focuses largely on U.S.-based research, Perry acknowledges the role of European intellectuals in defining or framing the directions of exploration. Each chapter follows a similar pattern: Perry introduces major theories through reporting the research of leading scholars, whose work he organizes either topically (“Psychology, Cognition, and Mass Communication,” “Theories of Media Content”) or in response to basic questions (“Does TV Hinder Academic Achievement in Children?”). While the treatment of each topic remains summary, the listed references allow the interested reader to explore the supporting research in more depth. Each major chapter concludes with a consideration of the consequences of that kind of research.

Three introductory chapters introduce the larger context. Chapter 1 rehearses the history of mass communication research and its changing attitude towards establishing the effects of mass communication. Chapter 2 provides a basic introduction to theory construction, research methods, study design, and some statistical tools. Chapter 3 sketches out various models of the mass communication process, together with their historical background and defining issues.

The next seven chapters form the heart of the book. “Theories of Media Audiences” (Chapter 4) examines what researchers hold about the audience, organizing the material around the uses and gratifications research approach, media system dependency theory, and entertainment theory. Chapter 5 presents the study of media ownership as well as theories of media content. While the former might be expected to affect the latter, Perry also identifies other forces, ranging from the creativity of individual writers to government policy. Within the overall consideration of content, he also examines the “representativeness” of media content and influences on media agenda. In Chapter 6 he turns to “The Cognitive Effects of Mass Communication,” exploring how media affect “mental processes such as attention, knowledge, memory, and
perception” (p. 114). Unlike much other mass communication research, this branch makes explicit connection to psychological theories and constructs. Within its orbit Perry includes a section on learning from the media and the ways in which television, for example, influences academic progress.

Three chapters address the study of the intended effects of mass communication. Chapter 7 looks at “Generally Intended Mass Media Effects: Attitude Change and Persuasion.” A great deal of research, particularly early research into the mass media, examined their ability to persuade people. Studies of propaganda, for example, looked at their persuasiveness after the fact while other studies, often connected with advertising, looked at how to persuade others through the media. Perry further divides these studies into those exploring source effects, message effects, channel effects, and audience effects. In more general terms he presents the Elaboration Likelihood Model, the heuristic-systematic model, and the unimodel as ways of explaining message processing. The chapter also explores the link between attitudes and behavior as well as the way persuasion works upon children. Chapter 8 turns to one particular kind of persuasion: communication campaigns. The research here includes large-scale theories (the diffusion of innovations, the role of the mass media in national development) and more targeted approaches in health communication (anti-smoking campaigns). The third chapter addressing intended effects (Chapter 9) turns to “Mass Communication, Public Opinion, and Civic Engagement.” How do the mass media affect the public as well as the public’s engagement in civil society? Some (especially the early) researchers focused on political opinion while others looked at how the media cultivate social reality. Particular theories stemming from this larger approach include the “spiral of silence,” and agenda setting.

The last major chapter (10) turns to the other side of the coin, asking about the “Unintended Effects of Mass Communication: The Impact of Media Violence and Sex.” These questions dominated a great deal of research, fueled by public concern and often funded by both private and government grants. Perry leads the reader through the history of this research, its key theoretical ideas, and the controversies it has raised among broadcasters, government, and the public. Dividing the chapter by subject matter, he lays out research into media violence first and then media sex.

A brief concluding chapter turns to two broad concerns: the role of the mass media in social change and “the need to address the public’s research agenda.” These provide a fitting summary by situating the mass media between the macro view of social forces on the one side and the micro view of individual citizens on the other.

—PAS


The author, a professor of marketing at Auburn University, is interested in the interaction between marketing and consumers, particularly with regard to questions of ethics. Since neither students nor anyone else except the business schools’ accrediting agency seemed to think that “ethics” was a particularly attractive course title, Rotfeld called his course “misplaced marketing.” His reasoning was that “it seemed intuitively obvious that marketing’s social issues easily fit dictionary definitions of ‘misplaced’ in that a marketing perspective had either been lost or misdirected. Other times, marketing tools were abused” (pp. vii-viii).

Chapter one addresses frequently encountered “myths and legends” about marketing. For example, the excuse, “we are just providing a service that people want” (p. 5), ignores the fact that “not all consumer needs ‘should’ be satisfied” (p. 9). The author explains his course title as follows:

When I coined the term “misplaced marketing,” it was intended to encompass a broad perspective for all the times that marketing could be misplaced because it is misapplied, misused, abused, or simply the focus of social criticism. ... And in many cases, firms might be better off (at least in the public relations sense) if they did not use all the marketing tools at their disposal, since the marketing could readily become the focus of public criticisms or products or services that various activists do not like. (p. 11)

Most of the chapters consist of case studies, examples and parables. They are grouped under four main parts: I. “Sell, Sell, Sell: The Modern Production Orientation of Marketing Companies,” II. “Opportunities Lost: Pitfalls of Arrogant Ignorance,” III. “Problems of Just Satisfying Customer Needs,” and IV. “Explanations and Criticisms by Misplaced
Marketing.” A fifth part, “Concluding Notes,” sums up the book’s thesis:

Unfortunately, the terms of the marketing concept make it seem as if marketing itself makes all modern businesses better oriented toward service to customers. ...This wondrous social value of marketing may be true, at least in part. Yet for many firms and many decisions by businesses, nonprofit organizations, or government agencies, a consumer focus is often lost, ignored, misused, or abused. It is hard to argue for marketing’s benefits to society when its core perspectives are often misplaced. (p. 224)

An index is supplied.


This collection, sponsored by the Asian office of the International Catholic Organization for Cinema (Organisation Catholique Internationale du Cinema) [now merged into an umbrella association of Catholic communication under the name SIGNIS] provides an overview for the study of cinema in Asia. It consists of articles, more or less arranged in concentric circles, addressing cinema in general, Asian cinema, and the cinema of particular countries. Authors include film critics, scholars, and film makers.

The first and most general section asks how the cinema teaches values, examining the process of the construction of meaning. Jacob Srampickal, one of the volume’s editors, sees the cinema as a mirror of social values while Peter Malone, the international president of OCIC and a film critic from Australia, examines the hopes and failures of cinema in teaching family values. He highlights in particular questions of patriarchy, commitment, cohabitation, separation and divorce, single parenting, careerism, rebellion, peer pressure, and sexual abuse as they appear in films. Virgilio Fantuzzi, a Rome-based film educator, provides a theoretical piece on transcendence in film and introduces a number of film makers known for their transcendental style. Jose Palakeel, the dean of studies at Ruhalaya in Central India, argues that audiovisual expression is particularly apt for the construction of meanings and values. Rooting his analysis in Jungian psychology, he notes that the individual constructs meaning and values through association of images, feelings, relationships, and intuitions. The section also includes Pope John Paul II’s World Communication Day message of 1995, the centenary of the cinema.

Because of its general character, this first section proves less helpful than the others in the book. Several of the writers correctly remark that their topics need more space for development. They do, however, raise key issues, particularly regarding the mechanisms through which cinema influences culture and society.

The second section, on Asian cinema, returns to these themes. Gaston Roberge, the founder of Chitrabani in Calcutta, specifically investigates the film as a cultural object and tries to identify how people interact with it in the context of Asian cultures and values. Aruna Vasudev, the editor of Cinemaya, an Asian cinema magazine, argues that even in the face of Hollywood blockbusters an Asian cinema has emerged with an emphasis on “the continuity of certain traditions—the family, the community, honour, emotionalism” (p. 52). He illustrates these themes and concerns with examples of film from Taiwan, the Philippines, Korea, Japan, India, and Iran. The Sri Lankan film critic Tissa Abeyasekara raises a challenge to this view, acknowledging that, while there is cinema in Asia, it may not have developed a specifically Asian aesthetic or idiom. Noting cultural differences across Asia, he admits that Asian cinema does share at least two common elements—a lack of support for the medium and a lack of integration with the rich traditions of the plastic arts across the region.

The book’s third section, consisting of examples and studies from the various countries of Asia, proves the richest by far, particularly for a reader less familiar with Asian cinema. Satish Bahadur, a retired member of the Film and Television Institute of India, contributes a study of the cultural and historical factors that have shaped cinema in India, discussing themes, directors, styles, and audiences. For example, Indian life has made cinema an urban phenomenon, but one rooted in the culture of the village, with city dwellers still clinging to village values. This juxtaposition also helps to explain the side-by-side existence of the Bollywood film and the socially conscious film. Roberge adds another essay here that explores some specific films and their relationship to the Indian family. Rounding out the examination of India is Manjunath Pendakur, a professor of international communication at Northwestern University (USA). His essay on Indian documentary film traces the rise of an independent film...
industry, competing with official government documentary production.

The cinema of other Asian countries receives briefer treatment. Tadao Sato, a Japanese film critic, penetratingly explores Japanese cinema by asking whether there is something “typically Japanese.” His historical overview explains the rise of certain themes and approaches to acting and film making while relating these to the history of Japan in the twentieth century. Lawrence Saldanha, a film educator in Pakistan, surveys a young Pakistani industry, noting its mixed fortunes in the face of shifting government regulation. Nicasio Cruz, a film critic, traces the rise in Filipino cinema of the action spectacle and the teen heart-throb movie. Both connect to the immense popularity (and political success) of movie stars in Filipino culture. James Reuter, a film educator on the staff of the Catholic Church communication office, asks whether there is place for God in the midst of such spectacle and vulgar romance films. Finally, William Biernatzki, the editor of Communication Research Trends, and Taewon Suh, a university lecturer, provide an overview of cinema in the Republic of Korea. They look both at the state of the industry (affected by government quotas, censorship, and the threat of piracy) and at the development of a Korean aesthetic.

The editors close the volume with reprinted “testimonies” from two great Indian directors: Satyajit Ray (“Why Do I Make Films?”) and Shyam Benegal (“Values Are of Primary Importance to Me”).

—PAS


Writing a history of American broadcasting, never an easy task given the many technological, economic, political and cultural developments that shaped the medium, has become even harder. As globalized trade in television and radio formats and programs accelerates, it becomes less clear where American broadcasting begins and ends. Technological borders blur as well in an era of digital convergence of all media, as television and radio are delivered via a bewildering array of systems and channels. Corporate concentration in the industry drives cross-media promotions and development of content that can play as well on the silver screen, the small screen or the computer screen. Thus, what is uniquely broadcasting has also grown murkier.

In their third edition of Stay Tuned, long the most helpful and comprehensive single-volume history of broadcasting available, Christopher Sterling (professor at George Washington University) and John Michael Kittross (academic consultant and editor of Media Ethics magazine) bring readers up to date on the major trends and developments since their last edition in 1990. The industry’s moves toward digitization, concentration, deregulation, deepening commercialization, and specialized programming for a fragmenting mass audience all figure prominently in a new chapter that covers trends from 1988 to the present.

A final chapter, entitled “Lessons from the Past for the Future,” has been entirely rewritten to focus on how history can inform our thinking about current debates over broadcasting’s regulation, economic organization and social impacts. The authors draw historical principles relevant to today’s struggles to introduce high-definition television (HDTV) and the integration of older broadcast technologies with computers. They note that successful inventions depend on ample financing and marketing, an ability to shape favorable law and policy, and a good deal of luck. They remind us that for consumers to adopt new technologies, as in the shift from black-and-white to color TV in the past or from analogue to digital television today, it takes time, reasonably priced equipment and an incentive in the form of new or better programming. The authors observe that:

Only when the government intervenes on the side of innovation, or a company decides not to exploit a patent position, or the rest of the industry gangs up on a leader, or a new idea (such as television itself, VCRs and the Internet) catches the public’s fancy, does the field open up” (p. 691).

Even then, they note, a dominant player such as Microsoft can sometimes stifle innovation.

The final chapter also sketches out debates over our media future. Can broadcasting’s mission to serve the public interest be clarified and honored at a time when regulators and the industry seem to be abandoning this goal in favor of competition and profit-making? Can local programming survive the increase in chain ownership of stations, conglomerate control of the media by distant owners, and competition from satellite and Internet programming? Can public broadcasting clarify its mission and secure stable funding
without becoming indistinguishable from commercial networks? Will the age of narrowcasting bring more original, varied entertainment and serious news, or more imitative situation comedies, cheap game shows, and newscasters cross-dressing as entertainers? How will the new media environment affect the audience’s experience and social impacts of broadcasting? The authors consider these and other questions.

The third edition, some 270 pages longer than the second, retains its predecessor’s breadth of scope, presenting the many aspects of broadcast history chronologically in clearly periodized chapters. The book begins with a chapter on the social, economic and technological context from which early radio sprang. Further chapters recount the prehistory of broadcasting, when radio was used primarily to supplement the telegraph for point-to-point communication; the beginnings of broadcasting in the early 1920s; the rise to power of commercially-supported networks in the late 1920s; radio’s “golden age” of programming in the 1930s; broadcasting during World War II; the postwar growth of AM, FM and television; television’s ascension in the 1950s; the mutual adjustments of radio and television industries, regulators and audiences in the 1960s and early 1970s; the growth of competing technologies and channels in the 1980s; convergence and concentration in the 1990s. Throughout, the authors weave together economic, technical and regulatory developments with accounts of changing programming styles and audiences.

The book is richly illustrated with graphics and photos, and punctuated by boxed features that give fuller treatment to particularly important individuals, events, laws, and technical devices. There is an alternate table of contents organized by topic and a long index, organized by author and subject. An ample bibliography as well as a list of web sites, museums, libraries and archives point readers to sources for further research. Other appendices include a chronology of American broadcasting, a glossary, and a collection of historical statistics on the medium.

—Chad Raphael
Santa Clara University


The authors say, “This book grew out of our own search for a culture-sensitive text to teach intercultural conflict at the undergraduate level. ... Unfortunately, ... we came up short” (p. ix). The present book is intended “for individuals who would like to better understand the intercultural conflict process” (p. x).

Chapter one emphasizes the need for a systems approach to bring into consideration all relevant factors in the conflict situation, paying "attention to the interconnectedness of the cultural level, individual level, situational and relationship level, and the process and outcome level of intercultural conflict management," and "the interconnected use of conflict management tools..." (p. 25).

In chapter two, the authors develop “a culture-based situational model.” Chapter three is concerned with “intercultural-intimate conflict in personal relationships,” such as intercultural dating or marriage. Chapter four deals with “intercultural conflict in diverse work groups.” Chapter five discusses “intercultural conflict between managers and employees in organizations.” Chapter six “highlights some of the skills that all of us can practice in managing everyday culture-based intimate conflicts, group conflicts, and organizational conflicts” (p. 173). The authors define intercultural conflict competence as “a process of integrating knowledge, mindfulness, and constructive conflict skills” and applying them “ethically in a diverse range of intercultural situations” (ibid.).

An appendix presents approaches to statistically measuring face concerns and facework behaviors on a wide range of cross-cultural face concerns and facework styles in four national cultures.

A list of references and an index are provided.

—WEB


Extraordinary claims have been made about how the new communications technologies will transform our personal lives, cure social ills, and bring about a new world order. Warnick’s book focuses on this tacit utopian vision underlying discourse about the Internet. Her purpose is to examine the persuasive strategies used in discourse about the Internet in order to recognize how advocates of these utopian visions use narratives, myths, forms of language, and visual images to
make their visions plausible and evoke the public’s largely uncritical assent. In particular she wants to make clear what ideologies are at work and whose interests (technology elitists) are being served by this utopian discourse. Only by achieving what she calls “critical literacy” regarding the new media, will we be able to promote technology policy that truly contributes to the common good.

Warnick begins her book with an introduction sketching the broad outlines of the utopian vision underlying Internet discourse. She raises the question: “Why is it that protechnology discourse seems to find a ready audience, cells of enthusiastic supporters, and so little sustained opposition in the public sphere?” (p. 3) One rhetorical factor she identifies is the tendency for Internet boosters to address their audience as true believers who already subscribe to the assumptions underlying their discourse. A second factor is the seductive promise that technology will foster sustained economic and social progress. Other rhetorical factors include how the technology elite have been successful in shaping the patterns of metaphors used in discourse about technology that humanize technology and lead the public to regard technology as basically benign and always improving.

Warnick is concerned that the public has a tendency to accept unquestioningly the protechnology vision of technology elitists in such a way that the beliefs and values embedded within this discourse are not subject to critical examination and productive public discussion. Her solution is to promote “critical literacy.” Her book then becomes one example of how that literacy might be applied to Internet discourse. She defines critical literacy as broader and deeper than alphabetic or media literacy. Critical literacy “refers to the ability to stand back from texts and view them critically as circulating within a larger social and textual context” (p. 6).

The rest of the book applies this critical framework to two issues connected with the Internet. The first is the problem of what Warnick calls “the conspiracy of silence” on the part of the media (particularly protechnology media such as Wired magazine) to suppress or ignore the dangers that new technologies pose. Warnick analyzes coverage patterns in protechnology media to show that the tendency is toward epidetic rather than deliberative discourse where key values and beliefs are uncritically reinforced rather than critically analyzed. “It is not in the interest of Wired, the technological elite, the corporations who invest in technology, or members of the academy who do research in these areas to raise serious questions about whether such research and development ought to proceed,” she writes (p. 60). Therefore, it becomes all the more important that media and the public in general not be uncritical disseminators of the protechnology ideology fostered by the technology elite.

The second issue raised by Warnick is the effect of the Internet on women. Warnick writes that she was initially drawn to study the rhetoric used by technology boosters because the Internet started out as a very gendered environment in that most early users were men. Warnick notes that protechnology discourse has had effects on women. One effect has been the discourse exhorting women to make use of the new technologies. In her rhetorical analysis, Warnick argues that the ideology underlying the invitation tended to masculinize the feminine. “It constructed an ‘ideal’ type of woman—one who was career-oriented, opportunistic, and prepared to take risks and try new things” (p. 86). By praising tech-savvy lifestyles and criticizing women who had other priorities, this discourse ironically disinvited the very audiences it was intended to welcome. At the same time, she notes that as the Internet has become more diversified, new opportunities for women to be involved in the kinds of discourse that met their needs and interests has all but erased the Internet gender divide.

Warnick concludes by noting that the protechnology elite has an enormous rhetorical advantage in the battle to shape public debate about technology because the technology elite has a narrative (limitless technology progress) that captures the public imagination. Critics of the protechnology elite lack a comparable counternarrative that captures the public imagination. Until such a narrative is developed, technology policy will largely be shaped by the libertarian optimism of the technology elite.

—Richard W. Cain
Wheeling Jesuit University


and

West, Mark D. (ed.). Applications of Computer Content Analysis (Progress in Communication Research Trends)
These two volumes, continuing the Progress in Communication Sciences series, are intended to advance theoretical and methodological understandings in the use of computers in content analysis.

The first book’s ten chapters, by fifteen authors, are half devoted to theory, beginning with an introduction, “In Praise of Dumb Clerks: Computer-Assisted Content Analysis,” by Robert L. Stevenson, suggests how “new data sources and new techniques of analysis are changing this time-honored staple of the communication researcher’s tool kit,” to make content-analysis easier and able to deal with a broader range of research questions (p. 3). Donald L. Diefenbach then describes “Historical Foundations of Computer-Assisted Content Analysis” (pp. 13-41). The following two chapters address the redevelopment of diction in content analysis, and frame mapping as “a quantitative method for investigating issues in the public sphere” (p. 61), while chapter five, by the editor and Linda K. Fuller, works “toward a typology and theoretical grounding for computer content analysis” (p. 77). The three chapters of Part II focus on method, with Alf Linderman addressing “computer content analysis and manual coding techniques: a comparative analysis,” Donald G. McTavish offering a computer content analysis approach to “pre-assessment of scale reliability,” and Janyce M. Wiebe and Rebecca F. Bruce discussing “probabilistic classifiers for tracking points of view.” Chapter nine, by Herbert J. Walberg, Gretchen W. Arian, Susan J. Paik, and John Miller, deals with “new methods of content analysis in education, evaluation, and psychology.” In the final chapter, the editor contemplates “the future of computer content analysis: trends, unexplored lands, and speculation.”

The second book is much more devoted to practical applications, and is intended to help readers apply computer content analysis techniques in their own studies by providing examples of studies done in a range of disciplines—political, science, natural resource management, mass communication, marketing, and education, among others. Some topics dealt with in the book’s ten chapters are “quantitative analysis of answers to open-ended questions,” “building world view(s) with Profiler +,” “intersubjective semantic meaning emergent in a work group” as revealed by content analysis of voice mail, “using the computer to identify unknown authors,” “using neural networks to assess corporate image,” a time-series analysis of gender language and gender gaps in the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign, “analysis of pharmacist-patient interactions using the theme machine document-clustering system,” “monitoring the social environment using computer content analysis of online news media texts,” and “media monitoring using CETA [Computer-Aided Evaluative Text Analysis]” on stock exchange launches. Chapter 9, “Computer and Human Coding of German Text on Attacks on Foreigners,” was discussed in the main review article of this issue of Trends (see above, section II).

Both books are supplied with indexes and brief notes identifying the authors, as well as ample references following each chapter.

—WEB

Journals Received


The topic of this issue of the newsletter is “Principles for the Ethical Conduct of Lobbying.” It also contains a contact list of the Twomey Center’s resources and projects.


Wong, James. “Here’s Looking at You: Reality TV, Big Brother, and Foucault.” (Pp. 489-501). This essay argues against linking of reality TV to Foucault’s use of the panopticon metaphor.

interrelationships between the Canadian sound recording industry, broadcasting community, cultural-policy practitioners, and the CRTC, which influenced the application process for MuchMusic...” It argues that a convergence of interests led to the station’s debut.


The journal also includes a research brief and book reviews.

*Cultures and Faith.* (2001) Vol. 9(4). Pp. 257-352. Published by the Pontificium Consilium de Cultura [Pontifical Council on Culture], Vatican City (as *Culture e Fede, Cultures et Foi, Cultures and Faith*, *Culturas y Fe*).

The issue consists of four chief sections: Documentation, Studies, Symposia, and Miscellanea, along with brief notices and book reviews. The documentation section includes material from Pope John Paul II on the relationship between science and faith, on pluralism, on the evangelization of culture, on cultural dialogue, and on various topics from his trip to Kazakhstan in 2001. Also recorded is a statement from the bishops of southern Mexico on the rights and cultures of indigenous peoples and the intervention of the Vatican representative to the United Nations General Assembly on dialogue among cultures.

The studies include papers by Cardinal Paul Poupard on the dialogue between faith and culture (presented as the opening address at the Irish Centre for Faith and Culture’s symposium on “Measuring Society: Discerning Values and Belief”), by Father Laurent Mazas on the notion of a European identity, and by several authors on Matteo Ricci and inculturation in 17th-century China (all part of a conference at the Gregorian University). The symposia section carries reports of various meetings; of particular interest to readers of *Trends* would be that on the conference on cinema for peace (24-28 September 2001, in Cartagena, Colombia).

Other reports of interest include the decision of the Episcopal Conference of Ecuador to begin negotiations to acquire a television channel, a statement on Internet privacy, the prize for documentary film at the Biarritz International Film Festival awarded to the Brazilian film *Onde a terra acaba*, a UNESCO-commissioned study cinema a globalization conducted by OCIC (the Catholic film organization), a church-sponsored television network in Panama for Central America, and a presentation by Carlo Buzzetti on the Bible and film.

*IDATE News.* No. 31(4th quarter, 2001), 1-12. Published by Institut de l’audiovisuel et des communications en Europe (Montpellier), www.idate.fr.

This newsletter examines consolidation and competition in telecommunications, the mobile Internet, and European broadband markets.


This newsletter provides newsbriefs, comment, and book reviews of interest to the Catholic Biblical Association and others interested in biblical studies.


This issue takes the theme of mass media and democratization in Asia and Eastern Europe.

Sparks, Colin. “Empowering Women and Men Through Participatory Media Structures” (pp. 3-6).

Downing, John D. H. “Issues for Media Theory in Russia’s Transition from Dictatorship” (pp. 7-12).


Hong, Junhao. “The Role of Media in China’s Democratization” (pp. 18-22).

Yoon, Sunny. “Democratisation and Restructuring the Media Industry in South Korea” (pp. 23-27).

Gross, Peter. “Media and Political Society in Eastern Europe” (pp. 28-32).


Chan, Joseph Man. “Media, Democracy and Globalisation: A Comparative Perspective” (pp. 39-44).

The issue also includes regular features of film reviews, memorials, and a forum. The forum topic this issue address media and Afghanistan.

*Mediaforum.* (2002/1), 1-12. Published by Cameco (Catholic Media Council), Aachen.
This newsletter features brief reports on documentary film making in the Balkans, Catholic television in Africa, the “Lifeline” project in Zimbabwe, the approaching UN World Summit on the Information Society (Geneva, 2003), and the children’s program, Nashe Maalo in Macedonia.


This issue, whose theme is computer-mediated communication and long-distance relationships, features articles by Annette Ramelsberger (“Dennsie wussten nicht, was sie tun sollten”), Christina Schachtner (“Ich bin verbunden, also existiere ich”), Antje Ebersbach (“Bist Du eigentlich Single?”), and Myriam Reimer (“See You im Cyberspace”).


Myagmar, Munkhmandakh and Paul Erik Nielsen. “The Mongolian Media Landscape in Transition: A Cultural Clash between Global, National, Local, and ‘no Nomads’ Media.” (Pp. 3-13). The authors provide an overview of the media situation in Mongolia, situating it historically and legally (particularly since independence and the 1998 Media Law). Examining newspapers, magazines, radio, and television, they discuss financial aspects, censorship, journalistic standards, democracy, and cultural identity, along with the inevitable clash between local, national, and global media. Social and cultural issues take on great importance in the light of the newness of the country and the long nomadic traditions of its people.


Boréus, Kristina. “Discursive Discrimination and Its Expressions” (Pp. 31-37). The study investigates expressions of discrimination, particularly in state or parliamentary discourse from the 1930’s, paying attention to the concept of “othering” as it was applied to the physically or intellectually handicapped, prostitutes, and immigrants. This discourse analysis model reveals how society deals with those it wishes to bracket as different from the mainstream.

Väliverron, Esa. “Popularisers, Interpreters, Advocates, Managers and Critics: Framing Science and Scientists in the Media.” (Pp. 39-47). This study of science journalism (based on a study of reporting on acid rain) presents a systematic analysis of the different roles that media discourse assigns to scientists.

Gjedde, Lisa & Ingemann, Bruno. “In the Beginning Was the Experience: The Experimental Reception Studies.” (Pp. 49-60). This essay presents an overview of experimental reception studies, contrasting them to the dominant qualitative reception studies based on informant interviews. These studies often consist of showing different versions of the same message to groups, including a control group. The article provides a description and a conceptual model.


Michalski, Hans-Jürgen. “O mercado mais livre do mundo: a ‘Deutschte Telekom AG’ e as telecomunicações na Alemanha.” (Pp. 9-41). This study examines the post-deregulation market for German telecommunications services.

Bolaño, César & Fernanda Massae. “A situação
das telecomunicações no Brasil ao final do processo de privatização. (Pp. 43-55). This article provides an overview of the telecommunications sector in Brazil, particular in the light of deregulation.

Cruz Brittos, Valério. “As Organizações Globo e a reordenação das comunicações.” (Pp. 57-76). This essay examines the Globo Organization’s communication strategies in the new market situation in Brazil.

Marques de Melo, José. “Costa Rego, o primeiro catedrático de jornalismo do Brasil.” (Pp. 79-117). This article, part of a history of journalism education in Brazil, profiles a pioneer educator, Costa Rego.

Martins Couceiro de Lima, Solange, Maria Lourdes Motter, & Maria Ataide Malcher. “A telenovela e o Brasil: relatos de uma experiência acadêmica.” (Pp. 118-136). This report presents the work of a research center on telenovelas and of a particular project on the role of telenovelas in Brazil.

The journal also contains interviews, commentaries, and book reviews.


The December 2000 issue of Spiritus has the theme of “Communication media: a revolution?” and publishes 12 essays on the topic from general overviews to reviews of particular projects. Authors include Jean-Pierre Caloz, Clotilde Lee, Monique Hébrard, Alain Agboton, Kalai Keviri College, Achille Kouawo, Pierre Saulnier, Pietro Pisarra, Gabriel Nissim, Claude Tassin, and Telmo Meirone.


A theme issue on global studies and media education, this issue presents teaching units and study guides for examining globalization in media ownership and studying the events of September eleventh. It also features a teachers’ exchange forum on global perspectives on media literacy and education.


This media education report on people and media features articles on pedagogical concepts for a humane media society (“Mensch & Medien: Pädagogische Konzepte für eine humane Mediengesellschaft”). Each of its five sections examines a different aspect of contemporary media education, with a continuing focus on new media and computers.